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Abstract 
 
This thesis is primarily concerned with how and why policy entrepreneurs succeed in 
promoting their ideas or policy proposals. In examining this, the thesis uses the case of 
Indonesia’s foreign and domestic policies regarding the protection of its own migrant workers 
who work abroad, particularly with the ratification of the 1990 United Nations Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW). 
There are three central questions that this thesis examines: (1) To what extent were the policy 
entrepreneurs important in shaping or playing roles in Indonesia’s foreign policy regarding the 
protection of its migrant workers and who were the main policy entrepreneurs?; (2) How did 
these policy entrepreneurs attempt to ensure that their policy proposals were adopted or their 
ideas heard?; and (3) Why were the policy entrepreneurs successful in promoting their ideas? 
The thesis argues that the protection of Indonesian migrant workers has become a 
pressing issue in the context of nation’s foreign and domestic policies. This can be seen from 
the decision of Indonesia’s Kementerian Luar Negeri (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in 2002 to 
establish a special directorate to address the issue, namely the Directorate for the Protection of 
Indonesian Citizens and Legal Agencies. Nonetheless, despite the establishment of this 
directorate, protection from this institution was still viewed as relatively poor since there were 
still numerous high-profile cases involving Indonesian migrant workers in cases related to 
torture and even some resulting in death. Recent policies developments, spurred by increasing 
democratisation, can be viewed as an improvement. This is demonstrated by Indonesia’s 
decision to ratify the CMW in 2012. With regard to this important decision, my empirical 
analysis showed that there were at least two categories of policy entrepreneurs that played 
important roles in influencing the decision: key figures operating within the important civil 
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society organisations who worked under the umbrella movement People’s Alliance for the 
Ratification of 1990 Convention (ARRAK 90) and several elected members of the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR – Indonesia’s House of Representatives). 
Overall, the thesis argues that policy entrepreneurs were successful if: (1) they 
advocated cogent policy proposals; (2) these proposals were based on normative principles; 
and (3) they promoted their ideas with persistence. Each of these three factors is examined in 
the case studies. In testing the notion of persistence, the thesis measures activities such as: 
conducting a series of demonstrations; writing papers; and holding lobbying luncheons or 
dinners. 
The thesis concludes that there were two success factors that brought Indonesia’s 
foreign policy shift from non-ratification to ratification: coalition-building and advocacy 
persistence. In coalition-building, policy entrepreneurs believed that the emergence of ARRAK 
90 significantly transformed the policy context. Working in coalition, policy entrepreneurs 
undertook continuous activities in terms of substantive work, demonstrations, and lobbying. 
As the policy context changed and window of opportunity presented themselves, policy 
entrepreneurs demonstrated enormous persistence in presenting their ideas. In this context, the 
policy entrepreneurs continuously pushed their demands, writing to influence public opinion, 
conducting various demonstrations for the purpose of raising public awareness, seizing 
government attention, and being persistent in demanding the adoption of their proposals. All 
these factors, particularly coalition-building and persistence, answer the primary questions of 
this thesis: to what extent were policy entrepreneurs important in policy change, how did they 
achieve change, and why were policy entrepreneurs successful in promoting their policy 
proposals? 
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Introduction 
 
A Tragic Catalyst 
On 18 June 2011 an Indonesian migrant worker, Ruyati binti Satubi, was beheaded in Saudi 
Arabia after murdering her employer. This case is significant for several reasons, not least the 
national outcry within Indonesia and the government’s swift retribution through establishing a 
moratorium on the sending of migrant workers. Ruyati was a 54 years old migrant worker who 
had worked in Saudi Arabia twice: five years in Madinah and six years in Abha. Before leaving 
for her third trip to Saudi Arabia, Ruyati’s family attempted to dissuade her from the plan due 
to her age. “You should just stay at home, Mom, take some rest. Let your children earn a 
living,” said Evi, Ruyati’s second daughter (Viva News 2011a). Nonetheless, due to pressure 
from the employment company she was registered with, PT. Dasa Graha Utama, Ruyati 
persisted with her plan even though she had to falsify her date of birth, from the original 7 July 
1957 to 12 July 1968 (Ruang Hati 2011). Ruyati then worked for the family of Mr. Omar 
Halwani in Mecca. She had been working with them as a domestic maid for one year and four 
months when tragedy struck. 
On 14 January 2010, Warni, Ruyati’s friend in Saudi Arabia called Ruyati’s family in 
Bekasi, West Java, Indonesia, saying that Ruyati had murdered her 64 year old employer, Ms. 
Khairiyah binti Hamid. Later in court, Ruyati confessed she had murdered Khairiyah due to 
physical abuse and the prolonged harsh treatment she used to receive from her (Detiknews 
2011, Tribunnews 2011). Prior to the murder, Ruyati made plans to run away, however this 
proved impossible as the house was always tightly locked. Then, on 12 January 2010, after a 
huge fight as her request to return to Indonesia was again rejected, she stabbed her employer 
several times with a knife (Detiknews 2011, Viva News 2011a). Ruyati was then brought to the 
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Saudi Supreme Court where she confessed to the murder. As the justice system in the country 
applies Qisas (the law of retaliation), the Court sentenced her to death.  
Upon hearing this shocking news, Ruyati’s family could not remain silent. They 
approached several relevant institutions such as Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI), and 
Migrant Care, an NGO known to provide advocacy for migrant workers. Viva News (2011a) 
reported that Een Nuraeni, Ruyati’s first daughter, said, “I asked for assistance to all institutions 
so that my Mom’s penalty could be reduced.” Een knew that if her mother was found guilty, 
the execution of the sentence was just a matter of time. On 18 June 2011, Ruyati was beheaded 
with a single stroke of a sword. 
To make the case even more disheartening, the Saudi authorities did not inform the 
Indonesian diplomatic mission prior to the execution of Ruyati, let alone her grieving family 
in Bekasi. According to Faizol Riza, an advisor to Indonesia’s Minister of Manpower, “Even 
her lawyer, who visited the prison one day after the execution, was surprised upon learning that 
her room was empty. Ruyati had been executed” (Viva News 2011a). 
The execution of Ruyati soon created an outcry in Indonesia. Upon learning this situation, 
the Saudi government sent its apology. “The apology was conveyed in a closed meeting 
between Saudi’s Ambassador to Indonesia with the Director of Middle Eastern Affairs, 
Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs” (Viva News 2011b). Yet the Indonesian public was 
already deeply angry; the damage had been done. Indonesian media reported that a few days 
after the execution, hundreds of people held demonstrations in front of the Saudi Embassy in 
Jakarta. Een Nuraeni said, “I will show my anger. I hate them.” Observing the issue from a 
foreign policy perspective, Wahyu Susilo, an advocate from Migrant Care, stated, “Indonesia 
must break its diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia.” Being touched by this case, Sam 
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Bimbo, a prominent Islamic singer, demanded, “Stop sending our women migrant workers to 
Saudi Arabia” (Viva News 2011b).  
Following the national outcry, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR – Indonesia’s House of 
Representatives) moved quickly, demanding a moratorium on sending migrant workers to 
Saudi Arabia. Through a plenary meeting just three days after the death of Ruyati, all the 
political parties in the DPR agreed to the proposed moratorium. “This moratorium is our harga 
mati (non-negotiable demand),” stated Marzuki Alie, DPR’s speaker (Kontan 2011). A similar 
call was also made by an NGO focusing on women’s rights. The Jakarta Post (2011c) reported, 
“A leading NGO on women’s rights, the Women’s Forum for Indonesia, has called for a 
moratorium on sending migrant workers to countries with whom Indonesia has yet to establish 
a workers’ protection accord”. Other NGO activists from Jaringan Masyarakat Sipil dan 
Komunitas Keluarga Buruh Migran Indonesia (Alliance of Civil Society and Family 
Community of Indonesian Migrant Labour) organised a demonstration and blamed the 
government for its failure to protect Ruyati (Suara Merdeka 2011). 
After mounting pressure, the Indonesian government finally imposed the moratorium. 
On 23 June 2011, the then President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono stated, “I decided to 
implement the moratorium on sending Indonesian migrant workers to Saudi Arabia, effective 
on 1 August 2011” (Partai Demokrat 2011). 
It may be thought that the idea of a moratorium emerged only after Ruyati’s beheading 
created the public uproar. In fact, demands for a moratorium had been voiced since early 2011 
by Tim Khusus DPR untuk Penanganan TKI di Arab Saudi (DPR’s Special Team in the 
Management of Migrant Workers in Saudi Arabia). “In relation to the many cases of Indonesian 
migrant workers in Saudi Arabia, the team demands the government and BNP2TKI (National 
Agency for the Protection and Placement of Indonesian Migrant Workers) conduct a study on 
the moratorium on sending unskilled migrant workers overseas” (Republika 2011). 
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The DPR Special Team’s call for a moratorium prior to Ruyati’s beheading showed that 
the team attempted to influence government foreign policy toward Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, 
the government remained unmoved. It was only after the beheading of Ruyati that the team 
saw a window of opportunity and later moved quickly by again demanding a moratorium. It 
finally succeeded in pushing the government to act. 
It is difficult to prove that the team was the only foreign policy actor that succeeded in 
pushing the government as there were other important actors who made similar attempts, 
particularly when the case triggered a national outcry. In particular many NGOs voiced similar 
demands. Together the DPR and the NGOs exerted influence on the government’s decision to 
call a moratorium. The members of these groups performed the role of policy entrepreneurs 
who, borrowing from Mintrom (2003: 122), promoted and compromised policy ideas. 
The case of Ruyati’s beheading and how the DPR and NGOs influenced the making of 
the moratorium policy demonstrates that political and community policy entrepreneurs have 
played important roles in Indonesia’s foreign policy. This case also illustrates the close links 
between domestic politics and Indonesia’s foreign policy in the context of labour migration. In 
essence, this thesis is primarily concerned with how and why policy entrepreneurs are 
successful in promoting their ideas for change. The case being used in this research is 
Indonesia’s foreign policy on the protection of migrant workers, particularly the country’s 
ratification of the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW). Based on this case, the thesis will 
examine three questions: (1) To what extent were the policy entrepreneurs important in shaping 
or playing roles in Indonesia’s foreign policy regarding the protection of its migrant workers 
and who were the main policy entrepreneurs?; (2) How did these policy entrepreneurs attempt 
to ensure that their policy proposals were adopted or their ideas heard?; and (3) Why were the 
policy entrepreneurs successful in promoting their ideas? 
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Indonesia’s ratification of the CMW 
The protection of Indonesian migrant workers working overseas has become a pressing issue 
in the domain of Indonesia’s foreign policy. The Kementerian Luar Negeri (Kemenlu – 
Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs) established a special directorate to address the 
complex issue in 2002, namely the Directorate for the Protection of Indonesian Citizens and 
Legal Agencies. Even though the directorate refers to ‘citizens’, in reality the directorate mostly 
deals Indonesian migrant workers. Nonetheless, ever since the establishment of this directorate, 
the protection dimension of Indonesian migrant workers has often been seen as poor, 
particularly due to the high number of workers facing death penalties and high profile cases 
such as the abuse of Nirmala Bonet in Malaysia in 2004, as well as the beheading of Ruyati 
binti Satubi in Saudi Arabia.  
Yet recent developments concerning the policy on Indonesian migrant workers have been 
viewed as improvements particularly in relation to their protection. This can be demonstrated 
by the decision of Indonesia to ratify the CMW on 12 April 2012. In regard to this policy 
change, there are at least two categories of policy entrepreneurs mentioned by the media or 
referred to by informants from my fieldwork. First, the civil society groups working under the 
umbrella movement Aliansi Rakyat untuk Ratifikasi Konvensi Buruh Migran 1990 (ARRAK 
90 – the People’s Alliance for the Ratification of the 1990 Convention) and, second, several 
members of DPR, such as Rieke Dyah Pitaloka (PDIP, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan 
– Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), Okky Asokawati (PPP, Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan – United Development Party), and Nova Riyanti (Partai Demokrat – Democrat 
Party). All of them were members of the Commission IX1 of DPR from 2009 to 2014. 
                                                          
1 Commission IX of DPR deals with issues on, among other things, migrant workers. 
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The members of ARRAK 90 are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as, but 
not limited to, Human Rights Working Group (HRWG), Peduli Buruh Migran (PBM, Care of 
Migrant Workers), and LBH Jakarta (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Jakarta - Jakarta Legal Aid 
Bureau). ARRAK 90 argued that the Indonesian government had not achieved much in regard 
to the protection of Indonesian migrant workers. Its primary role therefore was in urging the 
government to expedite the ratification of the CMW. Without ratification, argued ARRAK 90, 
there would not be any obligation for the government to protect the rights of migrant workers 
as stipulated in the convention (Republika 2009). At the same time, several members of DPR 
also voiced similar concerns. Rieke Pitaloka of PDIP was always critical of the government’s 
handling of the protection of overseas Indonesian workers. She often urged the government to 
improve the system of work migration not only with regard to work placement but also as a 
structure to protect Indonesian migrant workers (Okezone 2012). Okky Asokawati of PPP 
called for even further action, arguing that Indonesia should similarly ratify the ILO’s Domestic 
Workers Convention No. 189, which was adopted on 16 June 2011. In that regard Okky highly 
appreciated the work of civil society groups who have lobbied the parliament intensively and 
have become an extra-parliamentary power that can expedite deliberations (toward ratification) 
(Kompas 2011a). 
Due to the activism of policy entrepreneurs such as those members of ARRAK 90 and 
DPR, Indonesia finally ratified the CMW on 12 April 2012. This thesis will examine these 
cases in depth, from the ideas and proposals to the motivation and success factors of the policy 
entrepreneurs. 
 
The Main Proposition of the Thesis 
Based on the above discussion particularly on Indonesia’s ratification of CMW, the thesis will 
examine the proposition that policy entrepreneurs are successful if: (1) they advocated cogent 
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policy proposals; (2) these proposals were based on normative principles; and (3) they 
promoted their ideas with persistence. In testing the notion of persistence, the thesis will 
measure activities such as: conducting a series of demonstrations; numbers of presentations; 
writing papers; sending letters to key people; and holding lobbying luncheons or dinners. 
 
Methodology 
This thesis applies qualitative methodology combined with case study methods. In regard to 
qualitative methodology, Marshall and Rossman (1999: 25) state that “initial curiosities for 
(qualitative) research often come from real-world observations, emerging from the interplay of 
the researcher’s direct experience, tacit theories, political commitments, interests in practice, 
and growing scholarly interests”. This thesis will examine some of those elements via my direct 
experience as a former diplomat at the Kemenlu and the growing body of scholarship on policy 
entrepreneurship and foreign policy. This thesis follows the tenor of Marshall and Rossman 
(1999) in terms of direct experience and its application to scholarly enterprise, but it also further 
seeks to emulate the emphasis on discursiveness and depth of analysis intimated by King et al. 
(1994: 4), who state that 
qualitative research […] covers a wide range of approaches, but by definition, none of 
these approaches relies on numerical measurements. Such work has tended to focus on 
one or a small number of cases, to use intensive interviews or depth analysis of historical 
materials, to be discursive in method, and to be concerned with a rounded or 
comprehensive account of some event or unit.  
 
In other words, crucial factors in the methodology of this thesis consist of the use of case studies 
comprising interviews and archival research techniques. 
King et al. (1994: 3-9) argue that even though there are differences between quantitative 
and qualitative methodologies, they retain one similarity: inference. In seeking inferences, 
quantitative researchers depend on patterns or correlations between numbers within a 
framework of statistical methodology, whereas qualitative researchers scrutinise the relevant 
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information in their research in an attempt to ascertain significant associations and, 
consequently, identify inferences. King et al. (1994) also argue that in order to achieve a 
successful research outcome, four characteristics need to be met: aiming for inference; applying 
and justifying public procedures; there is no certainty in conclusions; and the content is the 
method. According to King et al. (1994), these four factors harness science as a social enterprise 
in the practice of research. Using this statement as a point of departure, this thesis attempts to 
treat as an inference the proposition that has been stated previously. The thesis attempts to meet 
each of the characteristics of a verifiable research project in the process of data gathering as 
well as the rigorous case study methods it applies. 
 
Case Study 
As part of the qualitative methodology, this thesis applies the methodology of the case study. 
By definition, a case study, according to Bennett (2004: 21), “is the investigation of a well-
defined aspect of a historical happening that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a 
historical happening itself”. For the purposes of this thesis what should be emphasised here is 
the “selection [of a case] for analysis” and not necessarily the historical description of the case 
under observation. Case study methodology has become important in International Relations 
studies because of its advantages in observing and analysing complex phenomena at a given 
time and place (Bennett and Elman 2007: 171). Additionally, Smith et al. (2012: 1) argue that 
case studies are not naively factual because “the theoretical assumptions that guide the analysis 
of the factual material are merely hidden from view”. In the context of this thesis, the case of 
policy change concerning the protection of Indonesian migrant workers is a complex 
phenomenon as it involves civil society, the legislature, the media, the government, and the 
international community. The case has also been widely discussed and promoted by policy 
entrepreneurs in Indonesia as a way of promoting further legal reform in developing country. 
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As with any research method, case study methodology has strengths and weaknesses. On 
the strengths of this method, Bennett (2004: 19) argues:  
The comparative advantages of case study methods include identifying new or omitted 
variables and hypotheses, examining intervening variables in individual cases to make 
inferences on which causal mechanisms may have been at work, developing historical 
explanations of particular cases, attaining high levels of construct validity, and using 
contingent generalizations to model complex relationships such as path dependency and 
multiple interaction effects. Particularly important is the ability to identify new 
hypotheses, which case studies can do through a combination of deduction and induction.  
 
As for its weaknesses, Levy (2002) argues that case study method has a number of serious 
limitations: (1) too many variables compared with the small number of cases; and (2) 
probabilistic theories are not easily achieved. Furthermore, as argued by Bennett (2004: 39), 
one of the most common criticisms of this methodology is that it is prone to “selection bias” 
and can be overly descriptive. 
This research considers the case of a foreign policy determination relating to Indonesian 
migrant workers. This case can be considered an example of the success of policy entrepreneurs 
(particularly of civil society groups, members of DPR, and certain public officials) as they have 
achieved what they set out to achieve: the Indonesian government’s decision to ratify the 
CMW. Even though policy entrepreneurs continue to seek to secure further achievements, the 
ratification decision has at least indicated substantial policy progress toward improved 
protection of overseas workers. This case was also selected because it can be considered 
extraordinary: an international UN convention adopted in 1990, signed by the government of 
Indonesia in 2004, and ratified in 2012. It is therefore important to record events associated 
with the policy change and analyse how policy entrepreneurs attempted to promote their ideas 
and policy proposals, made themselves heard, struggled, and finally achieved their desired 
outcomes. 
Nonetheless, the same case can be deemed a failure in other respects, particularly to those 
critics who opposed the ratification of the convention, such as the local business community 
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and the government bodies that showed reluctance on the ratification. As an example, the 
Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration – the government body most responsible for the 
issues of labour including migrant workers – was for years known to be the strong opponent of 
the ratification of the CMW. Yet their oppositional stance did not win much wider support due 
to causes that will be explained in this thesis.What makes the research finding interesting is 
that the success of policy entrepreneurs is not merely the work of a single person but a group 
of political actors (collective agency) who have been working persistently for a prolonged 
period. Ideas or policy proposals are indeed important, persuasive normative values may play 
roles in strengthening policy articulation, but success is largely dependent on the determination 
of entrepreneurs to work together even though they risk losing their political stamina. As one 
of the slogans in their final actions, ARRAK 90 once stated: “Our voices are almost finished”.2 
The selected case may have limitations in that it is prone to what is called “selection 
bias”. One may wonder, for example, why another case on the role of policy entrepreneurs in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy was not selected, such as the ‘Diaspora policy’. In this context, the 
First Congress of Indonesian Diaspora, held in Los Angeles in July 2012, may provide useful 
insights in relation to the topic. The Congress gathered more than 2,000 representatives of 
Indonesian diaspora worldwide, and secured the support of the then President Yudhoyono to 
make ‘Diaspora’ a new government foreign policy. However, the shortcomings of using the 
Diaspora policy as a possible case in this research are, firstly, that the policy has not been 
discussed widely by the media and the public to-date; and secondly, the ideas are seen as mostly 
generated by a single policy entrepreneur, Dr. Dino Patti Djalal, the then Indonesian 
Ambassador to Washington, as he had been personally active in campaigning for this cause, 
whereas the Kemenlu was not greatly involved. Hence it was still unclear how much impact 
Indonesia’s foreign minister, the most prominent Indonesian foreign policy stakeholder after 
                                                          
2 “Suara kami hampir habis” (Yura 2013, pers.comm., 19 September). 
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the president, had made. In fact, the then foreign minister Dr Marty Natalegawa did not attend 
the Congress, whereas other two ministers did, representing Education and Culture, and 
Tourism and the Creative Economy, of which only one offered speculation as to whether or 
not the policy was fully accepted at the Kemenlu. With regard to the warm reception given by 
the president to the matter, it can be argued that this was due to the close connections between 
President Yudhoyono and Ambassador Djalal, as the later was a spokesperson on foreign 
affairs during Yudhoyono’s presidency in 2004–09. 
The most likely limitation on the selected case for this thesis is on the time period that it 
covers. The relevant period is too long to provide a concise study, as it would need to be traced 
from 1990 (the birth of the CMW) up until the year of ratification, 2012. Nonetheless, the 
selected case is particularly suitable for answering the questions of how and why policy 
entrepreneurs were successful in promoting their ideas. The case provides an appropriate 
subject matter for this thesis. 
 
Levels and Units of Analysis 
Determining the levels of analysis in the study of International Relations, or more specifically 
Foreign Policy, is another important analytical step to take. There are three commonly 
recognised such levels, namely: (1) the individual level (2) the national state/country level, and 
(3) international system level. These three levels mainly refer to the theory of Images 
established by Kenneth Waltz in his ‘Man, War, and the States’ (Waltz 1959). Later scholars 
(Ciot 2014, Willetts 2010, and Neack 2003) add another level of analysis between ‘individual’ 
and ‘national state’ namely ‘a group or groups of individuals’. This level may comprise of 
institutions such as non-governmental organisations, bureaucracy, or even an informal 
coalition seeking for a policy change. 
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This research selects policy entrepreneurs as its unit of analysis, be they individuals or a 
group/groups of individuals. This is in line with the Waltz’ First Image that relates to “human 
behaviour”, which is related to the main focus of this thesis: policy entrepreneurs. As argued 
by Tamaki (2015: 12),  
Furthermore, firmly within the First Image is another derivation […], introducing the 
notion of policy entrepreneurs—individuals who are charismatic and instrumental in 
bringing about the change. These policy entrepreneurs provide convincing arguments and 
ideas that can influence the course of international outcomes. 
 
To sum up, based on the section of case study as previously explained, it is evidenced 
that the levels of analysis in this thesis are ‘invididuals’ and ‘a group/groups of individuals’. 
Therefore, the unit(s) of analysis of this reserarch are the individuals and a group or groups of 
individuals who have carried out efforts and being instrumental in making a foreign policy 
change, namely the ratification of Indonesia to the CMW. 
   
Answering the Main Proposition: What Makes Policy Entrepreneurs Successful? 
The primary focus of this thesis is to explain how and why policy entrepreneurs’ were 
successful in policy change. In that regard, the suggestion of McConnell (2010a) for a 
pragmatic definition of policy success can be useful as a starting point. He defines policy 
success as follows: 
A policy is successful insofar as it achieves the goals that proponents set out to achieve. 
However, only those supportive of the original goals are liable to perceive, with 
satisfaction, an outcome of policy success. Opponents are likely to perceive failure, 
regardless of outcomes, because they did not support the original goals (McConnell 
2010b: 39). 
The above definition is useful in helping us understand the meaning of policy success. 
Yet the definition is still too broad and does not cover the concept of policy entrepreneurs in 
the public policy process. For that reason, this chapter supports the arguments by Mintrom 
(2002) and Roberts and King (1991), which emphasise the role of policy actors who promote 
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or introduce new policy ideas. The chapter thus describes the success of policy entrepreneurs 
as follows. 
First, success is achieved when policy entrepreneurs have their ideas or policy proposals 
adopted or implemented as laws or government policies. As the primary function of policy 
entrepreneurs is to advocate for proposals, adoption and implementation is the prevailing 
measure of the success of their attempts. 
Second, as suggested by Kingdon (2003), policy entrepreneurs are successful if their 
ideas are heard and these ideas are followed up in the public policy cycle, either to be 
formulated as new proposals or to be used in changing or amending existing policy. This is a 
broader and more nuanced measure of success that accounts for the influence of policy 
entrepreneurs where the advocated policy is not adopted but, nonetheless, affects policy and 
policy decisions. Success, therefore, shall be measured from the latter rather than the former 
notion. 
Besides the above mentioned attributes that policy entrepreneurs should possess in order 
to secure a hearing for their ideas, a further important question concerns how policy 
entrepreneurs can potentially increase the likelihood that their policy ideas or proposals are 
successful in implementing or influencing future policy. Arguments among scholars vary on 
this matter. Mintrom (1997: 740) states, “Crafting arguments in support of their proposed 
innovation is critical for policy entrepreneurs if they are to successfully sell—or ‘broker’—
their ideas to potential supporters”. What we can take from this assertion is the importance of 
crafting arguments in order for policy entrepreneurs to succeed in selling their ideas. 
 The formulation of policy alternatives is often regarded as the most important activity 
for policy entrepreneurs, as it increases the prospects for success. Béland (2005: 1) argues, 
“The ability to successfully frame policy alternatives can become a decisive aspect of the policy 
14 
 
process”. Furthermore, policy alternatives which triumph over others appear to do so due to 
“the ability [of policy entrepreneurs] to frame a policy programme in a politically—and 
culturally—acceptable and desirable manner,” including additional factors such as “support 
from key political constituencies, technical feasibility in the context of established policy 
frameworks, and the relative simplicity of the policy ideas themselves” (Béland 2005). In 
regard to the process of successful policy formulation, Kingdon (2003: 205) argues: 
The appearance of entrepreneurs when windows are open, as well as their more enduring 
activities of trying to push their problems and proposals into prominence, are central to 
our story. They bring several key resources into the fray: their claims to a hearing, their 
political connections and negotiating skills, and their sheer persistence. An item’s 
chances for moving up on an agenda are enhanced considerably by the presence of a 
skilful entrepreneur, and dampened considerably if no entrepreneur takes on the cause, 
pushes it, and makes the critical couplings when policy windows open. 
Ideas or policy proposals advocated by policy entrepreneurs may not always be 
successful. Ideas or policy proposals may not work if, as argued by Cutler (2010), they do not 
orient into prevailing values and there is inadequate information about the quality of the ideas 
or proposals. Cutler (2010), who focuses his research on health care policy in the United States, 
further argues that part of the failure of public insurance programs are due to their orientation 
to volume of care and not value. In that context, the suggestion of Kingdon (2003) is important 
to highlight, as he argues that avoiding failure for policy proposals often requires alternatives 
for policy ideas or proposals. In his empirical research on health issues in the US, some of the 
issues, such as long-term and mental health care, were regarded as low or unimportant, not 
because participants did not find real problems there but because they were not aware of 
alternatives that might serve as solutions. 
Based on the above descriptions of who policy entrepreneurs are, what they do, and how 
they sell their ideas, it can then be summarised that policy entrepreneurs are the group of 
political actors who, first, advocate for policy proposals; second, promote an idea or ideas; and 
third, are willing to invest their resources to promote a position in return for anticipated future 
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gain. As for the notion of policy entrepreneurs’ success, it can be described as when their policy 
proposals or ideas are, first, adopted as laws or policies, and, second, are heard and further 
followed up in a public policy cycle. 
It can be argued that the success of policy entrepreneurs requires that their ideas or policy 
proposals fulfil several key criteria. 
First, they offer alternative ideas that are framed in a politically – and culturally – 
acceptable and desirable manner, as well as consisting of additional content, such as support 
from key political constituencies, and technical feasibility. What is important here is not the 
quantity of alternatives but rather how they are framed in a context that is likely to get 
acceptance from the political constituencies. Their ideas must, therefore, pay attention to the 
political and cultural context; must not be difficult to be linked technically to existing policy 
frameworks; and must be easily explained to the public in order to gain broad public support. 
Second, the ideas or policy proposals ought to be based on normative principles. The 
previously mentioned research conducted by Cutler (2010) emphasises the importance 
normative principles in a broader sense for ideas or policy proposals to win support. Rather 
than the number of proposed programs, it is the values or normative principles of policies that 
determine the emotional attachment of potential supporters. 
Third, the ideas or policy proposals are promoted with persistence. As suggested by 
Kingdon (2003: 181), successful policy entrepreneurs “spend a great deal of time” on efforts, 
such as giving presentations and public lectures, writing position papers, corresponding with 
key stakeholders, drafting bills, and attending lobbying luncheons. Persistence is an attribute 
applicable to any individual intent on success, and policy entrepreneurs are no exception. 
Possessing persuasive ideas or sound policy proposals is not sufficient. Since public policy 
relates to public concerns, it must link with relevant activities that deal with the public, such as 
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public presentations, opinion building, or influencing figures who can help to shape the policy 
cycle in any of its stages. 
 
Data Gathering 
Besides relying on analysis of the existing literature, data-gathering employed for this thesis 
included interviews and the assessment of media publications as well as documents released 
by the organisations relevant to policy entrepreneurs and their proposed policy. Hence, prior to 
conducting the fieldwork in Indonesia for the data gathering, a Human Ethics Protocol No. 
2013/069 of the Australian National University was secured, approving the research project. 
Later, primary source data were collected by undertaking interviews with individual policy 
entrepreneurs who were influential or had played significant roles in the case being researched, 
or from officials coming from institutions that opposed the ratification proposal. In total, 14 
people were interviewed and the interviewees were from NGOs, DPR, the Kemenlu, the 
Kementerian Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi (Kemenakertrans – Indonesia’s Ministry of 
Manpower and Transmigration), and various business associations. 
 On selecting the interviewees, the research applied the snowball sampling technique. 
Babbie (2014: 200-201) points out that through this technique, the researcher gathers data on 
the few members of the target population and later “[asks] those individuals to provide the 
information needed to locate other members of that population whom they happen to know”. 
Based on this technique, the already located NGOs were visited and the relevant policy 
entrepreneurs were interviewed. For example, after visiting and interviewing at least two 
NGOs, namely Migrant Care and Solidaritas Perempuan, the researcher was informed that the 
other policy entrepreneurs were from, among others, the Human Rights Working Group 
(HRWG), Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia (SBMI - Indonesian Migrant Labour Union), Peduli 
Buruh Migran (PBM - Care for Migrant Labour), and LBH Jakarta. Further, the researcher was 
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also informed that the policy entrepreneurs from the DPR were, inter alia, Rieke Dyah Pitaloka 
of PDIP, Nova Riyanti Yusuf of Democrat Party, and Okky Asokawati of PPP. As for the 
policy entrepreneurs from the government, there were two officials from the Kemenlu who 
were often mentioned: the then Ministry’s Director of Human Rights, Muhammad Anshor and 
the then Deputy Director, Acep Somantri. For all these interviews, the interviewees were asked 
a progressive series of questions determined by the answers provided. The list of these 
questions is in Appendix I. 
Besides interviewing the above mentioned policy entrepreneurs, interviews were also 
conducted with people coming from institutions known to have opposed the ratification 
proposal: the Kemenakertrans and business associations namely Asosiasi Perusahaan Jasa 
Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (Apjati – Association of Companies for Indonesian Migrant Workers) 
and Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia (Kadin – Indonesia’s Chamber of Commerce). Yet 
it was only the official from the Kemenakertrans who could provide relevant views as the 
people from business associations were either new in their positions or unaware of the case 
being researched. 
 
Thesis Structure 
Chapter 1 of this thesis examines the literature of policy entrepreneurship in foreign policy and 
more particularly in the context of Indonesia’s foreign policy. After an introduction on the 
relationship between policy entrepreneurship and Indonesia’s foreign policy, the first part of 
the chapter draws on the concept of policy entrepreneurship and other relevant matters, such 
as the conceptual differences between ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘policy entrepreneurs’ and the 
importance of policy entrepreneurs in the policy-making process. The second part of the 
chapter also draws on the concept of foreign policy and how foreign policy and domestic 
politics can influence the dynamics of policy choices/directions. The third part of the chapter 
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deals with Indonesia’s foreign policy. A number of scholarly works are examined, from 
classical pieces on the history of Indonesia’s foreign policy to those focusing on the foreign 
policy dynamics in the post-Suharto era. Lastly, the chapter introduces the case study of this 
thesis, namely the ratification by Indonesia of the CMW.  
As the case selected for this research is Indonesia’s ratification of CMW and more 
broadly in the context of Indonesian labour migration, it is therefore pertinent to examine a 
comprehensive account of migration, from the pre-colonial up to contemporary Indonesia. 
Thus Chapter 2 outlines the history of Indonesian labour migration during the pre-colonial 
colonial, and more particularly the post-colonial periods. In the pre-colonial period, migration 
was driven by trade, maritime movement, and other factors. As for the colonial period, in the 
context of labour migration policies, there were several policies released by the respective 
colonial powers, such as slave trade and forced labour. The history of Indonesian labour 
migration of the post-colonial period covers from the independence in 1945 up to 2015. The 
examination of this period is important as one can trace the historical account of labour 
migration in relation to Indonesia’s ratification of the CMW. The first part of the chapter 
examines the period 1945-1959 highlighting, among other things, the establishment of the 
Ministry of Labour. The second part, the 1960s, investigates how Indonesian labour migration 
was affected by developments in neighbouring countries such as Malaysia. The third part, 
1970s, discusses the increasing phenomenon of labour migration in Indonesia due to internal 
and external factors. The fourth part, the 1980s, examines how the private sector became 
involved in the migration industry. The fifth part, the 1990s, investigates how Malaysia 
launched the regularisation policy in a response to the influx of irregular migrants, the majority 
of them from Indonesia. The sixth part, the 2000s, highlights Indonesia’s labour migration 
policies and the high-profile case of the Nunukan humanitarian crisis. The seventh part, the 
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2010s, examines a number of recent developments, particularly in terms of migrant rights 
protection and Indonesia’s decision to ratify the CMW, the central theme of this thesis. 
As this thesis focuses on the role of policy entrepreneurs in Indonesia’s foreign policy in 
the context of labour migration, it is important to further investigate what foreign policies had 
been made by successive administrations. Hence, Chapter 3 examines Indonesia’s foreign 
policies on labour migration under each government administration, from the Suharto era 
(1967-1998) to the Joko Widodo era (2014-2015). The first part of the chapter, focussing on 
the Suharto era, examines the policies included in the Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun 
(Repelita). The second part, the Abdurrahman Wahid era, investigates, among other things, 
Law No. 37 on Foreign Relations and the ratification of ILO conventions. The third part, the 
Megawati Soekarnoputri era, examines policies, including the establishment of the Directorate 
of the Protection of Indonesian Citizens and Legal Entities at the Kemenlu and the Enactment 
of Law No. 39 of 2004. The fourth part, the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono era, investigates a 
number of foreign policy decisions, including the moratorium on sending migrant workers and 
the making of the grand design of protection policy. The fifth part, the Joko Widodo era, 
examines several initial foreign policies on labour migration of the relatively new government. 
Besides examining each successive administration in terms of foreign policy on labour 
migration, this chapter also examines the existence of policy entrepreneurs, more particularly 
in the context of the enactment of Law No. 39 of 2004, the signing of 2006 MoU with Malaysia, 
and certainly the ratification of CMW. 
Chapter 4 then investigates the CMW in more detail. This investigation is important as it 
can reveal what factors drove the emergence of these international norms, what international 
events contributed to its making, and why it took as long as ten years to reach the final 
agreement. Thus, this chapter examines the history of CMW, its contents, its obstacles and 
challenges at the international level, and what roles international and regional NGOs played 
20 
 
pre and post 1990. On the roles of international and regional NGOs, the thesis argues that it is 
important to examine the matter as they can present insight into the primary investigation of 
this thesis. Further, this chapter also briefly examines the role of Indonesian NGOs – the policy 
entrepreneurs – in the signing and more particularly the ratification by Indonesia of the CMW 
in 2012  
Having examined what the CMW is and the roles played, particularly by the 
international, regional and Indonesian NGOs in the context of ratification, Chapter 5 examines 
who the Indonesian policy entrepreneurs were and their views and proposals in terms of CMW 
ratification. Thus, the first part of the chapter identifies policy entrepreneurs from NGOs. The 
second part identifies other policy entrepreneurs from the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) 
and the government. The third and fourth parts examine the policy entrepreneurs’ views and 
proposals respectively. The chapter argues that examining the views and proposals of policy 
entrepreneurs is an important part of examining their role as they can describe the main ideas 
of the policy entrepreneurs in pursuing ratification goals. 
After examining the views and proposals of the policy entrepreneurs, it is also important 
to examine what other aspects contributed to the activism and influence of the policy 
entrepreneurs. Thus Chapter 6 examines the work, resources, motivations and success factors 
of the policy entrepreneurs. The first and second parts of the chapter investigate the work done 
and the resources used by policy entrepreneurs in achieving their goals. The third and fourth 
parts of the chapter investigate the policy entrepreneurs’ motivations and success factors. 
Chapter 6 will also answer the questions of this thesis as stated earlier in this Introduction, 
particularly on why the policy entrepreneurs were successful in promoting their ideas. This 
thesis will close with Chapter 7: Conclusion.  
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Chapter 1 
Policy Entrepreneurship and Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: 
A Literature Review 
 
This chapter will examine the study of policy entrepreneurship applied to the area of foreign 
policy. As a concept, policy entrepreneurship has been introduced, and has primarily been 
developed, by scholars in the broad domain of domestic public policy studies (Roberts and 
King 1991, Mintrom 1997, Kingdon 2003). The concept, however, is also used in the study of 
international relations and, more particularly, foreign policy issues (see Khan 1997, Carter et 
al. 2004). Yet the use of the concept in the study of foreign policy is still minimal, particularly 
as it applies to a country such as Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous country and a 
“powerful nation” in Southeast Asia (Clark and Pietsch 2014: 19). This chapter will, therefore, 
examine the use of the concept of policy entrepreneurship in the study of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. 
The chapter argues that policy entrepreneurs have become an important dimension in 
foreign policy. As suggested by Khan (1997: 145), the foreign policy community has witnessed 
a gradual development of “a third dimension, composed of non-academic and even some 
academic experts, former government employees, journalists and lobbyists”. What Khan 
means by the ‘third dimension’ is the policy entrepreneurs, whereas the first and second 
dimensions are expert practitioners and specialist academics, respectively. He argues that, 
unlike academics, the interests of policy entrepreneurs are not intellectual but a policy 
preference, which they seek to have taken into account in the policy-making process (Khan 
1997: 145). Similar to this argument, Carter et al. (2004: 278) also suggest that foreign policy 
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entrepreneurs “seek to enact their own foreign policy agendas” by framing policy discussions 
and mobilising public and interest group interest. 
Nonetheless, due to the still minimal use of the concept of policy entrepreneurship in 
foreign policy discourse, one may question whether the concept is more relevant to public 
policy or domestic politics studies rather than to foreign policy or international relations 
studies. This thesis, however, supports the arguments of scholars who hold the view that foreign 
policy and domestic politics are intertwined and, therefore, the two policy domains should not 
be separated (Putnam 1988, Halperin 1974), and that “domestic politics and international 
relations are often somehow entangled” (Putnam 1988: 427). This view is supported by other 
scholars (see Smith et al. 2012, Mintz and DeRouen 2010, and Hudson 2007), making the 
linkages between the two concepts more obvious. In short, using the concept of policy 
entrepreneurship and examining the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy is not only 
highly relevant but can also provide a more thorough understanding of how foreign policy is 
made. 
Indonesia’s foreign policy is the primary subject of this thesis. The relevant literatures I 
have drawn on are those scholarly works that explain the origins of the foreign policy and the 
principles that shape it (see, for instance, Agung 1973, Hatta 1976, Leifer 1983). The work of 
Agung (1973), for example, details how Indonesia’s foreign policy was built and implemented 
in the period 1945-1965, from the formulation of basic principles to particular cases, such as 
Indonesia’s confrontation with Malaysia. The speech of Indonesia’s first vice-president, 
Mohammad Hatta, in September 1948, entitled Mendayung Antara Dua Karang (Rowing 
between Two Reefs), brings us to the foundation of Indonesia’s foreign policy, particularly the 
‘independent and active’ principle (Hatta 1976). Leifer provides a comprehensive account of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy, which investigates “the course and nature of that foreign policy 
since the proclamation of independence” in 1945 up to 1982 (1983: xvii).  
23 
 
Other important scholarly works on Indonesia’s foreign policy examine and explain the 
transition of the policy from the Suharto/New Order regime (1967-1998) to the post-Suharto 
era (1998 onwards). For example, on the evolution of Indonesia’s foreign policy, Sukma (1995: 
305) provides an assessment of the nature of policy from a wider, more conceptual context and 
examines the changes in terms of the strongly held ‘independent and active’ principle. 
Observing Indonesia after the end of the New Order regime in the late 1990s, Anwar (2010) 
examines how Indonesia’s transition to democracy has had important impacts on the making 
of foreign policy. She argues that Indonesia’s transition to democracy has democratised the 
process of foreign policy-making, due to the existence of multiple power centres and various 
stakeholders in the reformasi era (Anwar 2010: 139). Examining the elite perceptions in 
Indonesia that determine foreign policy decisions, Novotny (2010: 346) argues that the 
“balance-of-threat theory is capable of explaining Indonesia’s foreign policy dynamics 
provided it extends the analysis beyond the elite’s threat perceptions”. 
This chapter begins with an introduction to policy entrepreneurship and Indonesia’s 
foreign policy. The first section draws on the concept of policy entrepreneurship and other 
relevant matters. It shows how scholars define the concept, which may be different from one 
scholar to the next, yet, in general, they put emphasis on the importance of ideas and how to 
promote them as policy preferences. Further, the section explains the differences between 
‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘policy entrepreneurs’, two concepts that may create confusion among 
readers. On the importance of policy entrepreneurs on the policy-making process, this section 
argues that policy entrepreneurs can play key or significant roles. Later, the section describes 
the quality of policy entrepreneurs in influencing policy-making. 
The second section examines the concept of foreign policy. It describes a number of 
definitions of foreign policy. It further argues that there are linkages between international and 
domestic politics, which explain that foreign policy is often influenced by the dynamics of 
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domestic politics. The section also argues on the importance of foreign policy analysis (FPA) 
study in analysing the making of foreign policy, as this study puts greater emphasis on human 
decision makers acting individually or in groups. The third section deals with Indonesia’s 
foreign policy. It describes a number of scholarly works, from classical pieces that examine the 
history of Indonesia’s foreign policy to works that examine the foreign policy dynamics in the 
post-Suharto era. This section also examines whether there are any particular references or 
analyses concerning the role of policy entrepreneurs in Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
 
1.1 Policy Entrepreneurship 
This section will be divided into several sub-sections, each of which investigates various 
aspects of the study of policy entrepreneurship, such as the conceptual framework, placement, 
importance, characteristics, the meaning of success in policy entrepreneurs’ activism, to a 
number of scholarly suggestions on how to achieve such success. 
 
1.1.1 Conceptual Framework 
The origin of policy entrepreneurship concept stretches back hundred years ago when the term 
“entrepreneur” was firstly defined by R. Cantilon in 1755, as those whom are, among others, 
“self-employed [dealing] with additional uncertainty” (Braunerhjelm 2010: 9). Yet the concept 
was made more significant and explained more sophisticatedly by a German scholar Joseph 
Schumpeter who began analysing the term ‘entrepreneurship’ in his legendary work “The 
Theory of Economic Development” (1934). Indeed the theories of entrepreneurship vary. Yet 
the theories offered by Schumpeter is considered by scholars to be one of the most influential. 
Swedberg (2007: 2), for example, argues, “Of all the theories that exist, [Schumpeter’s] theory 
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is still […] the most fascinating as well as the promising theory of entrepreneurship that we 
have.”     
According to Schumpeter, as I quote from Braunerhjelm (2010: 9), entrepreneurship is 
an ultimate vehicle “to move an economy forward from static equilibrium, based on 
combinatorial capabilities of entrepreneurial individuals”. From this statement, the concepts 
that we can underline are static equilibrium, combinatorial capabilities, and individuals. Put 
differently, entrepreneurs are individuals possessing combined capabilities and are considered 
able to transform something static toward a dynamic change. 
Up to the present time, Schumpeter’s theories of entrepreneurship are still used, at least 
as a departing point, by many scholars not only in the studies of economy but also in other 
disciplines such as political science and international relations. It is with this reason that the 
term ‘entrepreneurship’ has been coined to other concepts, such as political, public, policy, and 
so forth. 
Goes back to the main theme of this thesis, which is the role of policy entrepreneurs in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy, the definition of policy entrepreneurship, or policy entrepreneurs, 
varies from one analyst to the next.3 In recent years, political science scholars have borrowed 
the term entrepreneur from economics, applying it to political science. For instance, Mintrom 
(1997: 740) argues, “policy entrepreneurs can be thought of as being to the policy-making 
process what economic entrepreneurs are to the marketplace.” They are both change agents. 
He further defines the concept as identifying key “political actors who promote policy ideas” 
(Mintrom 1997: 739). Similarly, Kingdon defines policy entrepreneurs as “advocates for 
proposals or for prominence of an idea” (2003: 122) or “advocates who are willing to invest 
                                                          
3 The term ‘entrepreneur’ itself may create confusion to both scholars and the general reader. This is due to the 
more popular concept of ‘entrepreneur’, which many will understand in terms of business or ‘for-profit’ 
activities. 
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their resources – time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a position in return for 
anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solitary benefits” (2003: 179). 
Generally, the literature stresses the importance of ideas and advocacy in the roles policy 
entrepreneurs play. 
Whereas the above definitions do not specify who the political actors, or the so-called 
advocates, are, other scholars emphasise that policy entrepreneurs come from outside of 
government. Using a slightly different term, namely ‘public entrepreneurship’, Roberts and 
King (1991: 147) define this concept as “public entrepreneurs who, from outside the formal 
positions of government, introduce, translate, and help implement new ideas into public 
practice”. Roberts and King (1991: 147) further define public entrepreneurship as “the process 
of introducing innovation – the generation, translation, and implementation of new ideas – into 
the public sector”. Not all scholars agree that policy entrepreneurs should come from outside 
the formal position. Kingdon (2003: 204), for example, argues that policy entrepreneurs can be 
“elected officials, career civil servants, lobbyists, academics, or journalists. No one type of 
participant dominates the pool of entrepreneurs.” 
 
1.1.2 Applicability 
One may wonder on why I apply much of Kingdon’s specific concept on Policy 
Entrepreneurship throughout this thesis but apply less of his broader theory namely Multiple-
Streams Framework (MSF). This framework (Kingdon 2003) in essence argues that there are 
streams within public policy processes, namely Problem, Policy and Politics. These processes 
are often coupled, including by policy entrepreneurs, which later create results of a public 
policy change. 
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The reason that I apply much of Kingdon’s specific concept on Policy Entrepreneurship 
rather than his Multiple-Streams Framework (MSF) is due to the focus that I attempted to 
investigate, which is the actor or actors who had been instrumental in bringing about the policy 
change. There is no doubt that the Kingdon’s MSF could be useful in explaining any case being 
investigated. Yet I would argue that the use of MSF might derail from the main proposition of 
this thesis is attempting to focus, which is the role of policy entrepreneurs in Indonesia’s 
foreign policy. 
There have certainly been different approaches applied by scholars in using Kingdon’s 
theories on policy changes. Some (Gaess 2017, Beland and Howlett 2016, Weiner 2011) apply 
wholly the Multiple-Streams Framework, whereas others (Mackenzie 2004, Mintrom 1997, 
Roberts and King 1991) focus on using the notion of policy entrepreneurship. For this reason, 
I choose the latter. The rational of this approach is similar to what I have explained as above, 
namely on what makes policy entrepreneurs successful in bringing a policy change.  
On applying the concept of Policy Entrepreneurship in the locus of case study, which is 
Indonesia, one may ask the applicability of such attempts. This is due to the critical debates 
that have been emerging since Kingdon’s MSF was published in 1984, questioning whether 
the framework is applicable outside the United States political environment. In this context, I 
would argue that the debates are mostly on the use of the MSF as a theoretical concept, not 
exclusive to Policy Entrepreneurship. Chow (2014: 50, emphasis added), for example, states, 
“The applicability of the MSF outside the US political environment has always been a hotly 
debated topic in the literature”. Discussing from a view point of comparative policy analysis, 
Beland and Howlett (2016: 221, emphasis added) argue, “[It] is not clear that a framework 
developed exclusively on the basis of the examination of a single, somewhat idiosyncratic 
national [US] case should be able to generate insights for comparative research.” 
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This research, nonetheless, emphasises on the use of Policy Entrepreneurship concept in 
explaining and analysing the case being investigated. Having reviewed work on Policy 
Entrepreneurship, I would argue that there have been not much debate among scholars on the 
applicability of this concept outside the US system. Instead, the concept has been applied in 
many country settings. The concept, for example, has been used in the context of Australia 
(Mackenzie 2004), 15 countries and European Union (Meijerink and Huitema 2010), and 
Turkey (Bakir and Jarvis 2017). 
With the above reason, I argue that the concept of policy entrepreneurship can be applied 
in Indonesia. This is even more evidenced when Indonesia embraced a full-fledged democracy 
in 1998, when the authoritarian Suharto’s New Order regime (1967-1998) fell down and was 
replaced by the so-called reform era. Starting from this era, people and especially non-state 
actors enjoy their freedom of expressions and political activism as well as being more critical 
toward government policies. The section on Indonesia’s foreign policy at this chapter discusses 
further this matter. 
Taking into account the legislative process in Indonesia, by rules of procedures, bills can 
only be proposed by the government and/or the parliament members. Yet others including 
NGOs, interest groups or even individuals can play roles by influencing the government and 
the parliament members, at the very least by bringing policy issues into public discourse. As 
demonstrated by the result of study from The Policy Lab (The University of Melbourne) and 
the Indonesian Centre for Law and Policy Studies (PSHK) for Knowledge Sector Initiative 
(Blomkamp et al 2017), “Civil society organisations and the media appear to play a particularly 
important role in creating public awareness of issues.”  
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1.1.3 Importance of these Actors 
Similar to other emerging concepts and practices, various scholars have been involved in 
debates about whether policy entrepreneurs can play a more or less significant role in the public 
policy process. This thesis argues that policy entrepreneurs play a significant role. As suggested 
by Mintrom (1997: 739), “policy entrepreneurs can play a key role in identifying policy 
problems in ways that both attract the attention of decision makers and indicate appropriate 
policy responses”. Furthermore, using a number of activities in promoting their ideas from the 
agenda setting stage, Mintrom (2000: 57) argues that policy entrepreneurs engage in 
“identifying problems, networking in policy circles, shaping the terms of policy debates, and 
building coalitions to support policy change”. Additionally, having carried out research 
concerning the US Congress, Carter et al. (2004) argue that policy entrepreneurs have become 
important players. “The institution (Congress) and its members are, at the least, potentially 
influential in US foreign policy” (Carter et al. 2004: 279). 
 
1.1.4 Placement of Policy Entrepreneurs 
One may question the specific location of policy entrepreneurs, whether they are based in, or 
should come from, specific policy communities, such as governments, legislative bodies, or 
universities. Policy entrepreneurs can come from any of these institutions, or even as 
individuals who work by themselves. It does not really matter where they come from. As 
Kingdon (2003: 180) argues, “the placement of entrepreneurs is nearly irrelevant”. Thus, policy 
entrepreneurs can belong to the government or remain external to government as part of the 
epistemic community or other interest groups. Nevertheless, just like business entrepreneurs, 
policy entrepreneurs may expect a future return after investing their resources. That return may 
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be in the form of “policies of which they approve, satisfaction from participation, or even 
personal aggrandizement in the form of job security or career promotion” (Kingdon 2003: 123). 
As previously mentioned, policy entrepreneurs are political actors or advocates who want 
to secure the approval and implementation of policy agendas. They may work within 
government or outside of it. In relation to policy entrepreneurs who work inside of government, 
Kingdon (2003: 21-44) suggests that they are political actors who come from the 
administrative/executive branch (i.e. president/head of government, staff, or political 
appointees), civil servants, and legislative bodies (congress/parliament/house of 
representatives). Other policy entrepreneurs who work outside of government include interest 
groups (academics, researchers, and consultants), media, elections-related participants, and 
public opinion (Kingdon 2003: 45-70). 
In regard to how policy entrepreneurs inside the government, or the government itself as 
an institution, can play role in making change, it is worth mentioning the finding on German 
vocational training. Thelen and Busemeyer (2008: 23) find out that the role of the government 
in German vocational training has changed from brokering and facilitating to initiating and 
reforming, and this change is due to “deterioration of collectivism in favour of segmentalism” 
of the government system. What they mean as collectivist system and segmentalist sytem is if 
the former require “much more encompassing organisation and coordination”, the latter “based 
more on the production of” institution-specific skills (Thelen and Busemeyer 2008: 7). 
It is, however, not that simple to differentiate whether particular policy entrepreneurs 
belong to the government or not. “[The] line between inside and outside of government is 
exceedingly difficult to draw” (Kingdon 2003: 45). For example, interest groups lobby and are 
lobbied by government; some researchers can have close relationships with government, and 
even receive payments when they work as consultants. Yet it is still important to make such a 
differentiation, since the two lines have different authorities. As argued by Kingdon (2003: 45), 
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the distinction between policy entrepreneurs from inside and outside government retains an 
important meaning. People who hold positions in government have formal authority, a status 
that the outsiders do not enjoy. 
For that reason, Kingdon (2003) suggests that we can identify two distinct groupings: a 
visible cluster of actors and a hidden cluster. According to him: 
The visible cluster—those participants who receive a lot of press and public attention – 
includes the president and his high-level appointees, prominent members of Congress, 
the media, and such elections-related actors as political parties and campaigns. The 
relatively hidden cluster includes such specialists as academics and researchers, career 
bureaucrats, congressional staffers, and administration appointees below the top level. 
Interest groups travel between the two clusters, with some of their activities very public 
and others hardly visible at all (Kingdon 2003: 68). 
These groupings, and the categorisation of inside and outside government as previously 
discussed, will help us determine the placement and relative influence of policy entrepreneurs. 
Knowing the placement of policy entrepreneurs will indeed inform us on how they play their 
role in influencing the making of policy. 
 
1.1.5 Important Skills and Qualities of Policy Entrepreneurs 
One may question the qualities, or even the characteristics, of policy entrepreneurs who can 
generate considerable success in the context of public policy. In that regard, Kingdon (2003) 
puts forward arguments that the qualities which contribute to the success of the policy 
entrepreneur in realising their ideas as policy fall into three categories.  
First, they are a person “who has some claim to a hearing” (Kingdon 2003: 180) i.e., 
rather than merely possessing a desire to be heard, they are capable of ensuring that they are 
heard. What Kingdon means here is that there are scores of people who want to influence policy 
making processes, yet among those people only some who have a claim to a hearing can make 
it happen. This claim to a hearing can have one of three sources: (1) expertise; (2) an ability to 
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speak for others, such as a leader of a powerful interest group; and (3) an authoritative decision-
making position, such as the president or chairman of a congressional committee (Kingdon 
2003: 180). 
 Second, they are “known for [their] political connections or negotiating skills” (Kingdon 
2003: 181). This type of person combines technical expertise with political resources, since 
this combination creates more influence than if they were applied separately. In explaining this, 
Kingdon (2003) uses an example of someone like Wilbur Cohen (1913-1987) from the United 
States, a policy entrepreneur in social security and health insurance. As noted by Livingston 
(2008: 138), Cohen was a central figure for many of the US Social Security program’s most 
significant changes. Berkowitz (1995: xv) notes that the details of the life of Cohen illuminate 
the politics of social security in the US and particularly under the administrations of Kennedy 
and Johnson. Berkowitz (1995: 316) notes further: 
Throughout his life Cohen maintained a rhythm in which he alternated between 
contemplative research and active political tasks. Often he would perform background 
research, help to pass a law, and then write an essay reflecting on the experience. 
  
On the political influence that Cohen had, Berkowitz (1995: 316) argues that, had Cohen 
not transformed the political side of his persona, he would have been comfortable to stay in the 
bureaucracy and continue working as the head of the research and statistics division of the 
Social Security office. With all his achievements as a policy entrepreneur, Wilbur Cohen 
received great appreciation, including his labelling as “Mr. Social Security” by President John 
F. Kennedy (Livingston 2008: 138). 
Third and, according to Kingdon (2003), probably the most important category, policy 
entrepreneurs must be persistent. Most of these actors who have some claim to a hearing “spend 
a great deal of time giving talks, writing position papers, sending letters to important people, 
drafting bills, testifying before congressional committees and [the] executive branch of 
commissions, and having lunch, all with the aim of pushing their ideas in whatever way and 
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forum might further the cause” (Kingdon 2003: 181). Kingdon adds that persistence alone will 
not be adequate. Yet if persistence is combined with other qualities, it will make a huge 
difference.  
 
1.2 The Links between Foreign and Domestic Policy 
Prior to examining further the scholarly works on Indonesia’s foreign policy, this section 
briefly introduces the study of foreign policy and, more particularly, its definition; the linkages 
of international and domestic politics; and the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) theory. It is 
important to highlight the linkages between international and domestic politics since the thesis 
examines a case that exists in domestic politics and has an impact on Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
It is also important to get more insights into FPA theory since the theory puts an emphasis on 
an actor or actors, including non-state actors, in the making of foreign policy. 
 
1.2.1 Definition 
There are various definitions of foreign policy. Hill (2003: 3) defines it as “the sum of official 
external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international 
relations”. What Hill means by ‘an independent actor’ may include the European Union and 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). External relations are considered 
‘official’ when they include outputs from all the structures of government of the state or 
enterprise while being parsimonious to the huge number of international transactions. Policy is 
the ‘sum’ of the official external relations because, otherwise, all specific actions could be 
interpreted as a separate foreign policy. 
The definition of foreign policy as suggested by Hill seems to cover all important aspects 
of foreign policy-making, such as the actor and its activities in international relations. Yet it 
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narrowly defines the actor as a state, even though there are important exceptions: international 
or regional organisations such as the European Union and ASEAN. What is missing from Hill’s 
definition is the idea that actors of foreign policy these days are not solely dominated by the 
state. Some scholars have examined the role non-state actors play in international relations, 
such as international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), multinational enterprises 
(Fogarty 2013: 1), organised armed groups (Angeli 2010), and international institutions and 
regimes (Milner 2009).  
If the definition by Hill above puts emphasis on government or an official body or bodies 
of a state, Hermann (1978: 34) takes a broader approach that includes individuals or groups of 
individuals, as he defines foreign policy as “the discrete purposeful action that results from the 
political level decision of an individual or group of individuals […] It is not the decision, but a 
product of the decision.” From this definition, Hermann suggests that the actors of foreign 
policy-making do not necessarily come from a state/government or any formal institution. They 
can be any individual or a group of individuals who can influence or make decisions at the 
political level. Furthermore, foreign policy is not about the decision but is more about the 
product of the decision. Arguably, it focuses more on process, such as how the ‘product’ is 
made, who makes it, and why it is made. 
This thesis supports the definition offered by Hermann since, as argued previously, the 
actors of foreign policy are numerous and they can come from the domestic level or the 
international arena. Yet some may question what the contents of foreign policy are and how 
they are implemented. In that regard, Herman suggests that there is a distinction between 
foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour. He explains: 
Foreign policy consists of the development and conscious pursuit of some preferred goal 
or goals of an actor through the selective use of foreign policy behaviour. Foreign policy 
behaviour is purposeful action resulting from the implementation of a political-level 
decision to act so as to attempt to influence attitudes, beliefs, and/or actions of one or 
more other actors where entities external to the political jurisdiction of the decision 
35 
 
makers are either (1) the subject of the influence attempt or (2) the channel through which 
a message is conveyed to domestic individuals or collectivities (Herman 1983: 274-5).  
This explanation implies that the contents of foreign policy are a preferred goal or goals. 
When it goes to the question of how these contents are implemented, then it falls into ‘foreign 
policy behaviour’. Herman (1983: 275) further explains that what he means by ‘a political-
level decision’ in foreign policy behaviour is a choice made by individuals who hold the 
authority to use the resources of the government, ruling party, corporation, or other 
international entity. This explanation makes a stronger argument that there are various actors 
in foreign policy-making, an argument used in examining the case in this thesis. 
 
1.2.2 Linkages between International and Domestic Politics 
This thesis argues that the study of foreign policy has linkages to the study of public policy, 
which is usually considered as inside the domestic process. Smith et al. (2012: 4) suggest that 
“in concept, foreign policy links into much of the literature of public policy, with the notable 
difference that its targets are (usually) actors outside the domestic process”. This thesis will 
examine the targets of the actors or policy entrepreneurs inside the domestic process since it 
investigates what and how they influence foreign policy-making in the domestic political arena. 
On the linkages between domestic and international politics in the study of foreign policy, 
the thesis argues that they interact and sometimes even determine each other. Rosenau (1969, 
see also Rosenau 1971) is often regarded as the first scholar to propose the ‘linkage theory’, 
arguing that there are linkages between domestic and international politics (Elisabetta 2013). 
Rosenau (1969: 45) writes: 
Our approach to the phenomena bounded by the overlap of national and international 
systems is strictly an empirical one. We wish to identify and analyse those recurrent 
sequences of behaviour that originate on one side of the boundary […] became linked to 
phenomena on the other side in the process of unfolding […] Hence we will use a linkage 
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as our basic unit of analysis, defining it as a recurrent sequence of behaviour that 
originates in one system and is reacted to in another. 
Rosenau’s argument deepens our understanding that domestic and international politics 
are linked and they can influence one another. Yet Rosenau (1969: 8) acknowledges that there 
are shortcomings to the theory of linkage and the most basic reason is the lack of 
communication between the specialists in comparative and national politics on one side and 
the specialists who focus on international politics on the other. “Each group is trapped, as it 
were, in its own conceptual jail and, like all prisoners, its members rarely get a glimpse at the 
life of those incarcerated elsewhere” (Rosenau 1969: 8). 
While Rosenau is the scholar who introduced the concept of linkage between domestic 
and international politics, it is Putnam (1988) who highlights the linkages between international 
relations and domestic politics. Putnam (1988: 428) argues that “it is fruitless to debate whether 
domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse” because the answers 
to these questions are “both, sometimes”. Using the concept of ‘two-level games’ as a metaphor 
for domestic and international interactions, Putnam suggests that the state-centric literature is 
an uncertain foundation in developing theories on how domestic and international politics 
interact (Putnam 1988: 433). This argument is supported by Dosch (2006: 45) who argues that 
the domestic constituencies often pressure the government so that their favoured policies can 
be adopted. 
Nevertheless, the arguments of Putnam on ‘two-level games’ do not elaborate the impact 
of domestic factors in the making of foreign policy, particularly with regard to the differences 
of governmental regime types. As suggested by Dosch (2006: 46), there are two types of 
governmental regimes as such: the statist/non-democratic and the pluralist/democratic. In 
statist/non-democratic systems, foreign policy-making often ignores societal interests and even 
opposition. In the pluralist/democratic system, foreign policy choices are connected to the 
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perceived effect on the political standing of the decision-maker in his or her constituency. As 
argued by Dosch (2006: 46), “The degree of pressure on decision-makers seems to vary greatly 
according to the overall structure in which foreign policy making is embedded”. Put simply, if 
we locate the newly democratised Indonesia in context, foreign policy makers in the country 
will often face strong pressure. 
 
1.2.3 Drawing on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) Theory to Help Explain Policy Changes     
Another useful analytical tool in analysing the behaviour of policy entrepreneurs is foreign 
policy analysis (FPA) theory, which is characterised by an actor-specific focus (Hudson 2005: 
1). As this thesis argues that there are non-state actors in the making of foreign policy, it is 
useful to apply this theory in explaining the behaviour of policy entrepreneurs in Indonesia’s 
foreign policy as the actors or a group of actors who have played roles in determining the 
policy. 
The FPA theory focuses on how different actors in international systems conduct their 
relations. As Alden and Aran (2012: 1) put it: 
At the heart of the field is an investigation into decision making, the individual decision 
makers, processes and conditions that affect foreign policy and the outcomes of these 
decisions. By adopting this approach, FPA is necessarily concerned not only with the 
actors involved in the state’s formal decision-making apparatus, but also with the variety 
of sub-national sources of influence upon state foreign policy. 
From this definition, it is clear that FPA theory emphasises the decision-making process and, 
more particularly, the behaviour of the actors that affect foreign policy decisions. Even though 
the theory highlights the importance of state as a foreign policy primary actor, it also focuses 
on other, non-state actors who influence the foreign policy making process. 
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Some of the scholars who are regarded as the founders of FPA theory, according to 
Hudson (2012: 13), are Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. These scholars 
argue: 
We have defined international politics as processes of state interaction at the 
governmental level. However, there are non-governmental factors and relationships 
which must be taken into account by any system of analysis, and there are obviously non-
governmental effects of state action. Domestic politics, the non-human environment, 
cross-cultural and social relationships are important in this connection (Snyder et al. 
1962: 203). 
From this argument, it is more obvious that, from the beginning, FPA theory has acknowledged 
the factors of non-state actors. The theory not only takes into account the factor of domestic 
politics but also the dynamics within societies as they are regarded as important. 
Based on the definition, as well as the argument as written above, this thesis argues that 
FPA theory is useful in explaining the behaviour of the foreign policy making process, 
especially since it emphasises the roles of human decision makers, whether they act 
individually or in groups. This is in line with the argument of this thesis that there exist policy 
entrepreneurs – a group of political actors – in foreign policy making. As suggested by Hudson 
(2005: 1), “all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision 
makers acting singly or in groups”. In her much earlier work, Hudson (1995: 210) also suggests 
that from its inception, FPA has taken into account the examination of how foreign policy 
decisions are made and has assumed that the source of much behaviour and most change in 
international politics is human beings, whether they act individually or in collectivities”. From 
these views, one aspect that can be underlined is the ‘human decision makers’, whether they 
work individually or in groups. Thus, the centre of analysis of foreign policy under FPA theory 
falls into the human aspect, the aspect that will be the focus of this thesis. 
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1.3 Understanding Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Trajectories 
There are various scholarly perspectives analysing Indonesia’s foreign policy. Works from a 
historical perspective tend to examine Indonesia’s foreign policy based on time-specific, or the 
periodisation of governmental regimes, such as the period of President Sukarno, 1945-1967 
(see, for example, Agung 1973, Leifer 1983, Hein 1986), the period of President Suharto, 1967-
1998 (Leifer 1983, Sukma 1995), and the period of the post-Suharto regimes, from 1998 up to 
the period of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (Anwar 2010). Other thematic 
works focus more on specific issues. They examine, for example, konfrontasi (confrontation, 
Sukarno’s anti-Malaysia vitriol in 1963-66 period) (Mackie 1974, Clark and Pietsch 2014), the 
views of foreign policy leaders on aid and independence (Weinstein 1976), ASEAN (Anwar 
1994, Caballero-Anthony 2005, Clark 2011, Clark and Pietsch 2012), or Indonesia’s bilateral 
relations (Sukma 1999, Liow, J.C. 2004, Novotny 2010, Clark and Pietsch 2014). 
Outside of those scholarly works written in English, there exists a useful body of 
literature in Indonesian language that examine Indonesia’s foreign policy, such as on the 
periodisation of governmental regimes (Wuryandari et al. 2008). Another important piece of 
writing that should not be missed is the ‘work’ of the first vice-president Mohammad Hatta 
(1976) entitled Mendayung Antara Dua Karang (Rowing Between Two Reefs). The work, or 
policy speech, to be more precise, laid down the principle of Indonesia’s foreign policy, namely 
‘independent and active’ (politik luar negeri bebas aktif). 
This section examines some of the above-mentioned works, critically engages with their 
strengths and weaknesses, and seeks to find out whether there are particular references or 
analyses concerning the role of policy entrepreneurs in Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
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1.3.1 The Periodisation of Governmental Regimes 
Prior to examining the work based on the periodisation of Indonesia’s foreign policy, it is 
important to begin with the work of Hatta (1976) as this is usually referenced when discussing 
policy in such an approach. The work, or to be more accurate the speech, of Hatta before the 
Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (KNIP – Central Indonesian National Committee) in 1948, 
is an important reference on how the ‘independent and active’ principle emerged for the first 
time. Hatta’s speech, and his further explanation, demonstrated his determination on 
Indonesia’s foreign policy (pp. 49-50). 
In his speech, the then Vice-President Hatta revealed that the People’s Democratic Front 
(FDR) of the Indonesian Communist Party reversed its support to the Renville Agreement 
signed on 17 January 1948 (the agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands on a 
ceasefire, facilitated by the United States, Australia, and Belgium; see DFAT 2014) even 
though, previously, FDR fully supported the Agreement. Hatta observed that the dramatic shift 
occurred due to the conflict of international politics between the US and Russia (p. 17). He 
then questioned KNIP, whether the nation should stand on the side of Russia or America. In 
the words of Hatta: “Apakah tak ada pendirian yang lain harus kita ambil dalam mengejar 
cita-cita kita?” (Is not there any other stand that we can take in the pursuit of our ideals?) (p. 
17). Hatta further stated: 
The Government is of the view that the stand that we must adopt is that we shall not be 
an object of the conflict of international politics; we however shall remain the subject 
who reserves the right to define our own stand, reserves the right to struggle for our own 
goal, which is the independence for the whole Indonesia (p. 18, translated). 
This part of the speech later became the principle plank of Indonesia’s foreign policy, 
‘independent and active’. One may wonder in which part of the speech Hatta used the phrase 
‘bebas dan aktif’ as he did not specifically mention it in the speech. Yet the word ‘active’ 
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appeared later when Hatta wrote an article published in the prominent Foreign Affairs 
magazine (1953): 
The Indonesian Government is of opinion that the position to be taken is that Indonesia 
should not be a passive party in the area of international politics but that it should be an 
active agent entitled to decide its own standpoint. 
It appears that the word ‘independent’ was redefined by Prime Minister Wilopo, who 
assumed office in May 1952, in the following speech: 
When the Government stated that its conduct of foreign affairs would be in an 
"independent" manner, the underlying idea was to make it clear that, in face of the fact 
that there are two opposed trends in international circles which have given rise to two 
blocs—the Western bloc with the United States and its allies, and the Eastern bloc with 
its adherents—the Republic of Indonesia has decided to adopt an independent attitude 
(Hatta 1953). 
Elaboration of the ‘independent and active’ principle may be found in the work of Agung 
(1973) as it examines the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy under the Sukarno regime 
(1945-1967). More than that, the work also presents a great account of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy toward the Dutch and the countries in the region, such as China, India and Malaysia. As 
an example, Agung writes: 
[T]he Chinese government continued to cultivate a particular relationship with Indonesia, 
and later, after President Sukarno proclaimed his new political system of guided 
democracy, the Chinese strategy received a most welcome boost as the Indonesian 
president embarked enthusiastically upon an aggressive, militant foreign policy of anti-
imperialism and anti-colonialism (pp.  413-4). 
The work is useful for those who seek a detailed description. However, it is over-
descriptive as it emphasises the historical facts rather than providing an analytical account of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. Furthermore, as he was imprisoned by the Sukarno administration 
for almost five years, Agung tends to be negative in his judgment toward Sukarno’s foreign 
policy (see p. 543). 
Arguably, one of the best known accounts of Indonesia’s foreign policy under the 
Sukarno and Suharto regimes is the work of Leifer (1983) that investigates thoroughly the 
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policy from 1945 up to early 1980s. This work describes and analyses how the policy took its 
initial form, the ‘seeds of foreign policy’, by securing international recognition. As argued by 
Leifer, “The demand for de facto recognition and the exclusion of the Dutch forces constituted 
the initial negotiating position” (p. 6). This work also explains the emergence of the 
‘independent and active’ principle. Interestingly, Leifer suggests even though the principle “has 
exercised an abiding influence on successive Indonesian governments” (p. xvii), Sukarno 
disregarded it during the Guided Democracy period (1959-1965), as his foreign policy direction 
was more aligned to the Soviet Union and China (pp. 68-74). As the Sukarno era ended in 
1967, after the failed Communist coup in 1965, this principle shifted to be ‘moderate’ when 
Indonesia was led by Suharto. In principle, the policy under Suharto “reinstated a former course 
rather than pursuing a novel one” (p. 111). The work is arguably one of the most widely cited 
references of Indonesia’s foreign policy, as it covers many aspects. Yet Leifer offers little 
discussion on various important domestic events, such as the transition period to Suharto’s 
leadership. 
The gap in the work of Leifer is filled out by the work of Sukma (1995) as it investigates 
the development of Indonesia’s foreign policy from 1945 to the early 1990s. Sukma suggests 
that Indonesia’s foreign policy is best understood if it is divided into three evolutionary phases 
(p. 305). The first is the ‘Indonesia’s independence struggle’ (1945-1957), during which the 
focus of foreign policy was to get international recognition (p. 306). The second phase is ‘the 
radicalisation of foreign policy’ (1957-1967), particularly when Indonesian politics entered 
into a new era in 1959 when Sukarno introduced a Guided Democracy, “which paved the way 
for his political ascendancy” (p. 309). Sukarno later radicalised internal policies, which led to 
a parallel radicalisation of foreign policy. In this phase, Sukarno carried out “a series of anti-
colonialism measures”, notably winning sovereignty over Irian Jaya in 1962 and opposing the 
creation of the Malaysia Federation (p. 310). On the former, Sukarno was applauded. The latter 
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brought about his fall in 1967. This brought Indonesia to the third phase, ‘the New Order’ led 
by Suharto. In this phase, foreign policy changed. Suharto, for example, immediately 
terminated konfrontasi and subsequently normalised relations with Malaysia. The work of 
Sukma (1995) is useful in providing the history of Indonesia’s foreign policy. However, it lacks 
description and analyses on the period of Liberal Democracy (1950-57) and leaves one 
wondering about notable events during this period, such as the 1955 Asian-African conference. 
Last but not least, the work of Wuryandari et al. (2008) is another useful reference as it 
covers the history of Indonesia’s foreign policy over a longer time-span, 1945-2007, from the 
years of Sukarno to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). The work argues that Indonesia’s 
foreign policy making and implementation during those years has been influenced most by 
domestic politics (p. 20), even though each president had his or her own style. One of the most 
useful features of this work is the table summarising the whole periods of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy and the underlying domestic factors, as follows: 
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Table 1.1   Comparison of Domestic Factors in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (1945-2007) 
 
No 
 
Indicator 
 
OLD ORDER REGIME 
 
 
NEW ORDER 
REGIME 
 
POST-NEW ORDER ERA 
Early 
Independence 
Period - 
Sovereignty 
Recognition 
 
Parliamentary 
Democracy 
Guided 
Democracy 
1966-1982 1983-1997 BJ 
Habibie 
Abdurrahman 
Wahid 
Megawati 
Soekarnoputri 
Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono 
1 Domestic 
conditions: 
- economy 
- security 
- politics 
- Nation-state formation building 
- Deteriorating economy 
Consolidati-
on of 
economics, 
politics, and 
security 
Political 
stability and 
social-
economic 
achievements 
 
Instability of politics and security 
- Economic crisis 
- Democratisation 
Relatively 
stable macro 
economy, 
politics and 
security 
The ups and downs of parliaments 
 
Relatively stable 
politics 
- Prioritising sectoral 
development 
- Political and security 
stability 
- Authoritatiran, nepotism, 
and ‘pemasungan’ 
  
Vertical and horizontal conflicts 
 
The coups by 
Indonesian 
Communist 
Party (PKI) 
- ‘Politik 
Aliran’ & 
constitutional 
debates 
- Regional 
coups 
 
- The coups by 
PKI 
- Political stability 
  
Terrorism 
2 Modality Strong nationalism - Anticommunism 
- Economic development 
achievement 
- Political stability  
Positive image from the democratisation realities: 
- Development in many domestic institutions for democracy 
- Freedom of press 
- Respects to human rights 
- Transparent executive and legislative elections 
 
 
3 
 
Structure and 
Process in 
Policy Making 
Parliament heavy  Suharto  
In general there had been a balance between Executive and 
Legislative, yet in a number of cases the Executive was more 
instrumental 
  
Sukarno 
- ABRI 
- Technocrat 
- Golkar 
(ABRI, 
technocrat) 
- Islam 
4 Actors: 
- Policy makers 
- Policy 
implementer 
 
Sukarno 
Syahrir 
Hatta 
Parliament 
and Sukarno 
Sukarno Suharto State actor (legislative and executive), particularly since Wahid 
era the non-state actors started to play more roles 
- ABRI 
- Technocrat 
- Golkar     
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5 Foreign Policy 
Main Agenda 
Sovereignty recognition World recognition 
as an alternative 
leader 
 
Inviting foreign investment 
and became more active 
regionally and internationally 
Recovering economy and guarding democracy 
 Maintaining the national unity 
6 Dominant 
Domestic 
Issues 
- Dutch 
aggression 
- Diplomacy on 
territorial 
integrity 
 
- Diplomacy 
for West Irian 
- Regional 
coups 
- The ups and 
downs of 
parliaments 
- ‘Politik 
aliran’ 
 
- Politics of 
balance between 
military and 
communist 
- Neoliberalism 
and Imperalism) 
- New Emerging 
Forces vs Old 
Establishment 
Forces 
 
Political stability, 
economic development, and 
anticommunism  
- Economic crisis 
- Democratisation 
 
Simplifying 
political 
parties, 
mono 
loyalty of 
bureauracy 
Single 
principle 
(asas tunggal) 
 Separatism and horizontal conflict 
 Terrorism 
7 Styles Active Low profile 
Accommod
ative 
High profile No profile 
 High profile 
Patterns ‘Rowing 
between two 
reefs’ 
Friction 
between 
rightist and 
leftist powers 
 
Tend to be 
‘leftist’ 
 Fuzzy 
 ‘Hitting all the reefs’ ‘Charting all the 
oceans’ 
Source: Wuryandari et al. (2008: 241-2) 
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The table presented by Wuryandari et al (2008) is useful as it synthesises important 
aspects that some other scholars have already examined, such as the agenda, the actors, and the 
presidents’ leadership styles. Even though scholars may have further debates on concepts, such 
as the notion of ‘no profile’ in the post-New Order era, in general, the table succeeds in 
reflecting the domestic politics dynamics of Indonesia’s foreign policy under the three periods 
examined. What is lacking in this work is the minimal elaboration on the roles of non-state 
actors (NSAs), more particularly in the post-New Order era. Even though the chapter written 
by Mashad (2008: 201-3) suggests that NSAs become influential actors and have 
‘extraordinary roles’ from the beginning of the Wahid presidency in 1999, it does not explain 
much of this phenomena. 
 
1.3.2 Specific Issues in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy 
There are numerous works under the category of specific issues. On Konfrontasi, the work of 
Mackie (1974) is a very comprehensive account as it provides a detailed investigation of the 
domestic political situations in both countries (see p. 111, 333). Mackie suggests that the causes 
of confrontation were “complex and heterogeneous” (p. 3), “far more complex than” the 
Sukarno factor (p. 1), and the open break between the two countries in September 1963 “had 
far reaching consequences in Indonesian politics, consequences which proved to be irreversible 
until the coup of October 1965” (p. 10). Mackie argues that there are three theories that can 
interpret the confrontation, namely “expansionist, diversionist, and ideological”, yet none can 
explain the event satisfactorily by itself, as all three “must be invoked to account for particular 
parts of the story” (pp. 326-33). Mackie, however, suggests that ideological theory is 
persuasive, as the ideology of Sukarno was “undeniably revolutionary in its implications” (p. 
330). While the heterogenous theoretical suggestions of Mackie explains how confrontation 
developed sound sensible, his work does not provide much discussion on the theories 
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themselves. Thus, those who seek more theoretical elaboration on the rationale behind 
confrontation will not find it in Mackie’s account. This is, however, a minor criticism in the 
great contribution Mackie has made to the literature of Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
Another work based on the specific-issue category is the work of Weinstein (1976) that 
investigates the perceptions of foreign policy elites under the Sukarno and Suharto regimes 
concerning ‘the hard choices between independence and reliance on foreign support’. 
Weinstein argues, on the one hand, “the Indonesian leaders’ sharp awareness of their country’s 
weakness […] dictates a foreign policy directed toward securing from abroad the funds and 
expertise needed to bring about economic development” (p. 29). On the other hand, the elites 
had perceptions that the international order was exploitative and the big powers were threats to 
the country’s independence (p. 354). Weinstein compared the two contrasting views by 
providing the bulk of data after interviewing Indonesia’s so-called ‘foreign policy elite’. The 
work is useful in underlining the important issue of the linkage between domestic politics and 
foreign policy, one of the central themes of this thesis. The method of work—interviewing the 
elite or decision makers—has inspired other scholars, such as Anwar (1994) and Novotny 
(2010). This method, however, has been losing its influence, similar to what has occurred in 
the study of American foreign policy-making (Hastedt: 317). 
The work of Anwar (1994) is useful as it is a comprehensive study of ‘Indonesia in 
ASEAN’, another popular issue of Indonesia’s foreign policy. The work is useful as it describes 
and analyses how Indonesia behaves toward ASEAN. Furthermore, Anwar also highlights, 
albeit still minimally, the roles played by non-state actors (NSAs) in the making of foreign 
policy. Anwar suggests that some of the NSAs are, among others, NGOs, private business 
communities, intellectuals, and politicians (pp. 241-275).  On NGOs, for example, Anwar 
suggests that the most important one is LP3ES, a private social and economic research institute. 
She argues, “The institute has been involved in a range of activities […] The activities of the 
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LP3ES included joint training with NGOs in other ASEAN countries” (p. 261). On intellectuals 
or individuals, Anwar suggests there were figures, such as the journalist Mochtar Lubis, who 
had campaigned actively for the government to be more involved in ASEAN cooperation, and 
an economist attached to the Jakarta-based Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), Djisman Simandjuntak, who consistently wrote that “intra-ASEAN trade could 
become a real alternative to international trade” (pp. 255-270). The work of Anwar is relevant 
to the focus of this thesis, which is the role of policy entrepreneurs in Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. The NSAs, to some extent, could be regarded as policy entrepreneurs who promote 
ideas as policy preferences. Yet Anwar does not specifically examine further what these ideas 
were or, more particularly, how the NSAs promoted them. 
The role of NSAs and in particular the NGOs, especially after the wave of 
democratisation following the fall of Suharto in 1998, has indeed shifted much in comparison 
to the previous order. Non-governmental organisations in the contemporary Indonesia push the 
government for reform, demand policy changes, and even get involved in decision making. 
One area that they begin their involvement is foreign policy-making. The statement of former 
foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda in 2008 may best represent this situation: 
Since Reformasi (reform era, added), we have to take into account the checks and 
balances, as we have a vibrant civil society and media, and more and more actors getting 
interested in foreign policy issues (…) We can not operate like we were in the past, we 
have to reach out to people, the government t no longer has a monopoly on foreign policy. 
Non-State Actors can be a pressure as much as a contribution and this is why we must 
talk to them and find a way of reaching all the groups (Alles 2016: 135). 
 
Back to the context of ‘Indonesia in ASEAN’, the work of Caballero-Anthony (2005) is 
also useful since it investigates the role of NSAs within ASEAN, suggesting that through the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), “ASEAN has opened the doors for non-state actors” (p. 157). 
This phenomena is notable since ASEAN has often been observed as “a highly state-centric 
organisation and […] has not allowed NSAs to be part of the processes involved” (p. 157). 
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Caballero-Anthony argues that NSAs consist of “think-tanks, academics, and members of the 
‘unofficial’ policy community” (158). She uses the case of ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and 
International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), a regional NGO that consists of think-tanks, in proving 
her argument. She suggests that, prior to the formal establishment of ASEAN-ISIS in 1988, 
since 1984 Jusuf Wanandi of the CSIS had initiated several regional meetings that involved the 
heads, experts, and scholars of the think-tanks (p. 161). Later, ASEAN-ISIS expanded the 
issues concerned and became more instrumental by providing “policy inputs on various issues 
that affected the region for the consideration of the decision-makers in ASEAN” (p. 161). The 
work is useful as one can learn how an NSA from Indonesia, the CSIS, has been instrumental 
in the establishment of ASEAN-ISIS as well as its later activism. Nonetheless, the work lacks 
detail on how the ideas within ASEAN-ISIS are promoted. It does not elaborate how the NSAs 
such as Jusuf Wanandi promoted their ideas. The work merely focuses on the role of the NSAs 
as institutions rather than as individuals, something contrary to what much of the literature of 
policy entrepreneurship has suggested. 
Another account of ‘Indonesia in ASEAN’ is the work of Clark and Pietsch (2012). The 
work brings a perspective on how Indonesia’s embrace of democratisation has generated a 
perception within the country that the European Union (EU) model is superior to the present 
ASEAN. Highlighting some strong calls from academia (particularly the think tank CSIS) that 
Indonesia needs to embrace a ‘post-ASEAN’ foreign policy, the authors argue, however, that 
Indonesia has not been fully committed to such a policy (p. 45). On the proposed ‘post-
ASEAN’ foreign policy (see Sukma 2009), Clark and Pietsch suggest that the idea of a ‘post-
ASEAN’ foreign policy, and other proposals for a new regional body, have received 
underwhelming responses in Indonesia (p. 59). What Indonesia is more interested in is the 
“prospect of increasing regionalization with states outside the ASEAN region” (p. 58). The 
work is useful for those who seek further understanding of the linkages between Indonesia’s 
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democratisation and the country’s behaviour toward ASEAN. However, it offers little 
discussion on the role of think-tanks such as CSIS in contributing to Indonesia’s foreign policy, 
though the role of think-tanks has been known in the policy entrepreneurship scholarship. As 
argued by Stone and Garnett (1998: 16), the scholars and executives of think-tanks often act as 
policy entrepreneurs. 
After investigating Indonesia’s foreign policy with regard to a specific issue such as 
ASEAN, it is worth examining Indonesia’s bilateral relations with other countries. In that 
regard, the work of Sukma (1999) deserves attention as it provides a comprehensive 
investigation of Indonesia’s relations with China. The work itself focuses on the timespan 
between Indonesia’s decision to cut ties in 1967 and the normalisations of relations in 1990. 
Sukma suggests that Indonesia’s effort to establish diplomatic ties with China in 1950 was due 
to Indonesia’s interest in gaining recognition (p. 20). When the abortive coup by Indonesia’s 
Communist Party on 30 September 1965 resulted in the collapse of the party in late 1965, the 
power of ABRI (Indonesia’s Armed Forced) rose and this phenomenon led to the breakdown 
of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It was only after 23 years that Indonesia 
finally resumed relations with China. Sukma suggests that, in that long time span, there had 
been pros and cons debated within the Suharto government whether Indonesia should or should 
not normalise its diplomatic ties (pp. 98, 204). Sukma concludes by arguing that “the question 
of diplomatic ties with China for Indonesia has been, at least, as much a matter of domestic 
politics as of foreign policy” (p. 200). The work proves the argument that foreign policy must 
take into account the domestic context, something that this thesis supports. Interestingly, 
Sukma does not use the popular theory of ‘linkage politics’ introduced by Rosenau (1969), 
using instead the theory of ‘regime legitimacy’, something considered by scholars to be “vague 
and unhelpful” (Cribb 2002: 544). 
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Another account that focusses on ‘Indonesia’s bilateral relations’ is the work of Novotny 
(2010). The main argument of this work is that foreign policy has been shaped by the 
perceptions of individual policy makers rather than the notion of ‘national interests’. Novotny 
argues, “’national interests’ and ‘national security’ are inherently ambiguous concepts with a 
great variety of meanings which are substantially shaped by the way individual policy makers 
see the world around them” (p. 90). In the case of Indonesia and, more particularly, on the elite 
perceptions of the United States and China, he argues that “foreign policy decision-making 
largely remains the prerogative of a relatively small elite group of people” (p. 90). In the case 
of Indonesia’s relations with the US, Novotny suggests that “the elite’s attitude towards the US 
has traditionally been ambivalent and full of mixed feelings” described as ‘love-hate’ (p. 160). 
Whereas in the case of Indonesia’s relations with China, he suggests that the Indonesian 
leaders’ current attitudes are best described “as purely ‘pragmatic’’’ (p. 229). Novotny 
concludes by suggesting that the Indonesian elite “perceive both the United States and China 
as the two most potent state-based external factors with the potential to endanger Indonesia’s 
national interests and security” (p. 346). The work of Novotny is an interesting application of 
the balance-of-threat theory, a theory that is based “on the assumption that any assessment of 
power by the elite responsible for a state’s foreign policy entails subjective consideration” (p. 
39). Nonetheless, the work is too narrow in its approach since it only takes into account the 
perceptions of leaders or elites in Indonesia’s foreign policy. As argued early in this chapter, 
with Indonesia’s embrace of democratisation, foreign policy making in the country has to 
consider a number of NSAs to analyse. They range from, among others, NGOs, epistemic 
community to business players. 
Another account of Indonesia’s bilateral relations is the work of Clark and Pietsch (2014), 
examining Indonesia-Malaysia relations. Unlike many other similar accounts that mostly 
focusing on states as actors, a dominant approach in International Relations scholarship, this 
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work is unique as it applies an anthropological approach. Thus, the actors examined in this 
account vary, from the Indonesian-American model Manohara with her ‘Manodrama’ that 
fuelled a heat in the bilateral relations, language and mythology, cultural heritage, and even 
museums. One may wonder on the pertinence of museums in examining the two countries’ 
relations, yet the work shows a mountain of evidence that museums can be related to many 
aspects, more particularly cultural heritage, an aspect that often creates a bilateral conundrum. 
As the authors argue in the chapter concerning Museums, “In its broadest sense, the contrasting 
attitudes toward cultural heritage are representative of the differing politics of the two nations” 
(p. 92).  
In regard to labour migration, Chapter 7 of the work offers an examination of Indonesian 
labour migration to Malaysia. The chapter examines many aspects of the migration, from its 
history, the negative images of Indonesian labourers, to the issue of protection. Concerning 
protection, for example, the authors argue, “Some migrant workers believe that they have 
arrived in Malaysia legally, only to find that their passports were forged by unscrupulous 
private recruitment agencies, rendering them illegal and without any protections at all” (p. 172). 
In general, the examination of labour migration provides a picture of the complexity of this 
issue, though one may wonder why the examination is rather brief despite it being of the central 
themes of this work. 
Despite the work on Indonesia’s foreign policy, as referred to above, most do not examine 
the factors of groups of actors or policy entrepreneurs who influence or play more active roles 
in the making of foreign policy. Anwar (2010: 127) has actually introduced the matter as 
follows: 
After difficult early years of transition, […] relative normalcy and political stability 
seemed to have been restored by 2004 as Indonesia succeeded in holding its first direct 
presidential election. The newly democratic Indonesia recognises freedoms of expression 
and association as key principles, giving rise to a vibrant and increasingly critical civil 
society, free-wheeling media, and numerous political parties. These fundamental changes 
53 
 
in Indonesia’s political landscape have led to a re-structuring of relations between the 
state and society. One of the key areas affected by these political changes is in the making 
and implementation of Indonesian foreign policy, which during the previous era had been 
the prerogative solely of the predominant executive. 
Yet Anwar (2010) does not elaborate further on the factor of groups of actors, or the 
policy entrepreneurs, in Indonesia’s foreign policy-making, even though she has already made 
an interesting point on the rise of ‘vibrant and critical civil society’. She, in fact, chooses to 
focus more on institutional powers, such as the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR – the House 
of Representative) and Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda towards ASEAN, leaving the 
explanation on the role of civil society in lacuna. 
Perhaps this lacuna, to some extent, has been filled out by the work of Yazid (2013) 
which focuses on the important role NGOs play in Indonesia’s domestic and foreign policies. 
The work investigates the activism of Indonesia’s labour migration NGOs, with a focus on 
women migrant workers who are mostly domestic workers (p. 17). Yazid selects two NGOs, 
Women’s Solidarity for Human Rights (SP) and Migrant Care, examining their behaviour in 
the context of Law No. 39/2004 on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Workers 
Overseas and the 2006 MoU between Indonesia and Malaysia on the Recruitment and 
Placement of Indonesian Domestic Workers (p. 17-18). On the issue of how the NGOs 
influence domestic and foreign policies, Yazid suggests that the passing of the law “may not 
have completely met their expectations, but most NGOs admit that it is better to have a law 
than no law at all” (p. 167). On the 2006 MoU between Indonesia and Malaysia, Yazid argues, 
“[Here] decision-making is commonly limited to government representatives, with no room for 
the presence of outsiders, even to observe the process” (p. 197). This, therefore, explains why, 
after the signing of the MoU, the NGOs lodged strong complaints (p. 222).  
The work of Yazid is useful for this thesis as it has relevance to the study of policy 
entrepreneurship in Indonesia’s foreign policy. The finding that the NGOs were caught by 
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surprise in the signing of the MoU, and later lodged strong protests, demonstrates how 
important it is to consider NSAs in foreign policy-making. What is lacking in this work is that 
it does not cover the ratification by Indonesia of the 1990 United Nations Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, a foreign 
policy argued in this thesis as significant. This thesis, however, will build and expand on 
Yazid’s work. 
   
Conclusion 
This chapter begins with an examination of the conceptual framework of policy 
entrepreneurship in foreign policy and further examines its linkage to Indonesia’s domestic and 
foreign policy concerns. The chapter demonstrates that the foreign policy community has 
witnessed a gradual development of policy entrepreneurship. It also demonstrates that the 
interest of policy entrepreneurs is not intellectual but policy preference, which they hope to 
take into the policy-making process. On the question of whether the concept of policy 
entrepreneurship is relevant to studies of public policy or domestic politics, the chapter shows 
that it has a strong relevance, since domestic politics and foreign policy cannot be separated. 
The term ‘policy entrepreneur’ itself, defined as political actors who promote policy 
ideas, was borrowed from economics but applied to political science. In regard to the placement 
of policy entrepreneurs, they may come from any form of institution, or even act as individuals 
who work by themselves. On the role of policy entrepreneurs in the public policy process, the 
chapter argues that they can play a key role in identifying policy problems and indicating 
appropriate policy responses. Some of the common activities of policy entrepreneurs in 
promoting their ideas include identifying problems, networking in policy circles, shaping the 
terms of policy debates, and building coalitions to support policy change. Following Kingdon, 
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the characteristics of policy entrepreneurs who can generate considerable success perform three 
important roles. First, they have some claim to a ‘hearing’. Second, they are known for their 
political connections or negotiating skills. Third, and arguably the most important factor, they 
must be persistent. 
On the selection of Indonesia’s foreign policy as the primary focus of this thesis, scholars 
demonstrate that the notion of policy entrepreneurship activism has existed since the New 
Order period. Furthermore, with Indonesia’s embrace of democratisation after the fall of the 
Suharto regime, this activism gradually developed, especially due to the rise of a vibrant and 
critical civil society and free-wheeling media. The NGOs, think-tanks, and academia are some 
of the elements of civil society that have become more instrumental in the making of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, the chapter demonstrates there are only a few 
scholarly works on the role of policy entrepreneurs in Indonesia’s foreign policy. With that in 
mind, this thesis aims to fill this gap.  
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Chapter 2 
Patterns of Labour Migration from Indonesia: from the Colonial 
Era to the Post-Colonial Period 
 
The phenomenon of Indonesian labour migration is not new. Indonesians have travelled to 
many parts of the world from the pre-colonial period up to the present time.4 As Martinez and 
Vickers (2012: 112) argue, “The peoples who are now Indonesians have been linked into 
regional and global systems for a very long time”. The factors causing migration in the pre-
colonial period were different than in the present day, where migration is driven mostly by 
economic factors. Loveband (2009: 3) has observed, “The vast majority of [international] 
migrants [in the contemporary world] originate from the low income nations of ‘the South’”. 
In pre-colonial times, migration was driven by trade, maritime movement and other factors. As 
Martinez and Vickers (2012: 112) point out, there were many factors that influenced the 
migration of Indonesians in the colonial period, but trade and maritime movement were often 
linked to one another.  
As the case selected for this research is Indonesia’s ratification of the CMW and more 
broadly in the context of labour migration, it is important to begin by investigating its recent 
history.5  This chapter will examine the history of Indonesian labour migration based on the 
                                                          
4 The terms ‘Indonesia’ and ‘Indonesian’ are used loosely in this chapter as they were first coined by British 
geographer James Richardson Logan in the mid-nineteenth century during the colonial period (Brown 2003: 2). 
In the pre-colonial period, the use of those terms was uncommon as there was no specific legal identity imposed 
on individuals in the region of Southeast Asia at that time. As argued by Andaya (2010: 13), “Precolonial 
Southeast Asia was not subject to international conventions confining individuals within a fixed space and 
imposing on them a specific legal identity. Ethnic identity was a fluid concept, and the decision to adopt one or 
more ethnicities was the privilege of the individual”. 
5 Indonesia’s history in labour migration is often examined by scholars in twoperiods: the colonial period under 
the foreign powers (1511 to 17 August 1945), and the post-colonial period (often divided between an initial 
transition of independence to 1970 and then a more democratic period after 1970). 
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periods initially of the colonial and then post-colonial administrations. The beginning of 
colonial period is in the early sixteenth century as Indonesia was colonised by a western 
colonial power, Portugal, for the first time in 1511. The colonial period covers the time from 
1511 up to 1945. 1945 marks the end of the colonisation period in Indonesia as the country 
proclaimed its independence on 17 August 1945. Another section will be on the Post-Colonial 
Period, which will examine history of Indonesian labour migration from the declaration of 
independence in 1945 up to 2015. 
   
2.1 Colonial Period (1511 – 1945) 
Studies of the history of Indonesian labour migration during the colonial period (1511-1945) 
can be divided into two time spans: pre-1870 and post-1870. Pre-1870, the focus is on the 
coming of European colonial powers: the Portuguese, the British and, more particularly, the 
Dutch. Thus, many scholarly works reveal how the colonial powers imposed economic policies 
that can be associated with labour migration. Some of the works investigating the post-1870 
period discuss Indonesian labour migration in depth.  
The rationale for demarcating the two periods in this way is that in 1870 the Dutch-
imposed Cultivation System finally came to an end, bringing a new era where Indonesian 
labour started to move ‘officially’ to other parts of the world. With these introductory notes, 
this section will be divided into two sub-sections: pre-1870 and post-1870. 
 
2.1.1 Pre-1870  
The pre-1870 era of the Colonial period stretches back to the early sixteenth century when 
Indonesia was first colonised by the Portuguese. In those times, Portuguese traders sailed to 
Asia in search of the well-known spices of the region. These traders travelled south down the 
west coast of Africa, round the Cape of Good Hope, and charted the Indian Ocean up to India. 
58 
 
In 1512, Portuguese traders reached Maluku Island where they established a base on the 
Island of Ambon. Once in the region, the traders eventually shifted their efforts from collecting 
spices to securing a monopoly on the trade and also converting the locals to Catholicism. From 
that moment, things changed. Brown (2003: 33) points out, “The Portuguese presence had a 
significant impact on the dispersion of both trade and traders around the archipelago”.  
After being colonised by the Portuguese for almost a century, Indonesia fell to the Dutch. 
The Dutch arrived in Ambon in 1596, easily ousting the Portuguese. They then established the 
later well-known VOC (the Vereenigde Oos-Indische Compagnie – the United East India 
Company) on 20 March 1602. 
The establishment of VOC in Indonesia eventually revived the old practice of the slave 
trade that can be associated with forced labour, a practice that had actually begun in the 
fifteenth century during the Malacca era. Hugo (2006: 61) has argued: 
VOC were entirely mercantilist in their aim to extract the maximum in the way of saleable 
export crops with the minimum expenditure of their resources. The traditional aristocracy 
was installed as regents and became the medium through which the people of Priangan 
were forced to grow coffee. 
The initial intention of VOC in Indonesia itself was not the imposition of a slave trade 
but to become a trading empire. Yet, due to stiff competition with other European powers, the 
VOC needed more manpower. Due to the difficulties in meeting the labour demand, the VOC 
then turned to Asian and African slaves (Welie 2008: 159). 
The dominance of the VOC reached its peak in the last half of the eighteenth century. 
However, in 1799, it went into bankruptcy and later collapsed altogether. After the collapse of 
the VOC, its administration was handed over to the Dutch government. In 1806, the Dutch fell 
to Napoleon Bonaparte of France and he subsequently placed his brother Louis Napoleon on 
the Dutch throne (Ricklefs 2001: 145). Louis then installed Herman Daendels as the Governor-
General of the Indies. 
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From this point, there was a change of policy regarding forced labour. Initially, as noted 
by Brown (2003: 74), Daendels was against such a policy. Nonetheless, due to the naval 
blockade of the Indies by the British as a consequence of the Napoleonic War, Daendels had 
to prevent an invasion, particularly of Java. This meant he had to change his views, pushing 
more people into forced labour.  
At the end of the Napoleonic War in 1816, the British handed Indonesia back to the 
Netherlands. In 1824, Britain and the Netherlands reached an agreement, namely the Treaty of 
London, in which they made a clear dividing line between their interests in Southeast Asia, 
running through the Straits of Melaka. In this agreement, most of the areas that Indonesia 
currently enjoys were handed to the Dutch, whereas the British took over Malaysia and 
Singapore (Brown 2003: 81).  
The Dutch, however, faced financial difficulties due to two significant wars they 
conducted during this time: the Java War (1825-1830) and the Paderi War in Padang (1821-
1838). Despite winning both these wars, the Dutch suffered heavy financial losses. Brown 
(2003: 83) observes, “Both the Java and Paderi Wars cost the Dutch dearly, in personnel and 
in resources”. Because of this, as pointed out by Ricklefs (2001: 156), the Dutch again turned 
to Indonesia as a source of revenue, introducing the Cultivation System in 1830. 
The Cultivation System, as observed by Brown (2003: 84), required villages “to set aside 
one-fifth of their rice fields for the production of a crop nominated by the government, and 
suitable for the European market”. The System achieved huge financial success for the Dutch 
but had great adverse impact on Indonesian peasants.  
The establishment of the Cultivation System had in fact resulted, again, in a system of 
forced labour that affected many people. “Between 1836 and 1860, on average approximately 
60 to 75 per cent of all Javanese peasant households were forced to work in cultivation 
services” (Termorshuizen 2008: 266). 
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Later, some of this forced labour rebelled against the Cultivation System, some suffering 
physically and even dying. It is difficult to estimate the total number of Javanese workers who 
were involved the System, though the suggested number in 1850 was between eight and eleven 
million (Termorshuizen 2008: 267). In the 1840s and 1850s, the crisis deepened and resulted 
in a high death toll, which caused public outrage in the Netherlands. Some of the Dutch 
population, particularly those coming from industrial and capitalist classes who actually 
benefited from the System, demanded its abolition. The reason was, however, not necessarily 
humanitarian. As argued by Brown (2003: 88), members of these classes “wanted to see the 
elimination of state capitalism and its replacement with private enterprise”. 
The Cultivation System was finally ended in 1870 when the Netherlands passed the Sugar 
Law, reforming the colonial sugar industry. The end of the Cultivation System also saw the 
end of the forced labour system.  
Hence, the history of Indonesian labour migration under colonial governments, more 
particularly the Dutch, was dominated by the narratives of a forced labour system. From the 
beginning of its occupation until 1870, the Dutch continued to impose the system and it was 
only interrupted during the brief period of British rule. This system certainly created a 
humanitarian disaster for Indonesian labour, many suffering physically and even dying. This 
brought about attempts to rebel, resulting in high death tolls in the 1840s and 1850s. 
It was because of these death tolls that some in the Dutch population became outraged 
and later demanded the abolition of the Cultivation System. The enactment of the Sugar Law 
in 1870 finally ended this dreadful system of forced labour, shifting the policies on labour and 
labour migration to more humane policies, such as those introduced in the beginning of the 
twentieth century. 
  
 
61 
 
2.1.2 Post-1870 
1870 is considered by scholars to be significant for labour migration in Indonesia and the 
region. This is not only due to the law reform in the Netherlands but also because of changes 
happening throughout Southeast Asia. Kaur (2006: 23-4) observed: 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, industrialisation and economic growth in 
Europe and the expansion of the international economy resulted in European political 
and economic advances in Southeast Asia […] This process, which began around 1850, 
climaxed between 1870 and 1914.  
In the period 1870-1900, Indonesia, in particular, witnessed a substantial flow of private 
capital from the Netherlands. It was primarily due to the enactment of the Agrarian Law of 
1870, which regulated that the only people who could own land in Indonesia were Indonesians, 
foreign private entrepreneurs could only rent the land (Brown 2003: 89). Yet, due to the severe 
economic depression in Java in 1883-85, most of the private companies collapsed. Wages and 
working conditions declined and the welfare of the Javanese was declining in general.  
Responding to this severe economic depression, the Dutch turned to another source of 
revenue: tobacco. In developing tobacco plantations, the Dutch needed three elements: land, 
labour and capital (Brown 2003: 92). In regulating the labourers, the Dutch colonial 
government enacted the 1880 Coolie Ordinance, which worked very much in favour of 
employers and placed a heavy burden on the workers with its Penal Sanction. This Coolie 
Ordinance, however, brought colonial Indonesia into another system of labour and labour 
migration, so-called ‘indentured labour’. 
Indentured labour was actually not new in the nineteenth century.6 The practice had been 
carried out by many European migrants in the three hundred years prior to the nineteenth 
century. During those times, indentured labour travelled to other parts of the world, working 
                                                          
6 By definition, as suggested by Carter (1992: 229), “Indenture has generally been defined as an economically-
induced migration combined with coercive contractual obligations”. The nature of contracts imposed on 
indentured labour is normally that they had to work for a certain period, particularly until their debts to the 
employers were paid off. According to Kaur (2004: 44), “The indentured worker was bound by a contract to serve 
for a specified period – usually three years – until the debt incurred by him was paid off to his employer”. 
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for specific duration, and paid off their debts to their employer. Once they finished paying the 
debts, they were free to choose what to do next (Termorshuizen 2008: 261).  
The recruitment of Indonesian indentured labour was centred in Java and the first recruits 
were sent to Sumatra. Later, Javanese indentured labour was sent to Surinam, replacing the 
streams of labour from British India and China. The rationale in choosing Javanese labour was 
due to economic and ethical reasons (Termorshuizen 2008: 279).  
In implementing the indentured labour system in Indonesia, the Dutch imposed a legal 
framework, namely the Coolie Ordinances, in 1880. Houben (1999: 15), however, argues that 
the Coolie Ordinance was imbalanced against the protection of the labour. This was mainly 
due to the existence of a penal clause (poenale sanctie). This ordinance was later criticised in 
the Netherlands and, finally, it was withdrawn in 1931. 
The indentured labour system under the 1880 Coolie Ordinance not only affected 
Indonesian labour in that country but also caused the migration of some labour to other parts 
of the world. Hugo (1993: 37) noted: 
Significant number of contract workers were sent abroad especially to the Malay 
Peninsula and Surinam, but also to New Caledonia, Siam (Thailand), British North 
Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak, Cochin China (Vietnam) and even Australia”. 
Labour migration scholars generally agree that, under the 1880 Coolie Ordinance, 
Indonesian contract labour was first sent to Surinam in South America in 1890 (Termorshuizen 
2008: 279). Due to the warm welcome given to Indonesian indentured labour in Surinam, more 
and more workers were sent to this Dutch colony. The sending of labour to Surinam continued 
until 1939, involving almost 33,000 Javanese (Allen: 204). The sending of indentured labour 
stopped in 1931 due to the abolition of the 1880 Coolie Ordinance. Thus, between 1931 and 
1939, migrant workers sent to Surinam were either free labourers, colonists, or a mixture of 
both (Termorshuizen 2008: 299). 
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The migration of Indonesian indentured labour in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries was not just to far away parts of the world such as Surinam. The flow of migrant 
labour to neighbouring Malaysia also increased.  
As was the case in Surinam, Indonesian indentured labour in Malaysia also received a 
warm welcome. One reason that Indonesian labour was in demand was the commonality of 
culture and religion, which meant they could easily mix with the local Malays (Kaur 2005: 9). 
The living and working conditions of Javanese workers in Malaysia in the early twentieth 
century were good. Not only were contracts based on a specific regulation but the workers also 
enjoyed protective measures against possible maltreatment (Kaur 2005: 9).  
The Dutch government, however, repealed the 1909 Netherlands Indian Labour 
Protection Enactment in 1932 and, subsequently, the sending of Indonesian indentured labour 
was terminated. Indonesian labour migration continued under the free recruitment system but 
it did not proceed well. Later, the Dutch government attempted to import more Javanese but 
this was brought to an end by the Japanese occupation (Kaur 2005: 11).  
During World War II (1939-1945), Japan occupied Indonesia from 1942, overthrowing 
the Netherlands. Under Japanese rule, Indonesians were sent abroad and forced to work on 
Japanese projects (romusha). The Japanese occupation of Indonesia, albeit short term, had a 
huge impact on Indonesian migration. As pointed out by Hugo (2006: 66), “The short Japanese 
occupation period was one in which there was significant forced migration”. This migration, 
which was associated with forced labour, was catastrophic for Indonesia. According to Brown 
(2003: 146-7), “[Romusha] brought hardship and suffering to tens of thousands of people”.  
The Romusha system could even be regarded as bringing Indonesian labour migration 
back to the old practice of slavery that had occurred centuries before. Worse, the Romusha 
labourers frequently failed to return to Indonesia. Based on his fieldwork in West Java in 1973, 
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of around 100 young men taken as Romusha labourers, Hugo (2006: 67) finds, “None of [them] 
returned at the end of the war”. 
The United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 
1945 respectively. These great catastrophes in Japan brought an opportunity to the already 
resentful Indonesians to declare independence, on 17 August 1945. This independence shifted 
the country from a colonial to a post-colonial era. 
 
2.2 Post-Colonial Period  
This section argues that labour migration in the post-colonial Indonesia differs from that in the 
pre- and colonial eras particularly in terms of the factors that have shaped it. The main factors 
are both national policy and foreign governmental policy. In earlier times, factors such as trade, 
maritime movement, and the policies of colonial governments were more dominant. 
For the purpose of simplicity, this section will be divided by decade, except for the first 
part (1945-1959). This section is therefore divided into seven sub-sections. The first sub-
section will examine the period from 1945-1959. One of the important developments in this 
period was the establishment of the Ministry of Labour. The second sub-section, the 1960s, 
will investigate how developments in neighbouring states, particularly Malaysia, affected 
Indonesian labour migration. The third sub-section, the 1970s, will discuss the phenomenon of 
increasing Indonesian migrant labour as a result of both internal and external factors. The fourth 
sub-section, the 1980s, will examine the initial involvement of the private sector in the labour 
migration industry, the first official sending of Indonesian labour to Middle East, and the 
emergence of irregular migrant labour. The fifth sub-section, 1990s, will investigate the 
regularisation policy implemented by Malaysia in response to the influx of irregular migrants. 
This section will also investigate how Indonesia embraced the new political system, reformasi 
(reform), a shift from an authoritarian system to a full-fledged democracy. 
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The sixth sub-section, the 2000s, will highlight labour migration policies launched by the 
Indonesian government and the high-profile Nunukan humanitarian crisis. The seventh sub-
section, the 2010s, will examine numerous recent developments, particularly the issue of the 
protection of migrant labour rights. 
Out of the seven sub-sections, sub-sections 6 and 7 will briefly touch on activism of NGO 
members – the policy entrepreneurs – who influenced the making of Indonesia’s foreign policy, 
the central theme of this thesis. The foreign policy in this context is the ratification of the 1990 
United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (CMW). 
 
2.2.1 1945-1959 
This sub-section examines issues of labour migration in the newly independent Indonesia. It 
also examines the migration of Indonesian workers to Malaysia after Malaysia achieved its 
independence in 1957. 
After Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta declared Indonesia’s independence on 17 August 
1945, the country subsequently experienced a period of power transition from colonial rule to 
independence as well as a state-building process. Given the central theme of this chapter, from 
1945-1959 there was limited movement of Indonesian labour to other countries. Unlike the 
period of Japanese rule (1942-1945) where there was substantial movement of Indonesian 
labour because of the romusha system, in the early period of post-colonial migration was 
limited (Hugo 2004: 34). 
The issue of labour became a focus of the government when Indonesia established the 
Kementerian Perburuhan (Ministry of Labour) on 3 July 1947. This establishment is considered 
historical (Azmy 2012: 42, BNP2TKI 2011). As written in the website of Badan Nasional 
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Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (BNP2TKI – National Agency for the 
Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers): 
The date of 3 July 1947 became historical for the Ministry of Labour in Indonesia's 
independence era. Through the Governmental Decree No. 3 of 1947, Indonesia finally 
had an institution managing labour issues: the Ministry of Labour (BNP2TKI 2011). 
The establishment of the Ministry of Labour did not, however, automatically correspond 
to the mass mobility of Indonesian labour wanting to work overseas. In the 1950s there was 
still limited migration of Indonesian labour to other countries. It was not a phenomenon 
exclusive to Indonesia, as other countries in Southeast Asia faced a similar situation. Hugo 
(2004: 30) observes, “In the 1950s […] there was very limited migration in and out of the 
countries of the [Southeast Asian] region”. 
Despite limited migration, there was still movement of Indonesians to what is currently 
known as Malaysia from the late 1950s to the early 1960s after Malaysia achieved 
independence from the British in 1957. This was a political decision, as the Malaysian 
government hoped migration from Indonesia would provide a balance to the population of 
settlers from China and India. Liow (2003: 46), for example, argued:  
Later in the 1950s and early 1960s, Indonesian migration into Malaya was also 
encouraged by the Malaysian Government for political reasons, as their easy integration 
into the Malay community allowed Malays to maintain a numerical edge in the 
population over the Chinese and Indians. 
Indonesian migration to Malaysia in this period went relatively uninterrupted. As 
observed by Liow (2003: 46), Indonesian immigrants “were ‘silently welcomed’ by the 
Malays”. Similar to the situation during the Colonial period as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
some of the reasons for this continued migration were issues of race and ethnicity. 
“[Indonesian] immigrants were perceived as bangsa serumpun (of the same racial stock) who 
would eventually assimilate with the local bumiputera (indigenous person, literally ‘sons of 
the soil’)” (Liow 2003: 46). 
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This sub-section demonstrates that from 1945-1959 there was limited labour migration 
as such. There was mobility from Indonesia to Malaysia as the Malaysian government 
encouraged more Indonesian immigrants to settle in this country for the purpose of maintaining 
Malay dominance over the Chinese and Indian populations. This policy continued throughout 
the 1960s. This will be discussed further in the following section. 
 
2.2.2 The 1960s 
This sub-section investigates, among other things, the regime change from Sukarno to Suharto 
and the racial riot in Malaysia. This section also investigates whether this event contributed to 
increased labour migration from Indonesia to Malaysia. 
As was in the 1950s, in the early 1960s there was limited Indonesian migration to other 
parts of the world, which was a common phenomenon in Southeast Asia at the time (Hugo 
2004: 30). Yet the change of regime from Sukarno to Suharto in 1967 brought significant 
changes in terms of national policies, including on labour migration. The Suharto government, 
according to Azmy (2012: 43-4), aimed for more aggressive economic development policies, 
which left out the agricultural sector. As a result, many farmers lost their jobs. The government 
then developed an economic policy based on cheap labour in order to attract foreign investment 
and sent labour overseas. Notably, in 1969 the Indonesian government implemented Rencana 
Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Repelita) Pertama (The First Five Year Plan), 1969-1974, and the 
movements of Indonesian labour to other countries was officially recorded from this year on. 
In the regional context, Indonesian labour migration gained more impetus after Malaysia 
experienced racial riots in the late 1960s. This was in line with the policy introduced in 
Malaysia in the late 1950s of giving preference to Indonesian immigrants. Liow (2003: 46) 
argues, “The political motivation for the encouragement of Indonesian immigration gained 
greater urgency after the 13 May 1969 racial riots in Malaysia”. The riots, which occurred after 
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Malaysia held a federal election in May 1969, forced the government to assess its state identity, 
which later generated policies toward Malay dominance in the country. One of the policies was 
the New Economic Policy (NEP). Jomo (2004: 2) observes that this policy was made after the 
riot as one of several efforts by Malaysia to achieve national unity. The NEP will be discussed 
further in the following section. 
Thus, it can be argued that after the 13 May 1969 riot, further immigration from Indonesia 
was viewed by the Malaysian government as a buffer against the increased dominance of 
Malaysian Chinese. It was indeed a politically motivated policy, which was to limit the number 
of one nation-ethnicity, the Chinese, in relation to another, the Malays. As observed by Liow 
(2003: 46), “Many among the Malaysian leadership saw that close relations with Jakarta 
worked as an effective buffer to the increasing dominance of the ethnic Chinese community in 
Malaysia at the time”. 
This section demonstrates that one notable development in the 1960s was the national 
policy concerning labour migration, which the Indonesian government implemented for the 
first time as Repelita I in 1969. One important aspect of Repelita was that the migration of 
Indonesian labour was recorded officially. Another notable development was what occurred, 
again, in Malaysia after the 13 May 1969 riot. This riot pushed the Malaysian government to 
implement the New Economic Policy, a policy that drove further Indonesian labour migration 
to Malaysia in the 1970s onwards. 
 
2.2.3 The 1970s 
This sub-section discusses the New Economic Policy (NEP) of Malaysia, the initial movement 
of Indonesian migrant workers to Singapore, and the policy implemented by Indonesia in 
encouraging more workers to work overseas. All these phenomena had arguably contributed to 
the increasing trend of Indonesia labour working overseas. 
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As discussed earlier, from 1945-59 and during the 1960s, there was limited migration, 
let alone labour migration, from Indonesia. Some scholars suggest that it was in the 1970s that 
there was a significant increase in the movement of labour out of Indonesia (Azmy 2012, Hugo 
2004, Kaur 2006). One of the reasons for this phenomenon was the change in economic policies 
in Indonesia’s neighbouring countries, particularly Malaysia. These changes had an impact on 
Indonesian labour migration. Kaur (2005: 7) argues that in this period Malaysia implemented 
an export-oriented industrialisation policy based on low-cost labour-intensive export 
manufacturers. 
This export-oriented industrialisation strategy was implemented in Malaysia in 1970 
under the so-called New Economic Policy (NEP). This policy, as suggested by Jomo (2004: 
1), aimed to reduce poverty and to restructure society to eliminate the identification of race 
with economic function for the purpose of creating conditions of national unity. Since its 
implementation, Malaysia experienced fast economic growth as well as poverty reduction. 
Jomo (2004: 1) observes, “Since then, poverty in Malaysia had decreased tremendously”. 
The NEP had indeed transformed Malaysia and brought about rapid economic growth. 
At the same time, it created a problem with labour shortages (Garcés-Mascareñas 2012: 54). 
Confronted with this problem, Malaysia again turned to Indonesia, still with the rationale that 
Indonesian labour came from a similar cultural background. Kaur (2005: 7-8) observes: 
The old pattern of reliance on cheap labour associated with market competitiveness re-
emerged, and with it a dependence on foreign labour. Since then about a quarter of 
Malaysia’s workforce has consisted of migrant labour. The largest percentage of this 
migrant labour force has comprised Indonesians, consistent with the Malaysian 
government’s policy of recruiting people from a similar racial stock. 
It was also in the 1970s that the Malaysian government initiated a liberal policy on 
migrant labour recruitment. Kaur (2005: 24) observes, “[In the phase of] 1970-80, government 
followed a liberal policy towards foreign worker recruitment”. This liberalisation forced 
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employers to either hire Indonesians who resided in Malaysia or directly hire labour from 
Indonesia through private brokers. 
Beside the movement to Malaysia, Indonesian labour also began moving to Singapore in 
the 1970s. In the early period of this city-state’s development, most migrant labour came from 
Malaysia. From the late 1970s, labour from other countries, including Indonesia, began 
working in Singapore. Piper (2005: 2) notes, “Malaysia has historically represented a 
‘traditional source country’ for migrant labour in Singapore, but since 1978 flows have ebbed 
due to Malaysia’s own economic development”. As Malaysia also experienced shortages of 
workers due to its developmental needs, Singapore was forced to turn to workers from other 
countries. The so-called ‘non-traditional source countries’, such as Bangladesh, India, 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Thailand, had been considered for the purpose of 
overcoming persistent labour shortages (Piper 2005: 2). 
Another reason for the increase in Indonesian labour migration during this period was an 
internal factor, encouragement from the Indonesian government itself. As argued by Sinaga 
(2012: 61), it was from 1979 that the government actively promoted the sending of Indonesian 
workers overseas and these active interventions had contributed significantly to the rising trend 
of Indonesian labour migration. Some of the active interventions of government were reflected 
in the creation of government-to-government programs (Azmy (2012: 44). 
This sub-section demonstrates that the 1970s witnessed a significant increase of 
Indonesian labour migration, particularly to Malaysia. This increase was shaped by two factors, 
external (foreign governmental policy) and internal (national policy). On the external factor, 
Malaysia’s export-oriented strategy (NEP) had a significant impact as this policy had created 
labour shortages in Malaysia. This then forced the Malaysian government to turn to Indonesia 
with an increased demand for labour. On the internal factor, the active interventions of the 
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Indonesian government, including creating government-to-government programs, also pushed 
for more migration of Indonesian labour. 
 
2.2.4 The 1980s 
This sub-section examines the increase in Indonesian labour migration, the official recruitment 
of workers to Middle East, and the emerging association of Indonesian workers in Malaysia as 
pendatang haram (irregular migrants). 
During the 1980s, there was a further increase in Indonesian labour migration. Similar to 
what had happened in the 1970s, the increase in the 1980s was shaped by both internal and 
external factors. It was in this period that, besides managing labour migration itself, the 
Indonesian government involved the private sector in the management process, particularly in 
the recruitment phase (Sinaga 2012: 61). This policy was implemented by the establishment of 
an association of companies that provided services in recruiting Indonesian migrant labour, the 
so-called Asosiasi Perusahaan Jasa Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (APJATI – Association of 
Companies for Indonesian Migrant Workers). Later in the Repelita IV (1984-1989), the 
government for the first time identified Indonesian labour migration as a national program 
(Sinaga 2012: 61). 
These policies, alongside those previously launched by the government (the internal 
factor), caused the rate of Indonesian labour migration in the 1980s to increase significantly 
(see Table 2.1 below). Beside these policies, another reason driving the increase was the 
external factor, in this case, fast economic development in the Middle East. As observed by 
Adi (2003: 131), “[The increase in the Middle East] was related to the large scale development 
of infrastructure and industry in Middle Eastern countries which required massive numbers of 
workers”.  
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Figure 2.1  Number of Indonesian Overseas Workers, 1969-2002 
Year Male Female Total 
Five Year Planning Periods    
I : 1969-74 --- --- 5,624 
II : 1974-79 12,235 3,817 16,052 
III : 1979-84 41,410 55,000 96,410 
IV : 1984-89 93,527 198,735 292,262 
V : 1989-94 209,962 442,310 652,272 
VI : 1994-97* 310,372 503,980 814,352 
VI : 1999-2002 383,496 972,198 1,355,694 
* The data for 1998 is not available  
Sources: Adi 2003: 132, Azmy 2012: 63 
Although mobility had occurred for centuries due to the Hajj (Pilgrimage to Mecca), it 
was in 1983 that the official sending of Indonesian labour to the Middle East began. Silvey 
(2006: 28) notes it was in that year that the Indonesian government for the first time allowed 
Middle Eastern countries to formally recruit Indonesians to work overseas. The government 
registered 47,000 contract workers for Saudi Arabia alone. 
Other neighbouring countries, such as Malaysia and Singapore, also became more 
important receiving countries for Indonesian labour. Soeprobo and Wiyono (2004: 119) 
observe that since the 1980s, Malaysia, Singapore and Saudi Arabia have become the main 
destinations of Indonesian migrant workers. The rise in migration to Malaysia was caused by 
several factors, particularly the legalisation of foreign worker recruitment. Kaur (2005: 24), for 
example, observes that during 1981-88 foreign worker recruitment in Malaysia was legalised, 
an official channel was established, and bilateral agreements were signed with sending 
countries. 
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The implementation of foreign labour recruitment policy in Malaysia established official 
cooperation with Indonesia, and the two sides established a committee and signed a bilateral 
agreement in 1982 and 1984, respectively. Kaur (2005: 24-25) noted: 
In 1982 a Committee for the Recruitment of Foreign Workers was established and in 
1984 the Malaysian government signed a bilateral agreement, known as the Medan 
Agreement, with the Indonesian government for the government-to-government 
regulated supply of Indonesian workers for the plantation and domestic work sectors. 
One of the results of this recruitment policy was that Malaysia began to employ more 
domestic labour in the late 1980s. The primary reason of this was increased female participation 
in the Malaysian workforce. Garcés-Mascareñas (2012: 55) argued that up to the late 1980s, 
economic development drew Malaysian women into the workforce and this increased female 
participation brought a heightened demand for foreign domestic workers. This demand then 
resulted in the increasing numbers of women workers in Malaysia compared with men. As 
World Bank (2008: 18) puts it, “In the 1980s, female migrant outflow, especially as domestic 
helpers, began to increase significantly and outnumber male migrant”. 
 
2.2.4.1 Irregular Indonesian Migrant Labour 
Another important phenomenon occurring in Malaysia in the 1980s was the increasing 
popularity of the term ‘pendatang haram’ (irregular migrants), which was later changed to the 
more politically correct as ‘pendatang tanpa izin’ (PATI – migrants without permission) (Clark 
and Pietsch 2014: 170-171). In the common terminology used by international organisations 
(IOs), IOs such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) label this phenomenon 
‘irregular migration’ (International Organization for Migration 2010: 17). 
On the use of the terms pendatang haram or PATI, Garcés-Mascareñas (2012: 63) 
observes that at first they referred to the ‘boat people’ refugees from Vietnam who arrived in 
Malaysia in the late 1970s. However, in the following decade, these terms were almost 
synonymous with illegal Indonesian migrants. 
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In an effort to better manage labour migration, Malaysia and Indonesia established an 
agreement in 1984, the Agreement on Supply of Workers between the Republic of Indonesia 
and Malaysia (the Medan Agreement). The Agreement, however, was regarded to have failed 
in curbing the PATI. As observed by Kassim (2007: 58), “In spite of [the Medan Agreement], 
aliens continued to enter the country clandestinely”.  As a result, in January 1989 the Malaysian 
government launched a policy of regularising illegal migrants. 
The implementation of the regularisation policy was targeted toward Indonesian labour 
in the plantation sector. Through this policy, employers of Indonesian labour were asked to 
register their irregular labour and have them regularised within six months (Kassim 2007: 58). 
However, the first implementation of this policy was unsuccessful due to minimum cooperation 
from employers. “Many employers ignored the regularisation exercise, feeling safe in their 
belief that the government lacked effective mechanisms to enforce the directives” (Kassim 
2007: 58-9). Implementation of the policy was then postponed until mid-1991. 
Hence the 1980s witnessed increased migration of Indonesian labour. It was also in this 
period that Indonesian labour began to be employed in Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi 
Arabia. One of the factors driving this migration was the involvement of the private sector in 
the recruitment of labour. Another factor was development in the Middle East, which 
experienced fast economic growth and therefore needed more labour for its infrastructure and 
industrial development. 
The 1980s also witnessed a new phenomenon: irregular Indonesian migrants in Malaysia. 
Thus, in the late 1980s, the Malaysian government launched a policy of regularising the 
illegals, targeting mainly Indonesian labour. At its initial implementation, the policy did not 
succeed due to lack of cooperation from employers. Implementation of the policy was then 
postponed until the 1990s. Later this policy had a significant impact on Indonesian labour as, 
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for the first time, they faced deportation. This topic will be discussed further in the following 
section. 
 
2.2.5 The 1990s 
This sub-section investigates, among other things, the continued implementation of Malaysia’s 
regularisation policy for the purpose of halting irregular immigration and the first deportations 
of irregular migrants. This sub-section also investigates the reform era and the regime changes 
in Indonesia and whether these changes brought significant reform to Indonesian labour 
migration. 
In the early 1990s the Malaysian government continued the regularisation policy for the 
purpose of curbing illegal immigration. As previously discussed, the policy was mainly 
intended against Indonesian migrant workers who dominated the labour force and were viewed 
as a threat to the local workforce (Garcés-Mascareñas 2012: 62). This policy itself was 
triggered by economic recession in Malaysia (Kaur (2005: 25). 
This led to a more stringent policy implemented in Malaysia, which was the freezing of 
labour importation in 1989. At the same time, the Malaysian government continued the policy 
of regularising migrant labour, the majority of which were Indonesians. Kaur (2005: 25) 
observes, “Concurrently, a programme to legalise/regularise the status of Indonesian migrants 
was implemented”. In the late 1990s, the rate of regularisation of Indonesian labour was high. 
As noted by Garcés-Mascareñas (2012: 58), most regularised migrants came from Indonesia, 
which accounted for 88.1%. 
Another phase of Malaysia’s policy on labour importation was implemented in 1997. 
According to Kaur (2005: 25), it was the financial and economic crisis of 1997-8 that marked 
a change in state policy toward foreign labour recruitment. In this context, Malaysia made 
efforts to control irregular migrants, such as introducing an amnesty programme that permitted 
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illegal labour to leave without penalty and enforcing a work-permit system based on offshore 
recruitment. Further, Malaysia categorised its migrant labour more rigidly and strengthened its 
legislative and police action against irregular migration. It also established detention camps to 
hold irregular migrant workers. 
 
2.2.5.1 Deportation of Indonesian Migrant Labour 
The problem of irregular migrant labour in Malaysia has often been linked to the Malaysian 
government’s deportation policy. Even though the policy was not necessarily implemented on 
a regular basis, it caused negative impacts and even humanitarian crises, particularly for labour 
from Indonesia. 
Initiated in 1991 through a comprehensive work permit policy, Malaysia immediately 
launched the very first deportation campaign, which was to find and send undocumented or 
irregular migrant workers out of Malaysia. Garcés-Mascareñas (2012: 93) suggests that “the 
ideological thrust of this first deportation campaign was to ‘clear the country of illegals’ before 
embarking on the new labour policy.” To enforce this policy, the Malaysian government 
imposed two types of activity, namely Ops Nyah I and Ops Nyah II (‘Ops Nyah’ literally means 
Operation Get Rid). Ops Nyah I aimed to prevent unauthorised landings along Malaysia’s 
coastline; Ops Nyah II targeted undocumented migrants by raiding worksites and settlements. 
Under this deportation policy, many Indonesians were repatriated. Rudnick (2009: 70), for 
example, notes, “By 1999, almost 350,000 migrants had been repatriated. An additional 
188,000 left voluntarily and about 1,450,000 had come forward under legalisation 
programmes”. Indonesian labour was indeed the most impacted by the policy as their number 
reached more than 70 percent of those considered illegal. As noted by Kassim (2000: 102), 
under the Ops Nyah I and Ops Nyah II in 1992 and 1996, more than 70 percent of the irregular 
foreign workers were from Indonesia. 
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Indonesia was hit hard by the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. This crisis triggered 
the fall of the long-held authoritarian regime of President Suharto on 21 May 1998, which 
subsequently brought the Vice President Habibie to the presidential seat. Indonesia thus entered 
the reformasi (reform) era. Habibie, however, did not undertake much reform of Indonesian 
labour migration policy. At that time, as argued by Brown (2003: 231-4), he had to focus on 
managing the economic crisis and political instability. If there were to be policies made under 
Habibie’s administration, there were two regulations concerning the placement of migrant 
workers and social insurance. These policies, according to Azmy (2012: 51), focused only on 
managerial and operational matters and paid little attention to the issue of protection. 
Later in 1999 Habibie was replaced by Abdurrahman Wahid. Though his presidential 
term was as short as Habibie’s, Wahid released several notable policies concerning Indonesian 
labour migration. Some of those policies were the ratification of major conventions of the 
International Labour Organisation such as the Convention No. 138 on Minimum Labour Age, 
Convention No. 111 on Discrimination in Jobs, and the making of Law No. 37 of 1999 on 
Foreign Relations. Law No. 37 obliges the Indonesian government to protect Indonesian 
citizens including migrant workers abroad “regardless of whether they have initiated the case 
or are a defendant to a case” (ILO 2006: 23). 
This sub-section shows that Indonesian labour migration in the 1990s was much affected 
by the renewed implementation of Malaysia’s regularisation policy. This took place in the early 
1990s through the so-called Ops Nyah. Further fuelled by the Asian economic crisis, by the 
end of 1990s this policy had repatriated almost 350,000 migrants, the majority of them 
Indonesians. Internally, Indonesia also experienced a reform era, which brought a transition 
from the political system of authoritarianism to democracy. This brought changes in the 2000s, 
which they will be discussed in the following section. 
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2.2.6 The 2000s 
This sub-section examines, among others thing, the labour migration policies generated by 
subsequent administrations of Wahid, Megawati, and SBY. This sub-section also closely 
examines the Nunukan humanitarian crisis, a major event that transformed Indonesia’s 
domestic and foreign policies. The Nunukan crisis and other events occurring in this period 
forced the government to pay closer attention to the protection of Indonesian migrant workers. 
From 1999 to 2001 Indonesia was led by President Abdurrahman Wahid. As a former 
socio-religious leader as well as a human rights activist, Wahid paid attention to the issue of 
labour rights. Robinson (2009: 114), for example, notes that it was under Wahid’s presidency 
that Indonesia enacted Law No. 21 in 2000 regarding Workers Unions and since then there had 
been “steady growth in independent labour unions and federations”. Table 3.2 below 
demonstrates that, shortly after Wahid took the presidency, his government made several 
notable policies. 
 
Table 2.2   Selected Government Major Policies on Migrant Workers prior to Law No. 39/2004 (1970-
2004) 
Administration National Policies 
Suharto 
(1966-1998) 
The Decree of Minister of Manpower 4/1970 
The Joint Decision of Ministers of Transportation, Manpower, Transmigration, and 
Cooperative No. KM 136/S/PHB and No. Kep-59/MEN/1977 
Priority program in economic plan in the Fourth Five Year Development Plan (1984-1989) 
The sixth of seven basic policy priorities of Indonesia’s Sixth Five Year Plan (1994-1999) 
The Regulation of Minister of Manpower 2/1994 on the Placement of Migrant Workers in 
Foreign Countries 
The 1997 National Law on Labour 
Medan Agreement, 1984 on official channels for migrant workers 
Exchange of Note for Informal Sector, 30 January 1996 (domestic helper) 
Note of Agreement for formal sector, 1 August 1998 
Habibie 
(1998-1999) 
Presidential Regulation 29/1999 on the Establishment of Coordinating Agency for the 
Placement of Migrant Workers7 
                                                          
7 This regulation in the work of Sinaga (2012: 63) is put as one of the products of Wahid’s administration. The 
fact is that the regulation is the product of Habibie’s administration (see, for instance, Hukum Online 1999). 
79 
 
Wahid 
(1999-2001) 
The 1999 State Guidelines (Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara) 
Law 20/1999 on the Ratification of ILO Convention no 138 on Minimum Labour Age 
Law 21/1999 on the Ratification of ILO Convention no 111 on Discrimination in Jobs 
Law 37/1999 on Foreign Relations, Article 18 
The Regulation of Minister of Manpower and Transmigration 172/2001 on Technical 
Team on Indonesian Labour Return 
Megawati 
(2001-2004) 
The Regulation of Minister of Manpower and Transmigration 104A/2002 
The Presidential Decree 36/2002 on the Ratification of ILO Convention no 88 on service 
agency for migrant workers placement 
Indonesia-Malaysia Memorandum of Understanding to provide more safeguards in 
recruitment and repatriation of migrant workers, May 2004 
Source: Sinaga 2012: 63 
The presidency of Wahid lasted until 2001 and he was replaced by his Vice President, 
Megawati Soekarnoputri. In terms of labour migration, Megawati’s administration issued a 
number of notable policies, including Indonesia’s ratification of the ILO Convention 
concerning migrant worker placement. It was also under her administration that the government 
established Direktorat Perlindungan WNI dan Badan Hukum Indonesia (the Directorate of 
Protection of Indonesian Citizens and Legal Entities) under Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Azmy (2012: 52) argues that this body was established for the purpose of strengthening 
the protection of Indonesian migrant labour. 
 
2.2.6.1 Mass Deportation – the Nunukan Humanitarian Crisis 
A major critical event in Megawati’s presidency was the mass deportation of Indonesian 
workers from Malaysia to Nunukan, East Kalimantan, in 2002. Scholars (Azmy 2012, Clark 
and Pietsch 2014, Ford 2005, Tirtosudarmo 2004) view this mass deportation as a humanitarian 
crisis. 
The Nunukan crisis began with the deportation of Indonesian labour in Malaysia in the 
1990s, following the regularisation policy implemented by the Malaysian government. Later 
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in 2002, the Malaysian government launched major operations against illegal migrants and this 
subsequently created a severe humanitarian crisis for many Indonesian migrant workers and 
their families. The numbers of Indonesians deported were huge. According to Ford (2006: 228), 
the Malaysian authorities through Immigration Act No. 1154 of 1 August 2002 deported almost 
400,000 Indonesians to Sumatra’s Belawan, Batam and Dumai and Kalimantan’s Pontianak 
and Nunukan. It was on Nunukan Island, located in the north-eastern part of Kalimantan, that 
the crisis occurred. Ford (2006: 228), for example, observes, “The sudden influx of deportees 
to Nunukan, a small island […] with a permanent population of just under 40,000 people caused 
a humanitarian crisis“. 
As of 15 September 2002, it was reported that, 71 Indonesian migrant workers had died 
(Liputan 6 2002). The main cause of the deaths, as observed by Tirtosudarmo (2004: 325), was 
inadequate medical facilities and made worse by the government response which was too late. 
The Nunukan crisis drove Indonesian NGOs to push President Megawati and her 
administration more urgent action in handling the issue of Indonesian migrant labour 
protection. As argued by Ford (2006: 240): 
NGOs dealing with migrant labour played an important role in bringing the Nunukan 
crisis to the central government’s attention and in eventually forcing the government to 
take steps to begin to address the situation in Nunukan and other transit locations. 
However, as the NGOs – particularly those allying themselves in Jaringan Relawan 
Kemanusiaan (Humanitarian Volunteers Network) such as Solidaritas Perempuan, Koalisi 
Perempuan Indonesia, and Kopbumi – considered Megawati’s government did not respond 
adequately to the crisis, they immediately filed a citizen lawsuit against the government in 
September 2002 (Ford 2006: 240). 
Some of the critical points in the lawsuit, as described in Hukum Online (2002) were, 
first, President Megawati and her central government were deemed to have reacted very slowly 
in responding to the emergency, resulting in the deaths of tens of migrant labour. Second, the 
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NGOs accused the President as the head of government of failing to protect Indonesian migrant 
labour in Malaysia. Third, the President was accused of not carrying out the principle of good 
governance. 
Interestingly, even though this was the first time in Indonesia’s legal system such a 
lawsuit was brought, and there were debates concerning its legal standing, the court accepted 
it. The claimants also demanded the government establish a bilateral agreement with Malaysia 
on the placement and protection of migrant labour and urged the Indonesian government to 
sign and ratify the CMW (Hukum Online 2003, Yazid 2013: 107). 
In short, the Nunukan crisis had brought changes to Indonesia’s national laws and 
international agreements. As noted by Ford (2006: 241), “New bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations were also undertaken after the Nunukan crisis”. Later, on 22 September 2004, 
Indonesia signed the CMW and on 18 October 2004 President Megawati enacted Law No. 39 
of 2004 on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers. 
 
2.2.6.2 Labour Migration Policies under SBY Administration 
In 2004, Megawati was replaced by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). One of his tasks as 
the new president was to implement Law No. 39 of 2004. The early years of SBY’s presidency 
were also marked by the case of Nirmala Bonat, an Indonesian female labourer who was 
severely tortured by her Malaysian employer. According to Anggraeni (2006: 133), Bonat was 
abused by beating, burning and scalding. Due to this case, according to Azmy (2012: 57), 
Indonesian people demanded the government improve the protection of Indonesian overseas 
workers. 
During his presidency in 2004-2009, as noted by Azmy (2012: 58, 89-90), SBY generated 
numerous policies on the protection of Indonesian migrant labour. Table 3.5. below shows 
some of those policies. 
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Table 2.3 The Policies of Migrant Labour Protection under SBY Administration, 2004-2009 
Number Policy 
1 Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 81 Year 2006 regarding the Establishment of BNP2TKI 
(Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia – the National Agency 
for Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers)  
2 Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 6 Year 2006 regarding Reform Policy of Placement and 
Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers. 
Note: This Inpres was made by President SBY after listening to the complaints of Indonesian 
migrant labour in Malaysia and Qatar. 
3 Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 02 Year 2007 regarding Establishment of BNP2TKI with Jumhur 
Hidayat as the first Head of Agency 
4 Regulation of Minister of Foreign Affairs (Permenlu) No. 4 Year 2008 regarding Citizen Services 
at Indonesia’s Foreign Missions 
Sources: Azmy (2012: 89-90); Human Rights Working Group (2011: 11) 
 
Of all the policies generated during SBY’s presidency in 2004-9, the establishment of 
BNP2TKI is considered a breakthrough. Sinaga (2012: 94) argued, “… the establishment of 
BNP2TKI [has] been regarded as a breakthrough in solving the deadlocked system of 
protection of Indonesian migrant workers”. In practice, however, BNP2TKI is considered not 
to have performed its roles as expected. Sinaga (2012: 94) observed: 
Rather than the establishment of a protection system, it only justifies the complicated 
system of workers recruitment and placement into a higher legal instrument and a more 
coordinated agency […] The significant portion given to the placement system has made 
it still possible and easier for private agencies to abuse their power in reaping profits both 
legally and illegally. 
This negative assessment of the real work of BNP2TKI is similar to what has been 
observed by Azmy (2012: 89), who suggests that, in practice, BNP2TKI has worsened the 
situation for potential migrant labour as it created two channels of recruitment, namely the 
Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration and BNP2TKI, and there is no clear division of 
work and responsibilities between the two institutions. 
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Besides the policies within the national government, SBY’s administration also made a 
number of bilateral agreements (memorandums of understanding - MoU) with several countries 
that regulate Indonesian labour migration. Up to December 2006, according to World Bank 
(2008: 10), Indonesia had signed seven MoUs with migrant-receiving countries such as the 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Kuwait, Jordan, and Japan. These MoUs were mainly 
concerned with: 
- Designation of the agencies responsible for recruiting, selecting, and sending of 
Indonesian workers and their counterpart in the migration-recipient country. 
- Definition of quotas, recruitment requirements, procedure and mechanism, and job-
seekers in each country. 
- Definition of the terms of the labour contracts such as the maximum duration  
 
(World Bank 2008: 10). 
This sub-section demonstrates that, under the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, in the 
early 2000s there was further policies were launched in Indonesia concerning migrant labour 
rights. When Megawati took over the presidency in 2002, Indonesia experienced more 
problems with labour migration, including the high-profile and severe Nunukan humanitarian 
crisis. While this case occurred because of regularisation and deportation policies implemented 
in Malaysia, the Megawati government was accused of being slow to respond, driving several 
concerned NGOs to file a lawsuit against the government. This action then forced the 
government to enact legislation on the placement of labour and the protection of workers’ 
rights, as well as to sign the CMW. 
When Megawati was replaced by SBY in 2004, Indonesia implemented more labour 
migration policies. One notable policy was the establishment of BNP2TKI. This was 
considered, on one hand, as historical since the body was designed to solve the deadlocked 
system of the labour rights protection. On the other hand, the body has thus far been considered 
to have not performed its roles as expected as there is no clear division of work with the 
ministry dealing with manpower. 
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2.2.7 The 2010s 
This sub-section examines several important developments concerning Indonesian migrant 
labour, particularly the protection of workers’ rights. One notable issue was the high-profile 
case of abuse against an Indonesian maid in Hong Kong, a case that drew international 
attention. Another important development was Indonesia’s ratification of the CMW. Last but 
not least, this section also briefly examines Indonesia’s foreign policy on labour migration 
under the Jokowi administration. 
 
2.2.7.1 A High Profile Case in Hong Kong 
Hong Kong (China) is arguably the least problematic location for Indonesian migrant labour to 
work. Cases of exploitation and abuse, such as torture and physical violence, have been rarely 
exposed by the media in comparison to other countries, particularly Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. 
A report of BNP2TKI (2012c) shows that, between January and May 2012, it was Saudi Arabia 
that headed the list when counting the number of Indonesian migrant workers facing problems, 
with 776 cases, whereas Malaysia ranked second with 252 cases. With regard to Hong Kong, 
it counted ‘only’ 2 cases.8  
On one hand, this situation – a less problematic place or a better working environment 
for migrant labour – may causally be linked to the strong Employment Ordinance covering the 
rights and protection of foreign domestic helpers implemented in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (SAR), China. Further, it has been reported that Indonesian domestic 
labour, along with labour from other countries, has been entitled to permanent residency status, 
a unique privilege when compared to migrant domestic labour in other countries. This 
                                                          
8 This report is developed by the BNP2TKI based on facsimiles sent by Indonesian embassies and consulates in 
15 receiving countries of Indonesian migrant workers within the above-mentioned period (BNP2TKI 2012c). 
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opportunity is based on the decision of the Hong Kong district court that, due to its attempt to 
abolish discrimination, foreign domestic workers be allowed to become permanent residents 
(Asia Pulse 2011). 
On the other hand, Hong Kong is not free from international criticism concerning its 
working environment for migrant labour. The torture of Indonesian female worker Erwiana 
Sulistyaningsih by her employer was just another high-profile case that outraged Indonesia and 
the world. Soon after the case was exposed, Time Magazine named Erwiana as one of the top 
100 most influential people for her bravery in revealing the torture story, which later pushed 
Hong Kong to improve its law to better protect foreign domestic workers (Australia Network 
News 2014, Targeted News Service 2014). President SBY stated how dismayed and concerned 
he was when hearing about the case (Republika 2014). He further stated that Hong Kong 
(China) was in fact one the best countries when it comes to management of foreign labour, 
therefore he was very surprised to learn about such a case (Viva News 2014).  
On Erwiana case, after a series of court proceedings, the Hong Kong’s employer was 
finally found guilty of 18 charges and in February 2015 she was sentenced to six years in 
prison. The court suggested that, in order to prevent repetition of such cases, domestic labour 
should not be forced to live-in. The Wall Street Journal (2015) reports, “In delivering the 
sentence, District Court Judge Amanda Woodcock said the abusive conduct could be prevented 
if domestic helpers weren’t forced to live with their employers, as Hong Kong law requires”. 
 
2.2.7.2 Moratorium of Sending the Domestic Workers 
Destination countries where many Indonesian migrant workers have faced problems are Saudi 
Arabia and Malaysia. It is one of the reasons that Indonesia implemented a presidential decree 
on the moratorium of domestic workers between 1 August 2011 and December 2012 (KBRI 
Riyadh 2013). The moratorium itself, as discussed in the Introduction, was enforced by 
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Indonesia as a result of the beheading of Ruyati binti Satubi, a case that created uproar among 
the Indonesian public as well as uneasy bilateral relations between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. 
Soon after this case was made public, Indonesia implemented a moratorium. Reciprocally, 
Saudi Arabia responded by temporarily terminating the issuing of visas for migrant labour from 
Indonesia and the Philippines as of 2 July 2011. 
Yet the case pushed the two governments to work closely together and they finally signed 
a MoU on the protection of Indonesian migrant labour on 19 February 2014. The Indonesian 
Minister of Manpower and Transmigration, Muhaimin Iskandar, viewed this agreement as a 
milestone for the protection of Indonesian labour in Saudi Arabia since “this was the very first 
time both governments had agreed to prioritise their protection” (The Jakarta Post 2014a). 
The MoU, however, still raises concerns from civil society. Wahyu Susilo, in his capacity 
as the executive director of the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID), 
states that one important thing that was missed from the MoU is the Kafala system. “The most 
important thing is whether this bilateral agreement can replace the discriminative kafala system 
implemented in Saudi Arabia, otherwise it will not lead anywhere” (The Jakarta Post 2014a).9 
 
2.2.7.3 Ratification of the CMW 
Another important event in the 2010s was Indonesia’s ratification of the 1990 International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (CMW). On the date of the ratification, 12 April 2012, concerned members of 
parliament (DPR) and Indonesia’s NGOs expressed their feeling of relief and satisfaction. 
Rieke Diah Pitaloka, a member of Commission IX of the DPR (2009-2014) who was also a 
                                                          
9 The Kafala system is a sponsorship system that requires the migrant’s work permit to be tied to the employer 
and expires with the contract. The system makes migrant workers vulnerable to forced labour and slavery (Scully 
2010).  
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well-known figure in migrant labour protection, stated, “It was not easy. It was almost for 13 
years that we struggled for it, finally we ratified this Convention” (Koran Tempo 2012). 
Indonesia had actually signed the CMW in 2004, a foreign policy decision on labour 
migration made after several concerned NGOs lodged a strong demand following the Nunukan 
humanitarian crisis in 2002. Nonetheless, after the signing, the ratification process was 
extremely slow. It was only from the early 2010s that the interdepartmental processes toward 
ratification moved significantly. The processes were initiated officially through a technical 
meeting on 15 April 2011 concerning the follow up of the CMW ratification. The 
interdepartmental meetings went further, from preparing the academic manuscript, the draft 
law, and the ratification explanation of the CMW to the Establishment of the Inter-Ministerial 
Committee for the Drafting of Law on the Ratification of CMW. 
These processes gained momentum when Irgan C. Mahfiz, speaking on behalf of the 
Chairman of Commission IX of the DPR, stated in a final remark on 12 April 2012, “The 
agreement of the General Assembly of the DPR today is a proof that Indonesia acknowledges 
and respects human rights and basic freedom of human beings as the embedded and inseparable 
rights” (Mahfiz 2013). 
One obvious fact arising from the CMW ratification was that Indonesian policy 
entrepreneurs had contributed much to the process. These policy entrepreneurs, particularly 
individuals from NGOs such as Solidaritas Perempuan (Solidarity for Women), Human Rights 
Working Group (HRWG), Peduli Buruh Migran (Care for Migrant Workers), Serikat Buruh 
Migran Indonesia (Indonesian Migrant Workers Union), Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid 
Foundation) of Jakarta Chapter, spread the campaigning news, collaborated, and even formed 
alliances in order to strengthen their campaigns and movements in urging the relevant state 
institutions to ratify the CMW. We shall examine this in more depth in the following chapters. 
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2.2.7.4. Indonesia’s Labour Migration Policy under the Jokowi Administration 
Another important development in the 2010s is the new foreign policy concerning labour 
migration. On 20 October 2014, Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi), replaced SBY 
who had led Indonesia from 2004 to 2014. Subsequently, Indonesia’s policy on labour 
migration entered a new era as the government made it as one of three core issues of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Retno L.P. Marsudi, in her annual foreign policy 
statement, stated: 
Indonesia will only agree to send migrant workers if the country of destination has 
national legislation that guarantees the protection of foreign migrant workers, or if 
Indonesia has a bilateral agreement with the destination country, which guarantees the 
protection of Indonesian migrant workers (Channel News Asia 2015). 
Prior to this statement, both Jokowi and Retno demonstrated their priorities on the issue 
of migrant labour protection. Jokowi, for example, undertook the so-called ‘e-blusukan’ 
(conducting video calling to listen to the people directly) with representatives of migrant 
labour. As reported by The Jakarta Post (2014), “[Through] ‘e-blusukan’, the President 
conversed virtually with representatives of migrant workers from eight countries and made 
some crucial decisions to ease problems faced by Indonesians working overseas”. In that 
meeting, President Jokowi, who was accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the 
Minister for Manpower, listened to the complaints and suggestions of migrant labour, such as 
high-cost placement fees and the working hours of Indonesian embassies (The Jakarta Post 
2014b). 
Nonetheless, the heavy focus of Indonesia’s foreign policy on, among other things, 
labour migration also received criticism. It is not so much criticism of the policy itself but 
rather critical thoughts about whether Indonesia would abandon its international roles, 
something that this country had demonstrated under the SBY presidency (The Jakarta Globe 
2014b). 
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Responding to such criticism, Retno stated that, even though under the Jokowi 
administration Indonesia puts greater priority on promoting and protecting Indonesia’s 
domestic interests, Indonesia would still play an active role internationally. Channel News Asia 
(2015) reports, “Despite the heavy emphasis on promoting and protecting Indonesia's domestic 
interests, Ms Retno assured that Indonesia will continue to play an active role in the region and 
the world”.  We shall examine this issue further in Chapter 4. 
This sub-section demonstrates that in the 2010s Indonesia saw numerous important 
developments, such as the high-profile abuse case against an Indonesian maid in Hong Kong 
and the ratification to the 1990 CMW. On the abuse case, after a wave of criticisms from 
Indonesia and the world, the employer was finally found guilty with 18 charges and was 
sentenced to six years in prison. The judge who handled the case also suggested there needed 
to be a change in Hong Kong law concerning the requirement of domestic helpers to live with 
their employers. On CMW ratification, after a long period of activism, Indonesian policy 
entrepreneurs were finally successful in pushing the government and the parliament to ratify 
the convention. 
Last but not least, the 2010s represent a new era of foreign policy concerning labour 
migration protection as the Jokowi administration made it one of three core issues of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. Thus far, President Jokowi and the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
have demonstrated their good faith concerning this policy. Yet it has received criticism, not 
because its value has been underestimaed, but rather the inclination of Indonesia to abandon its 
international roles. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated in the beginning of the colonial period in the early sixteenth 
century, the Portuguese only intended to search for well-known spices and spread Catholicism. 
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When the Dutch colonised Indonesia in the late sixteenth century, Indonesians were forced into 
slavery and the slave trade though forced migration and forced labour. The Dutch policy was 
slightly interrupted when the British took over Indonesia in 1811. When the British handed 
Indonesia back to the Dutch, the system of forced labour resumed under the Cultivation 
System. The narratives of Indonesian labour migration pre-1870 were dominated by systems 
of forced labour. 
Post-1870, the Dutch colonial government introduced the 1880 Coolie Ordinance. This 
Ordinance brought Indonesia into the so-called ‘indentured labour’ system. At first, the 
implementation of the system was harsh, though by the early twentieth century it had improved. 
Post-1870 also witnessed, officially, the first group of Indonesian migrant workers, when 94 
Indonesians were transported to Surinam to work on plantations. Labour migration continued 
until 1931 under the indentured labour system and from this year onwards, labour was sent 
under the free recruitment system. 
Labour migration was interrupted by the Japanese occupation in 1942-1945. Despite 
occupying Indonesia only for a short time, the Romusha (forced labour) system used by the 
Japanese resulted in catastrophe for Indonesian labour, including significant forced migration. 
Indonesia finally ended the bitter and notorious experiences of colonialism when the nation 
proclaimed its independence on 17 August 1945, entering a new era of labour migration. 
The history of Indonesian labour migration in the post-colonial period demonstrates that 
every decade is distinct. This is related to either domestic factors, such as policies of national 
government, or international developments, such as foreign labour policy implemented in 
neighbouring countries. 
From 1945-1959, Indonesian labour migration was limited as the country still faced 
revolutionary upheavals after the independence declaration. One notable development was the 
establishment of the Kementerian Perburuhan (Ministry of Labour) in 1947, showing the 
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government’s concern about the issues of labour at that time. On labour migration, there was 
still mobility in terms of European repatriations. Indonesian immigrants also moved to 
Malaysia due to the policy of the Malaysian government that encouraged this migration for 
maintaining population dominance over the Chinese and Indians. This policy continued in the 
1960s, bringing more Indonesian migrants to Malaysia. 
In the 1970s, Indonesia experienced a significant increase in labour migration, 
particularly to Malaysia. One factor causing this was external, where migration was driven by 
the policy implemented by a foreign government, Malaysia’s implementation of the NEP. 
Another factor was internal, where the national government undertook active interventions on 
labour migration. One of these was the creation of government-to-government programs, a 
policy that further drove migration. The 1980s saw, for the first time, the official sending of 
Indonesian migrant labour to Saudi Arabia. Additionally, there was also a new phenomenon of 
irregular migration of Indonesian labour to Malaysia. Even though the term ‘irregular migrant’ 
was, initially, aimed at Vietnamese workers, later it was associated with Indonesians. Due to 
this, the Malaysian government launched a policy of regularising illegals, a policy that 
continued until the 1990s, and brought another negative consequence for Indonesian migrant 
labour: deportation. 
In the 1990s, Indonesian migrant labour was greatly affected by the regularisation policy 
of Malaysia, which later included deportation. Through the policy called Ops Nyah, many 
Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia were repatriated. This policy received more impetus 
when Malaysia and the Southeast Asian region faced an economic crisis in the late 1990s. In 
the 2000s, Indonesia was further exposed to the problems of labour migration. Special attention 
was given to the Nunukan humanitarian crisis as more than 70 migrant workers died. This crisis 
drove Indonesian NGOs to push for more protection of Indonesian migrant labour, resulting in 
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the enactment of legislation on the protection of labour as well as the signing of the 1990 UN 
Convention that promotes labour rights. 
In the 2010s, there were a number of developments in Indonesian labour migration. 
Among these was the high-profile case of abuse against an Indonesian maid in Hong Kong. 
This case drew international attention, including Time Magazine, naming the maid, Erwiana 
Sulistyaningsih, as one of the top 100 most influential people. It was also in the 2010s that 
Indonesia finally ratified the 1990 Convention that, theoretically, would force the country to 
implement more rights protection for migrant labour. This ratification was driven by policy 
entrepreneurs, which will be examined further in the following chapters. Another important 
development in this period was the new focus of the Indonesian government under President 
Jokowi, namely making the protection of Indonesian migrant workers one of the core agendas 
of the country’s foreign policy. Both Jokowi and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have shown 
their support for this new focus through their actions. 
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Chapter 3 
Indonesia’s Foreign Policy on Labour Migration 
 
Under Indonesia’s democratic governance, labour migration has become an important part of 
the government’s foreign policy agenda. Labour migration policy and, in particular, the 
protection of Indonesian migrant labour has become a crucial part of the foreign policy core 
agenda of the Joko Widodo administration, which provides evidence of that importance. For 
example, in the 2015 Annual Press Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister Retno 
L.P. Marsudi stated that Indonesia’s foreign policy in the next five years would prioritise, first, 
guarding Indonesia’s sovereignty; second, improving the protection of Indonesian citizens and 
legal entities; and third, enhancing economic diplomacy (Marsudi 2015). 
The foreign policy agenda of labour migration and the protection of Indonesian migrant 
labour also existed under previous democratic governments. During the administration of 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (2004-2014), labour migration and the 
protection of Indonesian labour was an important part of the agenda, even though it was not 
identified as one of the core issues in the early days of SBY administration as it has been under 
Jokowi. During the SBY administration, Indonesia signed a number of memorandums of 
understanding (MoUs) and declarations. It was also under the SBY administration that the 
government launched the so-called ‘grand strategy’ for the protection of Indonesian citizens 
overseas. 
Similarly, the foreign policy agenda of labour migration and the protection of Indonesian 
labour under the administration of President Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004) was also 
considered to be of importance. Not only did this administration have to face the high-profile 
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Nunukan humanitarian crisis that occurred in 2002, it was also in this year that the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs established the Directorate for the Protection of Indonesian Citizens and Legal 
Entities, a second-echelon unit under the Ministry, highlighting the importance placed on this 
issue. The Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda, in his 2003 Annual Press Statement, point 
number 137, stated that this governmental unit was established for the purpose of providing 
and improving the protection for Indonesian citizens overseas (KBRI Canberra 2003). 
Under the administration of President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), the foreign 
policy agenda of labour migration and the protection of migrant labour were also prominent, 
its significance being recognised for the first time. In 1999, responding to the growing salience 
of this issue, Indonesia enacted Law No. 37 of 1999 concerning Foreign Relations. In Chapter 
V, Article 18 of this Law, it is stipulated that “the protection for Indonesian citizens has become 
the centre of attention for the purpose of providing protection, including for Indonesian labour 
who work overseas”. This law was enacted to satisfy local demands for action. 
Prior to 1999, but particularly under the administration of President Suharto (1967 – 
1998) as President Habibie only ruled for a short transition period (1998 – 1999), there were 
policies on labour migration, such as the inclusion of the program of sending Indonesian labour 
overseas in the Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Repelita) Pertama (The First Five Year 
Plan), 1969-1974. Also, in 1970, there was the establishment of a government unit at the 
Kementerian Tenaga Kerja (Ministry of Labour) called Pusat Antar Kerja Antar Negara 
(Centre for Overseas Employment) that facilitated the movement of Indonesian labour 
overseas. 
Significantly, prior to Suharto’s presidency, or under the administration of President 
Sukarno (1945 – 1966), there is no concrete historical evidence of the establishment a specific 
policy, let alone a foreign policy, on labour migration. As indicated in Chapter 2, Indonesian 
labour migration at that time was driven more by the host policies of Malaysia. 
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This chapter will examine Indonesia’s foreign policy on labour migration under the 
administrations of President Suharto (1967 – 1998), President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999 – 
2001), President Megawati (2001 – 2004), President SBY (2004 – 2014), and President Joko 
Widodo (2014-2015).10 This chapter will also discuss the emergence of policy entrepreneurs 
in Indonesia’s foreign policy on labour migration. The enactment of Law No. 39 of 2004, the 
signing the 2006 MoU with Malaysia as well as other related foreign policy decisions, and the 
ratification of the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW), are some examples of how policy 
entrepreneurs have influenced policy-makings, with regard to both domestic and foreign 
policy. 
The chapter is divided into five sections analytically examining labour migration policies 
made under successive administrations that were responding to democratic pressures. In the 
first section, focussing on the Suharto era, the chapter will examine the specific programmes 
included in each Repelita. In the second section, focussing on the Abdurrahman Wahid era, the 
chapter will investigate, inter alia, Law No. 37 on Foreign Relations and a number of foreign 
policy decisions relating to labour migration, such as the ratification of ILO conventions. In 
the third section, focussing on the Megawati Soekarnoputri era, the chapter will examine the 
establishment of the Directorate of the Protection of Indonesian Citizens and Legal Entities and 
the Enactment of Law No. 39 of 2004. In the fourth section, focussing on the SBY era, the 
chapter will investigate several decisions, such as moratorium policy and the grand design of 
the protection policy. In the fifth section, focussing on the Joko Widodo era, the chapter will 
examine the elite statements as well as initial government decisions concerning Indonesia’s 
foreign policy on labour migration and the protection of migrant labour. 
                                                          
10 At the time of writing, the Jokowi administration was only in its second year, so this examination of its policies 
regarding labour migration is limited. 
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3.1 The Suharto Government – a Period of Transition 
The official policy on the sending of Indonesian migrant labour was initiated for the first time 
by the Suharto administration. As observed by Setyawati (2013: 268), “The Indonesian labour 
export policy began in the Suharto era from the late 1960s to the mid-1990s, with the intention 
of generating economic growth from workers’ remittances”. The first policy was established 
in 1969 when the Suharto government included labour migration in the Repelita I, 1969 – 1974. 
It was from this year that the movement of Indonesian migrant labour was officially monitored 
and recorded. 
Implementation of this policy was carried out by the then Departemen Tenaga Kerja, 
Transmigrasi dan Koperasi (Depnakertrans - Department of Manpower, Transmigration and 
Cooperative Units). Established in the transition period 1966-1969, it replaced the Kementerian 
Perburuhan created under the Sukarno administration (Kementerian Tenaga Kerja dan 
Transmigrasi 2003). The Depnakertrans took as an important policy Regulation No. 4 of 1970 
that prohibited the recruitment of migrant labour without a permit and placed further conditions 
on recruitment (Setyawati 2013: 269). Another notable element in this policy was the 
establishment of the Pusat AKAN (Centre for Overseas Employment) in 1970. 
Under the Suharto administration, there were few foreign policy decisions in the form of 
international agreements. Table 3.1 below lists related agreements made by Indonesia either 
with international organisations or other countries. 
 
 
  
97 
 
Table 3.1 Agreements between the Government of Indonesia with International Organisations 
     and with other Countries during the Suharto Administration 
 
Source: Kementerian Luar Negeri (2015) 
It is evident that the Suharto administration did not pay much attention to foreign policy 
concerning labour migration as it committed to only a few agreements. Even when it signed 
agreements with other countries, in this case with Malaysia, it focused more on the 
management of supply and did not touch on domestically sensitive issues such as protection. 
For example, the very first agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia in 1984 addressed the 
establishment of official channels in the recruitment of Indonesian labour, particularly those 
who had previously been regarded as illegal. As observed by Weiss (2010: 178), “[The 1984 
Agreement] established official channels for recruiting Indonesian workers, previously all 
undocumented”. Similarly, the agreement in 1993 focused on how the two countries could 
cooperate in the supply of migrant labour. The Preamble of the agreement reads, “Desiring to 
strengthen their existing relationship and to assist each other in the promotion of economic and 
technical co-operation between the two nations, particularly in the provision of workers” 
(Kementerian Luar Negeri 1993). 
No Title of the Agreements Place and Date of 
Signing 
Entry into Force 
1 
Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia and the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) regarding the 
Establishment of the ILO-Office in Jakarta 
Jakarta, 21 May 1970 21 May 1970 
2 
Agreement on Supply of Workers between 
the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia  
Medan, 12 May 1984 12 May 1984 
3 
Memorandum of Agreement on Recruitment 
of Indonesian Workers between the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia and 
the Government of the Kingdom of Malaysia 
Jakarta, 15 December 
1993 
15 December 1993 
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The focus on the supply of migrant labour in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Suharto 
was its initial priority as it was explicitly reflected in the bilateral agreement. The policy was 
publicly stated in the Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN - State Guidelines) of the 
Repelita V, 1989-1994. According to Azmy (2012: 48), this GBHN viewed Indonesian labour 
migration as, among other things, reducing unemployment, which was seen as a threat to 
national stability if not managed, and increasing the inflow of foreign currency. However, 
another view argues that this labour migration was not necessarily solely in Indonesia’s interest 
but also Malaysia’s. According to Irewati (2003: 36), the demand from Malaysia also played 
an essential role, and this demand side had existed since the Dutch colonial era.  
 
3.2 The Abdurrahman Wahid Government – an Important Interlude 
Abdurrahman Wahid became the fourth Indonesian president in 1999. Soon after taking office, 
Wahid undertook a number of reform initiatives. One essential policy decision made under the 
administration was written in the GBHN (State Guidelines) 1999-2004. The GBHN read: 
Developing a comprehensive and integrated policy of manpower, and improving the 
quantity and quality of overseas labour placement by paying attention to the competence, 
protection and defending of migrant labour, managed with an integrated system and to 
prevent the exploitation of labour (Irewati 2003: 35). 
With this GBHN, the administration moved quickly and, in the same year, enacted Law 
No. 37 of 1999 concerning Foreign Relations. Matters concerning the protection of Indonesian 
citizens, including migrant labour, are stipulated in Chapter V of the Law, particularly Articles 
18 to 23 (See Table 3.2 below). Essentially, the articles of Law No. 37 of 1999 emphasised that 
the Wahid government shall protect the interests of, and provide protection and legal assistance 
to, Indonesian citizens overseas, including migrant labour. 
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Table 3.2  Law No. 37 of 1999 on Foreign Relations, Chapter V (The Protection of  
  Indonesian Citizens) 
 
 Article 18 states that: a) the Indonesian Government protects the interests of all Indonesian nationals and 
legal entities abroad; b) the protection is given in accordance to International Law and Convention. 
 Article 19 states that: a) the Indonesian Government should promote unity and harmony among 
Indonesian citizens abroad; and b) it is the duty of the government to provide protection and legal 
assistance to Indonesian citizens and legal entities abroad in accordance to International Law and 
Convention. 
 Article 20: In case of conflicts that involve Indonesian nationals or its legal entities abroad, the 
Indonesian Foreign Office is obliged to resolve it first through deliberation and in accordance to the law. 
 Article 21: In case of threats that endanger Indonesian nationals abroad, the Indonesian Foreign Office 
is obliged to give protection and assistance, as well as a safe place to stay, and exert all efforts to repatriate 
them. Repatriation expenses are to be borne by the state. 
 Article 22: In cases of war or termination of diplomatic relations with a certain country, a Minister or a 
designated official appointed by the President coordinates efforts to secure and protect national interest, 
including Indonesian citizens. 
 Article 23: The implementation of the regulation stated in Article 21 and 22 is carried out through 
cooperation with local government or other countries or related international organization. 
    Source: Kementerian Luar Negeri (2009) 
In terms of foreign policy decisions on labour migration in the form of international 
agreements, the Wahid administration did not produce much beside the ratifications of ILO 
conventions No. 138 on Minimum Labour Age and No. 111 on Discrimination in Jobs. Yet the 
administration, through Presidential Decree No. 109 of 2001, made a breakthrough decision by 
establishing Direktorat Perlindungan Warga Negara Indonesia dan Badan Hukum Indonesia 
(the Directorate of Protection of Indonesian Citizens and Legal Entities, herein after referred 
as ‘the directorate’) under the Kementerian Luar Negeri (Kemenlu – Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.11 Azmy (2012: 52) observed that the purpose of the establishment of this body was to 
strengthen the protection of Indonesian migrant labour. 
As a second-echelon government division under the Kemenlu, the directorate performed 
a number of functions, such as policy formulation and implementation; negotiating protection 
measures with other countries; and formulating standards, norms, guidance, criteria, and 
procedures of protection. The directorate consisted of four sub-directorates, dealing with 
                                                          
11 Even though the decision to establish was made in 2001, the establishment of the Directorate took place in 2002 
under the Megawati administration. The establishment also took place when the Minister for Foreign Affairs under 
the Megawati administration, Dr. Hassan Wirajuda, undertook bureaucratic reform in the Ministry (Tabloid 
Diplomasi 2009). 
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protection in foreign countries, protection in Indonesia, consular monitoring, and social 
assistance and repatriation. On the protection of Indonesian citizens in foreign countries, the 
directorate provided numerous services, including among others: legal assistance on civil and 
criminal law and the handling of problems of citizens or migrant labour (Tabloid Diplomasi 
2009). 
 
3.3 The Megawati Soekarnoputri Government – Moving Towards a More 
Institutional Response 
One of the important policies concerning labour migration made under the Megawati 
administration was Ministerial Decree No. 104A/2002 on the Placement of Indonesian Migrant 
Labour. In the context of addressing the issue of migrant labour placement, the decree was 
comprehensive. It covered many aspects, such as legal bases, roles of state, and a long list of 
clauses concerning the roles and responsibilities of perusahaan jasa tenaga kerja Indonesia 
(PTJKI – the migrant labour service providing companies). Some aspects worth mentioning 
were on the penalties faced by the PJTKI if they failed to follow the requirements of migrant 
labour placement. 
The decree had indeed highlighted the issue of migrant labour protection. Yet it was 
still very minimal, stipulated in just four of the Articles: 58, 59, 60 and 61. Furthermore, the 
responsibility to protect Indonesian migrant labour mostly fell on the shoulders of PJTKI and 
not the government. As stipulated in Article 60, the government played a role in providing 
protection, yet this role could only be carried out by cooperating with a body of PJTKI 
representatives called Lembaga Perlindungan TKI (the Agency for the Protection of Indonesian 
Migrant Labour). The Article states: “Indonesia’s Foreign Mission in cooperation with the 
Agency for the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Labour shall take data and monitor the 
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migrant labour whereabouts to help in the protection and legal assistance in its accredited 
territory” (Kementerian Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi 2002). 
Nonetheless, one notable part of this decree was that it recognised the vulnerability of 
uncontracted labour in the domestic sector. As observed by Setyawati (2013: 269), the 
Kemenakertrans passed the decree “which set the platform for the early recognition of 
‘vulnerable workers’, which refers to those who work in the domestic sector without contracts”. 
As stipulated in Article 29 (1) of the decree, PJTKI were obliged to have: (a) placement 
cooperation agreements; (b) job orders/demand letters on behalf of the PJTKI; (c) working 
contracts; and (d) placement agreements with the migrant workers. Furthermore, failing to meet 
this requirement would cause the PJTKI to lose their licence (Kementerian Tenaga Kerja dan 
Transmigrasi 2002). 
In terms of agreements with foreign countries, the Megawati administration negotiated 
three, namely with the Philippines, Malaysia, and the Republic of Korea (see Table 3.3 below). 
The substance of the 2004 MoU with Malaysia was essentially similar to previous agreements 
signed in 1984 and 1993, in that it focused on the sending of Indonesian migrant labour to 
Malaysia. Interestingly, the 2004 MoU did not single out any clauses concerning the protection 
of Indonesian migrant labour despite this being stipulated, though still minimum, in the Decree 
of Indonesian Minister for Manpower and Transmigration No. 104A/2002, as discussed above. 
What is of more interest is this MoU was signed after the establishment of the directorate for 
the protection of Indonesian citizens and legal entities under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
2002. It demonstrates that the Megawati administration did not do its utmost to uphold the 
policy of rights protection when making agreement with other countries. 
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Table 3.3 Agreements between the Government of Indonesia with other Countries within the 
period of Megawati Administration 
No Title of the Agreements Place and Date of 
Signing 
Entry into Force 
1 
Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Department of Manpower and 
Transmigration of the Republic of Indonesia 
and the Department of Labor and 
Employment of the Republic of the 
Philippines concerning Migrant Workers 
Jakarta, 18 January 
2003 
Not yet ratified 
2 
Memorandum of Understanding on the 
Recruitment of Indonesian Workers between 
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
and the Government of Malaysia 
Jakarta, 10 May 2004 10 August 2004 
3 
Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Department of Manpower and 
Transmigration of the Republic of Indonesia 
and the Ministry of Labor of the Republic of 
Korea on the Sending of Indonesian Workers 
to the Republic of Korea 
Seoul, 13 July 2004 13 July 2004 
Source: Kementerian Luar Negeri (2015)       
Another notable development during the Megawati administration was the enactment 
on 29 September 2004 of Law No. 39 of 2004 concerning the Placement and Protection of 
Indonesian Migrant Workers. As discussed in Chapter 2, this law was enacted mainly due to 
pressures by the so-called policy entrepreneurs from civil society groups who criticised 
President Megawati and her government as failing to protect Indonesian migrant labour, 
particularly after what occurred in Nunukan, East Kalimatan in 2002, which activists and 
scholars viewed as a humanitarian crisis. Yazid (2013: 81) observed, 
The government has […] become more responsive to […] unfortunate events 
experienced by migrant workers and to pressures such as those from civil society 
groups, including NGOs. In 2002, after the crisis in Nunukan, there was increased 
pressure on the government to work on a law concerning migrant workers. Law No. 
39/2004 on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Workers Overseas was 
eventually passed in October 2004. 
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Law No. 39 of 2004 was initiated by members of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR 
– Indonesia's House of Representatives). Sinaga (2012: 64) notes, “In 2004, 31 members of the 
House of Representatives signed and oversaw the initiation of the drafting process of Law 
39/2004”. Though initiated by members of the House, most of the substantive materials of the 
Law were supplied by the Indonesian government. “The government also proposed a draft in 
which the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration provided most of the technical input” 
(Sinaga 2012: 64). 
The government and the DPR were anxious to enact the Law before their terms of office 
ended and rushed it through, with just two weeks from initiation to enactment. As noted by 
Sinaga (2012: 67), “The Bill was adopted after a quick two-week deliberation, a few days 
before President Megawati completed her presidency, and just a day before parliament ended 
(1999-2004)”. Consequently, since most of the substantive content was supplied by the 
government, the Law took much of its wording from Ministerial Decree No. 104A/2002, with 
its focus on private recruitment companies rather than the protection of Indonesian migrant 
labour. Sinaga (2012: 67) argues, “The bulk of the law’s provisions derived from the Minister 
of Manpower Regulation Decree 104/A/2002 whose contents favoured private companies”. 
Since the enactment of the Law, scholars and activists have viewed it as falling short 
of providing protection for Indonesian migrant labour. This is mainly because of the overall 
109 clauses stipulated in the law, only 9 were concerned with actual protection. Furthermore, 
it was not clear which organisation or institution held responsibility for the protection of 
migrant labour rights. As observed by Farbenblum et al (2013: 60), “The law [no. 39 of 2004] 
does not identify the party or parties responsible for fulfilling and enforcing any of these 
rights”. Thus, this law has been regarded as far from adequate in providing protection for 
Indonesian migrant labour. The reason for this poor legislation, according to Azmy (2012: 55), 
was the exclusion of migrant workers and their representatives from the policy-making process. 
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To make the situation worse, rather than simplifying the process of the placement of 
workers in jobs in foreign countries, Law No. 39 of 2004 created unforeseen consequences. 
One of these was the increased potential for a worker to be considered illegal. Farbenblum et 
al (2013: 60) have argued, “The law establishes serious consequences for migrant workers if 
they do not uphold their obligations, namely that the worker will be considered ‘illegal’ and 
potentially unable to obtain redress”. 
In short, Law No. 39 of 2004 has been viewed by scholars and activists as ineffective 
as it generated more problems than it solved in its attempt to create a better system of protection 
for Indonesian migrant labour. Sinaga (2012: 93) put it aptly, “[The Law] has been ineffective 
and only resulted in the more commercial roles of private companies, less protection provisions 
and sanctions, and contradictions with other Indonesian legal instruments”. 
Law No. 39 of 2004, however, formed the basis for the succeeding government, the 
SBY administration, to undertake a reform of placement and protection policies, including the 
establishment of BNP2TKI. This will be discussed further in the following section.12   
 
3.4 The Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Government – Gradually Coming to 
Accept the Need for a Moratorium  
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) began his term of office in October 2004. Early 
in his presidency, SBY was confronted with a high-profile case: the abuse of Nirmala Bonat 
who worked as a domestic helper in Malaysia. The case first came to public attention in mid-
May 2004 when President Megawati was still in office. As the court proceedings took years, a 
verdict was not reached until 2008, and Nirmala’s employer, Yim Pek Ha, was sentenced to 18 
years in prison. President SBY was reported to have taken a personal interest in Nirmala Bonat 
                                                          
12 Another notable development under the Megawati administration was the signing of the CMW on 22 September 
2004. This issue will be examined further in Chapter 4. 
105 
 
and applauded the court’s decision. As reported by the New Straits Times (2008), “Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono […] welcomed the court’s decision against her 
employer, saying justice had been done”. 
The SBY administration was in power for two five-year periods and this section will 
examine some of its notable domestic and foreign policies, such as Presidential Instruction No. 
6 of 2006, the 2006 MoU with Malaysia, the Moratorium on sending migrant labour to Saudi 
Arabia, the ratification of the CMW, and the launch of the grand design of the protection policy 
of Indonesian labour overseas. 
 
3.4.1 Presidential Instruction No. 6 of 2006 
In terms of labour migration and the protection of migrant labour rights, the SBY 
administration implemented numerous policies. One notable policy was the reform of the 
placement and protection system, with reference to existing law. According to Setyawati (2013: 
269), the administration advanced the previous regulation framework, more particularly Law 
No. 39 of 2004, “by issuing a Presidential Instruction No. 6/2006 on Reforming the System of 
Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers”. This Instruction brought a number 
of measures in the protection of labour when working overseas. There were two points of 
protection, namely advocacy and legal defence for migrant labour and the strengthening of 
Indonesian mission functions to protect labour. This gave more authority to Indonesia’s 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, particularly in terms of labour protection. As stated in the 
Instruction, the focal point of these roles is the Minister (Kementerian Pendayagunaan Aparatur 
Negara 2006). 
Presidential Instruction No. 6 of 2006 also mandated the establishment of BNP2TKI. 
BNP2TKI’s main responsibility is the placement of migrant labour, previously managed by the 
Kemenakertrans (see the Table 3.4 below). 
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Table 3.4  The Historical Background of the Establishment of BNP2TKI  
The Indonesian government, cq. the Ministry of Manpower, Transmigration and Cooperatives, began 
the sending of migrant labour in 1970  through a program called AKAN. This program was carried out 
by a section at a fourth-echelon level, reporting directly to the first-echelon Director General for 
Development and Deployment. In 1986, the Directorate General was merged with the Directorate 
General of Development and Protection, changing its name to the Directorate General for Development 
and Placement. Due to this merger, the AKAN section was promoted to a second-echelon level and 
renamed as ‘Pusat AKAN’ or Centre for Overseas Employment. In 1994, Pusat AKAN was dissolved 
and its role taken over by another second-echelon level, the Directorate of Export of Migrant Workers 
Services. In 1999, the Directorate was renamed the Directorate of Placement of Workers Overseas. 
 
In 1999, the government established Badan Koordinasi Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (BKPTKI 
– the Coordinating Agency for the Placement of Indonesian Migrant Workers) with members coming 
from nine related institutions. In 2001, the Directorate General for Development and Placement was 
dissolved and replaced by the Directorate General for Placement and Protection of Workers Overseas. 
When Law No. 39 of 2004 was enacted, Article 94 (1) and (2) mandated the establishment of BNP2TKI. 
The Presidential Instruction in 2006 detailed the establishment of BNP2TKI. The agency began its work 
in 2007 when its first head was appointed. With the existence of BNP2TKI, all matters concerning 
placement and protection of migrant labour was put under the authority of BNP2TKI, coordinated with 
the MoMT, yet responsible directly to the President. With the existence of BNP2TKI, the Directorate 
General of Placement and Protection under the Ministry was dissolved as its functions were shifted to 
BNP2TKI. 
 Source: BNP2TKI 2011 
After the establishment BNP2TKI, the Kemenakertrans then focused on formulating 
regulations. In reality, however, this division of work was difficult to manage. As observed by 
Yazid (2013: 89), “Different interpretations of what should be the responsibility and authority 
of each institution generated overlapping actions, which led to tensions between the two 
institutions”. Furthermore, despite the intent to reform and create a better system of Indonesian 
migrant protection, BNP2TKI was criticised for its lack of effectiveness in performing tasks 
due to the vagueness and ambiguity of its structure and roles. Sinaga (2012: 94) has argued, 
“[The function of BNP2TKI] is not clearly defined, its structure is vague, and its roles are 
ambiguous”. 
In responding to Presidential Instruction No. 6 of 2006, the Kemenlu issued Regulation 
No. 4 of 2008. Setyawati (2013: 269) suggested, “[The Regulation] was designed to assist 
Indonesian nationals abroad through close cooperation between consulate offices in host 
countries and the BNP2TKI”. The main mandate of this Regulation was the establishment of a 
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citizen service in 18 Indonesian foreign missions. The Regulation aimed to create improved 
services as well as stronger protection for Indonesian labour while overseas, particularly in 
terms of technical assistance (Sinaga 2012: 196). 
 
3.4.2. The 2006 MoU with Malaysia 
Indonesia signed another MoU with Malaysia in 2006 concerning the recruitment and 
placement of Indonesian domestic labour. This MoU, however, was still viewed as giving weak 
protection to Indonesian migrant labour and was regarded as only duplicating problems created 
by the previous MoU. As argued by Sinaga (2012: 201), “The 2006 MoU […] repeats the same 
problem as the 2004 MoU”. One of the weak points of the 2006 MoU, according Azmy (2012: 
57), was the section on the responsibilities of employers that gave them authority to hold 
workers’ passports. Appendix A, on the Responsibilities of the Employer (point xii), states: 
The Employer shall be responsible for the safe keeping of the Domestic Worker’s 
passport and to surrender such passport to the Indonesian Mission in the event of 
abscondment or death of the Domestic Workers (Kementerian Luar Negeri 2006). 
This point, as argued by Azmy (2012: 169), greatly disturbed Indonesian migrant workers 
since access to their passports was a vital need. It was vital because if during the working 
contract period there occurred a dispute between the worker and the employer resulting in the 
worker deciding to leave the employer, without their passport the worker would be listed as 
undocumented or illegal labour. This situation left workers vulnerable to violent treatment from 
employers. 
Another weak point of the 2006 MoU was its inability to use Malaysia's labour laws for 
the benefit of Indonesian migrant labour. According to Sinaga (2012: 201), “The 2006 MoU 
failed to secure the application of Malaysia’s labour laws to migrant domestic workers”. 
Additionally, the MoU was not able to impose a responsibility on employers to repatriate 
workers when abuse took place. “[The 2006 MoU also failed] to allocate responsibility for the 
108 
 
repatriation of migrant domestic workers who are abused by their employers” (Sinaga 2012: 
201). 
With all these weaknesses, the 2006 MoU with Malaysia came in for wide criticism, 
particularly from NGOs. Yazid (2013: 218) observed, “In May 2006, immediately after the 
MoU was signed, SBMI, Kopbumi, and GPPBM produced a critical note on the MoU entitled 
Rejecting the Package of Modern Slavery”.13 The NGOs’ assessment of the MoU was, among 
other things, it did not uphold the rights of migrant domestic labour, it legitimised the trading 
of migrant labour, and it even enabled modern slavery. It has been claimed by Yazid (2013: 
225) that these weaknesses were caused by the limited involvement of NGOs in the policy-
making process. 
Subsequently as pressure on the government mounted, in June 2009, Indonesia made a 
notable foreign policy decision by implementing a moratorium on the sending of domestic 
labour specifically to Malaysia. According to Clark and Pietsch (2014: 172), this decision was 
made by the Indonesian government as there had been many well-publicised cases of abuse. 
Additionally, as observed by Yazid (2013: 223), the moratorium was implemented after 
popular protests from the public and in particular migrant workers’ advocates. The advocates 
then used the moratorium to push the Indonesian government to pressurise Malaysia to revise 
the 2006 MoU. As a result, Indonesia and Malaysia began negotiations to revise the MoU in 
August 2009. 
It is empirically clear that migrant workers’ advocates played important roles both in 
the Malaysian moratorium and in the 2006 MoU revision negotiations. As argued by Nesadurai 
(2013: 104), “The Indonesian government could not ignore bottom-op emotional appeals from 
                                                          
13 SBMI stands for Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia (the Federation of Indonesian Migration), Kopbumi stands 
for Konsorsium Pembela Buruh Migran Indonesia (the Consortium for the Defence of Indonesian Migrant 
Labour, and GPPBM stands for Gerakan Perempuan untuk Perlindungan Buruh Migran (the Women’s 
Movement for the Protection of Migrant Labour). 
109 
 
the public and other significant actors, including politicians and NGOs”. It can also be 
perceived that the advocates demonstrated part of the work of policy entrepreneurs who played 
roles in policy decisions. As discussed in Chapter 1, policy entrepreneurs are “advocates for 
proposals or for prominence of an idea” (Kingdon 2003: 122). 
As negotiations to revise the 2006 MoU began in August 2009, Indonesia and Malaysia 
negotiated numerous detailed aspects in the MoU, such as the cost structures, minimum wages, 
and the holding of passports (Yazid 2013: 223, Azmy 2012: 59). One of the difficult issues to 
resolve was the structure of transportation and recruitment costs (Sinaga 2012: 201). In that 
context, Indonesia held a position that cost structure should be adjustable based on the 
prevailing costs in host nations (Yazid 2013: 223). Finally, after a series of negotiations, the 
two countries agreed the amendment of the MoU under an agreement called the 2011 Protocol 
Amending the 2006 MoU (See Table 3.5). 
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Table 3.5  Agreements between the Government of Indonesia with other Countries within the 
period of SBY Administration 
Source: Kementerian Luar Negeri (2015)       
The completion of the negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia in May 2011 
brought an end to the moratorium implemented unilaterally by Indonesia in June 2009. Sinaga 
No Title of the Agreements Place and Date of 
Signing 
Entry into Force 
1 Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia and 
the Government of Malaysia on the 
Recruitment and Placement of Indonesian 
Domestic Workers 
Bali, 13 May 2006 15 June 2006 
2 Arrangement between Ministry of Manpower 
and Transmigration of the Republic of 
Indonesia and Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations of the 
Government of the Commonwealth of 
Australia concerning Labour and Social 
Protection 
Canberra, 4 June 2009 4 June 2009 
3 
Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
represented by Ministry of Manpower and 
Transmigration and the Government of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan represented by 
Ministry of Labour on the Placement and 
Protection of Indonesian Domestic Workers 
Bali, 27 June 2009 27 June 2009 
4 
Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia and 
the Government of the Republic of Turkey on 
Labour Development 
Ankara, 29 June 2010 29 June 2010 
5 
Protocol Amending the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Government of 
the Republic of Indonesia and the 
Government of Malaysia on the Recruitment 
and Placement of Indonesia Domestic 
Workers 
Bandung, 30 May 
2011 
20 October 2011 
6 
Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia and 
the Government of New Zealand on Labour 
Cooperation 
Jakarta, 17 April 2012 17 April 2012 
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(2012: 202) reflected: “The amended MoU leads to the revocation of the moratorium […] 
previously applied by the Indonesian government since June 2009”. The completion also meant 
that Indonesian domestic workers could again travel to Malaysia for work (Clark and Pietsch 
2014: 172-3). 
Examining the process of adopting MOUs and the related foreign policy decisions 
implemented by the SBY administration afterwards, it became obvious that policy 
entrepreneurs, particularly NGOs, had not been closely involved or not pushed hard to be 
involved in the negotiating processes and therefore missed the opportunity to influence the 
contents of the MoU in 2006. They did, however, play a role in pressuring the Indonesian 
government to implement the moratorium in 2009 as well as demanding the government revise 
the MoU. These efforts came to some fruition when both states finally agreed to sign the 2011 
Protocol amending the 2006 MoU that later restarted the movement of Indonesian domestic 
labour to Malaysia. 
 
3.4.3 The Saudi Arabia Moratorium to Protect ‘Economic Heroes’  
President SBY in his second term came to pay attention to the issue of labour migration, 
particularly with respect to worker protection. In a speech at the 100th International Labour 
Conference in Geneva, 14 June 2011, the President stated: 
[Migrant workers] are important players in this new era of social justice. We cannot 
ignore their contributions to the global labour market, as well as to the economies of their 
home countries. We in Indonesia call these migrant workers “economic heroes” 
(pahlawan devisa), due to their hard work and selfless devotion to the welfare of their 
family back home (International Labour Organization 2011). 
Furthermore, SBY highlighted the importance of the protection of Indonesian migrant 
labour by developing cooperation with migrant-receiving countries. He continued in the 
speech, “We have developed arrangements with host countries, to ensure that their rights are 
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respected and protected, including their rights to minimum wage and days-off” (International 
Labour Organization 2011). 
This speech drew appreciation from across the community and community 
organisations. President SBY even received a standing ovation after delivering the speech. 
Andre Omer, SBY’s interpreter at that time, wrote: 
President Yudhoyono received a standing ovation after his delivery at the 100th session 
of the International Labour Conference. Juan Somavia, Director General of the ILO 
conveyed his deep appreciation to the President for […] his leadership role in promoting 
the global labour and employment agenda especially in combatting the crisis and 
forging a new global economic framework (Omer 2011). 
Nonetheless, just four days after SBY delivered his speech, the Indonesian maid Ruyati 
binti Satubi (mentioned in the Introduction) was beheaded in Saudi Arabia. To make the case 
worse, the beheading was carried out without notification to the Indonesian government. This 
beheading raised criticism from Indonesian civil society with advocates now arguing that 
SBY’s speech was shameful and worthless (The Jakarta Post 2011). This beheading without 
notification led some Indonesian MPs to urge the government to declare a specific moratorium 
on the sending of migrant labour, this time to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East in general 
(BBC 2011). 
In responding to Indonesia’s criticism, the Saudis issued an explanation to the Task 
Force on the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers, led by the former Minister of Religious 
Affairs, Maftuh Basyuni, who met the Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Minister of Domestic Affairs, 
Dr. Ahmad Muhammad Al-Sakim on 20 July 2011. A press release from the Indonesia’s 
Consulate General in Jeddah (Kementerian Luar Negeri 2011) noted the explanation of the 
Saudi authorities as follows: 
The Deputy Minister of Domestic Affairs explained how the execution of a death 
sentence is not informed to anyone except the heirs of the victim and the convict […] 
Such secrecy is maintained as it considers a number of factors, such as security, 
psychology and society. 
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The Saudis argued that the failure to inform the Indonesian government was due to the 
secrecy policy followed by their authorities. This policy applied to all Saudi citizens and 
including migrant labour. As further noted by the Indonesia’s Consulate General in Saudi 
Arabia: 
The secrecy of the execution applies for all citizens including Saudi Arabian citizens. 
These are the reasons why the time of execution for the Indonesian Citizen, Ruyati binti 
Satubi, was not informed to anyone, including the Indonesian Representative 
(Kementerian Luar Negeri 2011). 
The beheading without notification of Ruyati had created uproar in Indonesia. Shortly 
after the beheading took place, there were numerous calls demanding the Indonesian 
government show their displeasure to the Saudi government. Hikmahanto Juwana, an 
international law professor from the University of Indonesia, demanded the Indonesian 
government take firm measures toward the Saudi government. Juwana, as reported by The 
Jakarta Post (2011), urged the government “to stop sending workers there or to take diplomatic 
actions, ranging from recalling its ambassador to the kingdom to scaling down its 
representation there”. 
Following these calls, the SBY administration took the policy decision, namely to 
impose a moratorium on the sending of Indonesian migrant labour to Saudi Arabia. CNN (2011) 
reported that the Indonesian government decided to impose the moratorium effective from 
August 1, 2011, “until an Indonesian-Saudi memorandum of understanding on the protection 
of migrant workers is signed and a bilateral joint task force is established”. 
In response to the moratorium policy implemented by Indonesia, the Saudi government 
temporarily terminated the issuing of visas for Indonesian migrant labour. At the same time, 
the two governments worked closely and finally reached an agreement on the MoU on the 
protection of Indonesian migrant labour on 19 February 2014. As already discussed in Chapter 
2, this agreement has been regarded as historical as it was the first time the two governments 
agreed to make the protection of migrant labour a priority. 
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3.4.4 The Ratification of the CMW 
Another notable and important foreign policy decision made during the SBY administration 
was Indonesia’s ratification of the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW) on 12 April 2012. This 
notable decision to ratify took as long as 22 years in gestation. After the CMW was adopted 
unanimously in the United Nations General Assembly in December 1990, it took 14 years 
before Indonesia finally signed it, after strong demands from civil society groups in the 
aftermath of the Nunukan humanitarian crisis in 2002. 
The demands for the CMW to be first signed and then ratified came as part of the citizen 
lawsuit submitted by civil society groups in the Indonesian Court in Central Jakarta on 24 
January 2003 (Hukum Online 2003). The civil society groups that submitted the lawsuit worked 
in an alliance called Tim Advokasi Tragedi Nunukan (TATN – the Advocating Team of 
Nunukan Tragedy). The groups belonging to the TATN were, among others, Yayasan Lembaga 
Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (YLBHI – the Foundation of Indonesian Aid Institute), Solidaritas 
Perempuan (SP – Solidarity for Women), and Kopbumi (Hukum Online 2002, 2003). 
It took another eight years after signing for Indonesia to finally ratify the CMW. Again, 
this foreign policy decision was driven largely by civil society groups, who this thesis argues 
carried out the roles of policy entrepreneurs. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
4. 
 
3.4.5 The Grand Design of the Protection of Indonesian Citizens Overseas 
Another notable foreign policy decision taken by the SBY administration was the launch of a 
policy paper in 2012 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Marty Natalegawa entitled ‘Grand 
Design Perlindungan Warga Negara Indonesia di Luar Negeri’ (the Grand Design of the 
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Protection of Indonesian Citizens Overseas) (Kementerian Luar Negeri 2012). The purpose of 
this proposal was, among other things, to guide the implementation of policy on the protection 
of Indonesian citizens overseas; to map the roles and functions of other stakeholders such as 
the government, private sectors, and civil society; to implement standardisation in the 
protection of Indonesian citizens that could be referred by Indonesian overseas missions and 
the relevant government institutions at the national and regional level; and to push for a 
paradigm change in the management of issues emerging from international migration by 
upholding human rights and development (Kementerian Luar Negeri 2012: 2-3). 
The policy paper emphasised that the government should carry out its endeavours on 
three levels: bilateral, regional, and multilateral (Kementerian Luar Negeri 2012: 11-12). At 
the bilateral level, the paper stated that the government had already signed a number of 
agreements, namely with the United Arab Emirates, Japan, Kuwait, Republic of Korea, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, Qatar, Jordan, Timor Leste, Australia, and Brunei Darussalam. In the 
future, the government planned to renegotiate existing agreements as well as signing more 
agreements. At the regional level, the government argued it has been and would continue to be 
active in relevant forums, among others ASEAN and the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development. At the multilateral level, the government had ratified the CMW. It also planned 
to ratify the ILO Convention 189 concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers. 
As the policy paper emphasised, it also set out the levels of protection that the Indonesian 
government could provide: preventive action, early detection, and immediate response 
(Kementerian Luar Negeri 2012: 13-14). Preventive action included, among other things, 
improving national legislation, capacity building, and establishing a database system integrated 
between the national government/institutions and Indonesian overseas missions. The planned 
database would consist of relevant information such as citizens’ identities, immigration 
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documents, migrant labour cases, identities of migrant workers being placed, and black-listed 
migrant labour service-providers. 
With regard to this grand design, the then Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa 
stated in the 2013 Annual Press Statement on Foreign Policy that his Ministry had made the 
three stages of protection part of the foreign policy agenda. Natalagewa said, “In line to our 
commitment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had already made the grand design of protection 
of Indonesian citizens overseas. The strengthening of preventive action, early detection, and 
protection become the main agenda” (VOA Indonesia 2013). 
The grand design of the protection of Indonesian citizen overseas received appreciation, 
including from the Chairman of Commission I of DPR, Mahfudz Siddiq. VOA Indonesia (2013) 
reported that Siddiq conveyed his appreciation to the hard work of the government in providing 
protection to Indonesian citizens [through the grand design]. At the same time, he also 
suggested that the government should add to the number of personnel at Indonesian diplomatic 
and consular offices abroad, particularly staff with mastery of legal and employment-related 
matters. The adding of these personnel, according to Siddiq, could optimise the legal protection 
of Indonesian citizens facing problems in foreign countries (VOA Indonesia 2013). 
 
3.5 The Joko Widodo Government – Still Grappling to Implement a 
Comprehensive Policy 
Indonesia’s foreign policy on labour migration under the Jokowi Widodo (popularly known as 
‘Jokowi’) administration gained new importance, alongside guarding Indonesia’s sovereignty 
and enhancing economic diplomacy. The focus of Indonesia’s foreign policy under this 
administration was on providing protection for Indonesian migrants. In her 2015 Annual Press 
Statement, the Foreign Minister, Retno L.P. Marsudi stated that Indonesia’s diplomacy and 
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foreign policy must be able to provide protection and security for Indonesian citizens and legal 
entities overseas (Marsudi 2015). 
This new foreign policy direction was in line with the ‘pro-people’ image Jokowi had 
been trying to project for his administration. At the same time, Jokowi was also seen to be 
correcting the elitist approach of his predecessor, President SBY. Parameswaran (2015) argues: 
[The new foreign policy direction is] in line with Jokowi’s ‘firm, dignified, down to earth, 
pro-people’ foreign policy which aims to secure the needs of the Indonesian people first 
and foremost – a welcome correction, some argue, to the overly elitist and internationalist 
worldview of his predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Retno as well as Jokowi’s 
advisers have also been repeating these priorities since October last year, and they have 
already begun work on them. 
From the outset, the Jokowi administration gave priority to the issue of protection for 
migrant labour, promising workers better treatment from the recruitment phase to returning 
home. The Minister for Manpower and Transmigration, Hanif Dhakiri, pledged “to ensure that 
all Indonesian migrant workers receive proper protection from when they are recruited to when 
they return home” (Jakarta Globe 2014c). Dhakiri also promised to take tough measures 
against the bad practices of migrant labour agencies and officials in his ministry. He stated, “I 
will not tolerate anyone playing dirty, be it the agencies or the staff in my ministry” (Jakarta 
Globe 2014c). 
Foreign minister Marsudi stated that the protection of citizens, which included migrant 
labour, would be continually improved (Marsudi 2015). She emphasised that Indonesia would 
only cooperate in sending migrant labour provided that (i) the receiving countries have national 
laws that regulate the protection of foreign migrant labour; and/or (ii) Indonesia has signed 
bilateral agreements with the receiving countries that uphold the protection of Indonesian 
migrant labour. 
Marsudi also affirmed the commitment to protect Indonesian migrant labour in the 
ASEAN region, including by driving the creation of the ASEAN legal instrument. It is reported 
that Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry has been pushing hard to have a legally binding instrument 
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that can protect Indonesian migrant labour in the region. The Director of ASEAN Functional 
Cooperation of the Ministry, George Lantu, stated, “We are pushing so that the documents can 
be used as a framework whenever there is a dispute [regarding the fate and welfare of 
Indonesian migrant workers] in the future” (Asia One 2015). 
The main concern with this instrument is whether it will be legally binding or not. This 
concern has emerged as some countries, including Indonesia, interpret the word ‘instrument’ 
as an international agreement, whereas other countries, mostly labour-receiving states, interpret 
the word as merely a guideline, which is not legally binding. For the Human Rights Working 
Group (HRWG), an absence of a legally binding instrument will only lead to an absence of 
responsibility for ASEAN countries. Yuyun Wahyuningrum of HRWG stated, “If it's not 
legally binding then there's no sense of responsibility [among ASEAN countries]” (Asia One 
2015). 
Besides all the national, bilateral, and regional policies and legal framework that the 
Jokowi administration is pursuing, other policies that the administration has undertaken or 
plans to implement are: cooperating with the Ministry of Communication and Information and 
with five cellular service companies to provide hotline numbers of nearby Indonesian missions 
to Indonesians who travel overseas; and integrating a database of Indonesian citizens overseas 
with the database of Indonesian migrant labour operated by BNP2TKI (Marsudi 2015). 
 
3.5.1 Criticism toward the Current Foreign Policy Direction 
The new focus of Indonesia’s foreign policy under the Jokowi administration on the protection 
of migrant labour was generally positively received. Vatikiotis (2014) commented, “There is 
also appreciation for the new directions he is setting for policy: […] laying out a foreign policy 
that better serves people's welfare and economic interests”. 
119 
 
The new focus, however, also received criticism, particularly on the critical question of 
whether Indonesia is shifting its direction toward abandoning its international roles. Jakarta 
Globe (2014b) writes, “The new focus on the protection of Indonesian migrant workers abroad, 
while welcomed as a positive change, has prompted questions as to whether the country is 
abandoning its international roles”. 
The international roles played by the SBY administration had indeed led to more positive 
views of Indonesia. According to Piccone and Yusman (2014), “Much credit should be given 
to his administration for guiding Indonesia to economic prosperity and international 
prominence in the last ten years”. Examples of this international prominence include 
Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN, a closer cooperation with Australia, China, and India, the 
promotion of international norms of democracy through the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), 
actively participating in the G20 summits, and playing a leadership role in the UN High Level 
Panel on the Post-2015 MDGs Development Agenda. Piccone and Yusman (2014) argue, 
“SBY has taken Indonesia a great distance toward a special seat at the global table”. 
The above-mentioned ‘special seat’ in international diplomacy under the SBY 
administration was likely to be discontinued as Indonesia’s foreign policy direction under the 
Jokowi administration shifts. Connelly (2014), for example, argues, “[Jokowi’s] inexperience 
in foreign affairs suggest that his presidency will lead to less clearly defined positions on 
specific foreign policy issues, less Indonesian leadership in foreign affairs”. The emphasis 
placed by the Jokowi administration on, among other things, the migrant labour issue is 
evidence of this shift. As an analyst stated, “We must pay attention to the fate of Indonesian 
workers overseas. But it doesn’t mean that it should make up the largest portion of our foreign 
policy” (Jakarta Globe 2014b). 
 
  
120 
 
3.5.2. Facing the Existing Challenges 
This chapter argues that the Widodo administration has not yet addressed the root of the 
problems faced by Indonesian migrant labour nor proposed substantive solutions. 
MoUs with receiving countries and the existence of an informative database provide little 
guarantee that Indonesian migrant workers will not face problems or become illegal. The 
problem does not necessarily fall on, or stem from, the workers themselves. It is much more 
complex, from the corrupt practices of public officials to cumbersome working procedures. As 
argued by Adi (2003: 162), “Indonesia has to give more attention to […] curbing the corruption 
of public officials, streamlining government procedures and requirements, and adopting a more 
proactive policy to curb illegal practices”. 
MoUs with host countries will not solve the problem of illegality as they are not designed 
to cover undocumented labour. Taking as an example the 2006 MoU with Malaysia, the 2011 
Protocol amending the MoU does not refer to any issues concerning undocumented labour and 
therefore it cannot be used if there are cases of abuse involving undocumented labour. The 
database may be useful for monitoring the movement of Indonesians to other countries. Yet it 
can only be used as data provision rather than a protection policy itself. Having a legally 
binding instrument to protect the rights of undocumented labour within the ASEAN region may 
sound like a promising policy but there is no guarantee such a bold move will be made in the 
near future. 
Interestingly, the Jokowi administration has neglected the use of the CMW as a powerful 
policy tool14, either through demanding other labour-receiving countries accede to it, or at least 
                                                          
14 The CMW has indeed addressed the issue of undocumented migrant labour. The Preamble to the CMW reads, 
“Considering that workers who are non-documented or in an irregular situation are frequently employed under 
less favourable conditions of work than other workers and that certain employers find this an inducement to seek 
such labour in order to reap the benefits of unfair competition” (Kementerian Luar Negeri 2013: 72). There are 
certainly differences in the legitimacy of documented and undocumented labour, yet the CMW underlines that 
undocumented workers must be afforded their fundamental human rights. As stated by the UNESCO (2005), the 
CMW “recognises that legal migrants have the legitimacy to claim more rights than undocumented migrants, but 
it stresses that undocumented migrants must see their fundamental human rights respected, like all human beings”. 
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in revising national legislation, particularly Law No 39 of 2004, by harmonising it with the 
CMW. The plan to revise the Law had actually been stated in the Grand Design of the 
Protection of Indonesian Citizens Overseas (Kementerian Luar Negeri 2012: 15). Yet the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs did not mention this matter, particularly in relation to the CMW, in 
her 2015 press statement. As for the Minister for Manpower and Transmigration, in late 2014 
he stated that his Ministry was developing a grand design concerning the placement and 
protection of Indonesian migrant labour, to be implemented in early 2015, and the plan to revise 
Law No. 39 of 2004 (MetroTVNews 2014). However, up to the time of writing of this thesis, 
neither the promised grand design nor the initial stage in revising the Law have materialised. 
With the absence of a comprehensive policy addressing major problems faced by 
Indonesian migrant labour, it is understandable that criticism keeps occurring towards the 
Jokowi administration. Migrant Care, for example, gave a ‘rapor merah’ (literally means ‘red 
report’ or a negative score in an evaluation report) to the Minister for Manpower and the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Anis Hidayah, the coordinator of Migrant Care, states that the 
protection of Indonesian migrant labour has been explicitly mentioned in the ‘Nawacita’ (the 
vision and mission of President Jokowi) with the keywords ‘the state is present’, yet this big 
idea has not been reflected in the government plan for the period 2015-2019 (Migrant Care 
2015). 
 
Conclusion 
The foreign policy priorities of successive Indonesian governments have differed from one 
regime to the next, gradually improving protection of migrant workers in foreign countries as 
the issue rose in salience in the domestic sphere, with an exception of the Jokowi government 
in its early years. 
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The Suharto government made few foreign and domestic policy decisions on labour 
migration. This was due to the transitional nature of the government that prioritised economic 
development. In the context of labour migration, it focused more on workers’ remittances rather 
than the protection dimension. What caused the government to behave as it did was mostly due 
to the domestic situation at those time. As Weinstein (1976) has argued, Indonesia’s policies 
during the Suharto government were more inclined to securing funds from abroad. 
In regard to policy changes, the government however developed the initial foundation 
of labour migration policy by including it into the Repelita and proceeded further in the 
following years. The government also established two agreements with Malaysia, a major 
receiving country for Indonesian labour, concerning cooperation on labour migration. However, 
the policies made and implemented by the administration mostly dealt with the supply of labour 
migration, or the commercial side of it. 
It was not that clear whether the policy entrepreneurs on labour migration issues were 
active in the period of this administration. Yet, as Indonesia under Suharto was generally seen 
as an undemocratic government, it is difficult to imagine that such potential entrepreneurs had 
much influence. Borrowing the suggestion by Dosch (2006: 46) that in the non-democratic 
governmental regime the policy-making often denies societal interests and even opposition, I 
would argue that the policy entrepreneurs in this period had not yet existed, let alone played 
roles in policy-making.  
The Wahid government, despite being in power for a relatively short time, made several 
notable foreign and domestic policy decisions on labour migration. Furthermore, unlike the 
preceding government, the Wahid government introduced the rights protection in labour 
migration policies. The enactment of Law No. 37 of 1999 on Foreign Relations, that included 
a long list of clauses concerning rights protection, and the establishment in the Kemenlu a work 
unit that specifically deals with the protection of Indonesian citizen overseas, prove that the 
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government made important foreign policy decisions on labour migration and, more 
particularly, the protection of the rights of Indonesian migrant labour. 
There are at least two explanations that can be made concerning the behaviour of 
Indonesia’s foreign and domestic policies under the Wahid government. First, the country’s 
governmental regime shifted dramatically from undemocratic to democratic. As has been 
argued by Anwar (2010), the newly democratic Indonesia gave rise to, among others, a vibrant 
and increasingly critical civil society. Wahid had to take these developments into account.  
Second, Wahid as a decision-maker personally contributed in the policy-making itself. 
Given his former work prior becoming the country’s president was a human rights activist, it 
certainly influenced how he thought and acted as a president. Not only he had paid more 
attention to human rights, he should have also given more opportunities to civil society actors 
to be more active in doing their advocacy. Thus, Wahid’s personal traits played important roles. 
This reminds us to what has been argued by Hudson (2005) that the dynamics between nations 
and across nations have a ground in human decision makers whether acting as an individual or 
groups. Wahid as a president was a proof. 
Nonetheless, due to the short period of the administration, we can only call it an 
‘interlude’ toward the more institutionalised policies under the next government. Yet it was 
still an important phase of the salience of labour migration policies in the country. At the very 
least, it has given foundation for human and particularly workers’ rights as well as opportunities 
for civil society to play more active advocacy roles for policy change. 
The Megawati government adopted several policies on Indonesian labour migration. 
The policies, however, were seen by civil society to have neglected the protection dimension 
toward Indonesian migrant labour. A notable policy was the enactment of Law No. 39 in 2004, 
even though the law was made more due to an external factor: the Nunukan humanitarian crisis. 
The enactment of the law clearly demonstrated that civil society groups had relatively been 
124 
 
successful in pushing the administration, by using the Nunukan case, to establish a legal 
framework to protect the rights of migrant labour. 
Beside the notion of success as referred above, what needs to be underlined is that the 
policy entrepreneurs were also considered to have failed in guarding the progress of the law 
from the stages of deliberation to enactment, resulting in poor legislation that provided limited 
norms on the protection of Indonesian migrant labour. What may explain to this failure was an 
absence of qualities and characteristics of successful entrepreneurs. To be able to succeed as 
policy entrepreneurs, as suggested by Kingdon (2003), they must have claim to a ‘hearing’, are 
skilful negotiators, and, lastly, are persistent. This failure was, however, still understandable 
due to the circumstances at those time. The decision of Megawati government to enact the law 
was made in a brief consultative process, particularly in just few months prior to the termination 
of her presidency.  
In contrast to the Megawati government, the making of labour migration policies within 
the SBY government has demonstrated clear evidence on the influential role of policy 
entrepreneurs in policy change as well as the obvious linkage between foreign and domestic 
policies. As discussed earlier in Introduction and Chapter 1, these are among the primary 
propositions that this thesis attempted to test. The relevant section in this chapter shows that 
during its ten years in power, the SBY government made a number of notable and important 
policy decisions concerning labour migration.  
Among other things, the SBY government, through Presidential Instruction No. 6 of 
2006, established BNP2TKI, a defining government body dealing with the placement and 
protection of Indonesian migrant labour. It is true that the body still needs to prove its 
effectiveness particularly in terms of the provision of protection. Yet its establishment has 
shown a linkage between SBY’s personal attachment and labour migration issue, particularly 
when there were high-profile cases such as the abuse of Nirmala Bonat. 
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Another notable decision was the 2006 MoU with Malaysia concerning the recruitment 
and placement of Indonesian domestic labour. This MoU was considered weak as it merely 
duplicated the 2004 MoU and policy entrepreneurs had been excluded from the policy-making 
process. As a result, they criticised the MoU and urged the government to revise it. These 
attempts came to fruition in 2009 when the Indonesian government implemented a moratorium 
on the sending of migrant labour to Malaysia. Later in 2011, the two countries finally signed 
the Protocol amending the 2006 MoU. 
The decisions on 2006 MoU, the 2009 moratorium, and the 2011 protocol signing 
demonstrated that the policy entrepreneurs from civil society had conducted more active 
advocacy roles that subsequently bringing successes. As described, the 2006 MoU was 
regarded by the policy entrepreneurs weak, moving them to do a substantive advocacy by 
producing a critical note toward the MoU. As a result, the SBY government unilaterally 
imposed the 2009 moratorium. This success reminds us to of the conclusion argued by Mintrom 
(1997) that policy entrepreneurs can play a key role in identifying policy problems that attract 
the attention of decision makers. Furthermore, the follow up by both governments of Indonesia 
and Malaysia to sign the 2011 Protocol amending the 2006 MoU showed the strong linkage 
between foreign and domestic policies. Borrowing the metaphor put forward by Rosenau 
(1969: 8), the two governments were ‘trapped’ and therefore forced to sign the protocol in order 
to move further with migrant labour supply and demand. 
The moratorium on sending migrant labour to Saudi Arabia was indeed another notable 
policy under the SBY government that prove the strong linkage between foreign and domestic 
policies. This policy also demonstrated that the government has gradually come to accept the 
need for a moratorium mainly to accommodate domestic concerns. At first, the government 
implemented it in 2009 for Malaysia. Latter, the policy was implemented in Saudi Arabia after 
its government beheaded Ruyati binti Satubi without notification. What remains to be 
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questioned is whether there have been any substantive legislative progress in both countries as 
domestic pressures in Indonesia is rather different than the ones in Malaysia or Saudi Arabia.  
Another important decision under the SBY government was the release of the Grand 
Design policy to protect Indonesian citizens overseas. This Grand Design was made for the 
purpose of providing three stages of protection, namely preventive action, early detection, and 
immediate response. The Grand Design received appreciation from the Indonesian public. 
Interestingly, there were no records indicating that the grand design was made due to external 
pressures such as from civil society. The policy should have, therefore, come from the 
government itself and more particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). In other words, 
the change came from the institution. In explaining this, we may refer to what Thelen and 
Busemeyer (2008) have argued concerning institutional change, that the role of a government 
has somewhat changed from brokering and facilitating to initiating and reforming. In the Grand 
Design case, we can claim the MFA has shifted its role to become an initiator and reformer. 
Last but not least, the Jokowi government has made a change to Indonesia’s foreign 
policy direction by giving greater symbolic emphasis to the issue of Indonesian migrant labour 
protection. President Jokowi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister for Manpower 
have all given some attention to this issue, at least through their policy statements to the media. 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs even promised to pursue a legally binding instrument that can 
ensure the rights protection of Indonesian migrant labour. 
Nonetheless, there has also been criticism toward the administration. Civil society 
viewed that what the government has done thus far were mostly giving statements, or symbolic 
gestures, rather than a comprehensive policy to address major problems. Worse, the 
government has not shown any interest to harmonise the already ratified CMW into Indonesia’s 
legal regimes on the protection of migrant workers. Though the most simple and realistic way 
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is by revising the Law No. 39 of 2004, the law that was perceived by policy entrepreneurs to 
be weak and ineffective. 
To this end, I would argue that the criticisms toward the Jokowi government may have 
been caused by the more tempered behaviour of policy entrepreneurs themselves. They might 
have been in euphoria with the presidency of Jokowi, a president that emerged from an ordinary 
class. Furthermore, the Minister of Labour himself had once declared that his mother was 
previously a migrant worker. Because of these, the policy entrepreneurs might have thought 
that the Jokowi government would have been more inclined toward labour protection. In other 
words, they have subordinated their public activism on this issue and instead lent support to 
the administration. 
The perceptions of policy entrepreneurs could be misguided since they might not have 
considered that Jokowi was previously a businessman. To a large extent, as a former 
businessman, he would still think as a businessman or, at the very least, listen more to the 
interest of labour migration industry. Yet, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, we can claim that the 
recruiting industry has not paid much attention on the issue of labour migration protection. 
What it prefers to focus on is the commercial side of labour migration or, more specifically, 
sending as many as possible the labour overseas. This phenomena is indeed a challenge for the 
policy entrepreneurs. If they let Jokowi government proceeds as it has been, most probably 
they will see more a reverse set of policy rather than a comprehensive one. 
In general Indonesia’s foreign (and domestic) policy decisions on labour migration 
from the governments of Suharto to Jokowi have demonstrated incremental patterns in slow 
improvements in policy changes to protect migrant workers in foreign countries. Over a long 
period from the 1960s to the early 2010s, the policies get more salient particularly in the 
domestic level. The policy entrepreneurs have indeed played roles, especially when Indonesia 
shifted to become a democratic country in late 1990s. Further, they might have reached one of 
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their peak policy cycles when the country ratified the CMW. Yet challenges remain within the 
Jokowi government as it mostly shows symbolic gestures than gearing towards an expected 
comprehensive policy. This may become another topic for further research. 
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Chapter 4 
The UN Convention on Migrant Workers: Who Drove Its 
International Campaigns for Ratification, and How? 
 
As the central theme of this thesis is the role of policy entrepreneurs in the ratification by 
Indonesia of the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW), it is important to examine the Convention in 
some detail. There are some pertinent questions to be asked. What factors drove the emergence 
of the CMW? What international events contributed to the making of the Convention? Why 
did it take as long as ten years to negotiate? Why was there no ratification in the early years 
after adoption? 
Further, as this thesis primarily argues that policy entrepreneurs, particularly civil society 
actors such as NGOs, played a key role in the ratification of Indonesia to the CMW in 2012, it 
argues that civil society actors at the international and regional levels had been playing such a 
role long before. Their involvement was in the stages of ratification campaigns, the 
negotiations, and even in introducing the idea of the importance of CMW in the international 
arena. Thus, the role of civil society actors at the international, regional, and domestic levels is 
also important and should be examined as they can provide more insight into the primary 
investigation of this thesis. 
This chapter will therefore examine the historical background of the CMW, its contents, 
its obstacles and challenges at the international level, and the role of international NGOs pre 
and post 1990. This chapter will also briefly examine the ratification by Indonesia of the 
Convention on 12 April 2012. 
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4.1 Historical Background of the CMW 
This section examines the historical background of the 1990 CMW including its relation to the 
migrant workers’ norms managed by the ILO and the international environment at the time the 
ideas for the CMW emerged. There are three international norms that presently govern the 
issue of migrant labour rights: the Convention concerning Migration for Employment (ILO 
Convention 97, adopted in 1949), the Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive 
Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers 
(ILO Convention 143, adopted in 1975), and the CMW, adopted in 1990. The first two 
Conventions were the products of the ILO, a multilateral organisation that applied a tripartite 
system that involved governments, unions of employers, and unions of workers in negotiations. 
The second Convention (CMW) was the product of the United Nations, whose members, unlike 
the ILO, are governments. The rationale for bringing the latest migrant workers’ international 
norms to the UN was mainly the reluctance of governments to deal with other parties such as 
unions of workers and employers. According to Pecoud & Guchteneire (2006: 246), UN 
member countries were reluctant to leave migration issues to the ILO due to the tripartism of 
the organisation, in which it grants unions “too important a role for many governments” 
Because of this, a number of developing countries initiated a campaign for a UN 
convention that dealt with the rights of migrant labour. The germ of this idea emerged in 1975 
when the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) produced a report titled Exploitation 
of Labour through Illicit and Clandestine Trafficking (United Nations General Assembly 
1972). This report, according to Hune and Niessen (1991: 132), drew the world’s attention to 
the insecure position of migrant labour. 
Later, through the General Assembly Resolution 34/172 of December 1979, the UN 
agreed to establish an Open-ended Working Group to discuss and draft a new international 
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convention for the protection of migrant workers (OHCHR 2005: 2). The draft was proposed 
by Algeria, Mexico, Pakistan, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Barbados, and Egypt (Battistella 2009: 55). 
The Working Group was initially chaired by Ambassador Gonzales de Leon of Mexico, at that 
time a developing country as well as a major labour-sending country in its region. Nonetheless, 
the initial attempt by developing countries to speed up the work on the draft convention was 
not successful due to rejection by western European countries as it was considered to legalise 
irregular migration (Battistella 2009: 55). 
Yet, when an informal group called MESCA (a group of seven Mediterranean and 
Scandinavian countries namely Finland, Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) 
got involved and brought their national norms into the proposed international treaty, the 
drafting process moved on. Battistella (2009: 55) observes that the draft Convention was 
“fundamentally a European text”. While working closely amongst themselves at the drafting 
stage, the MESCA countries often invited other countries such as France, India and Yugoslavia 
to take part in the discussion. The group also succeeded in involving the ILO in the drafting 
process, even though developing countries succeeded in downplaying the organisation’s role 
(Hune and Niessen 1991: 134). 
Another factor that drove countries to continue work further on the CMW was the high 
concern for the vulnerability of women migrant workers and whether their presence in other 
countries was legal or illegal. More specifically, the emergence of the rights that women 
migrant workers deserve was highlighted during the ‘decade for women’, a movement declared 
by the United Nations. Hune (1991) observes that there are several driving ‘women factors’ 
that have contributed to the movement of the CMW, more particularly when there were linked 
with the United Nations Decade for Women, 1976-1985. 
Of these so-called ‘women factors’, the first was their emergence as migrant workers 
often linked to abuse and exploitation. According to Basch and Lerner (1986), as quoted from 
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Hune (1991: 803), it was the Forum of NGOs and migrant women organisations that brought 
this concern into international public awareness. The second factor was the holding of three 
key international conferences that related to the UN Decade for Women. The conferences were 
held in Mexico City in 1975, the Copenhagen Meeting in 1980, and the Nairobi Meeting in 
1985. According to Hune (1991: 803), these three conferences served as a basis for “examining 
the specific situation of migrant women today and their needs”. The third factor was the push 
by international NGOs. An NGO Forum was held in parallel with the Nairobi Meeting in 1985 
at which the NGOs highlighted the vulnerability of migrant women. These driving factors, as 
argued by Hune (1991: 807), reinforced the need for universal standards for the protection of 
migrant workers. 
 
4.2 The Negotiation and Contents of the CMW 
This section examines how the CMW was negotiated, the actors involved in the negotiation, 
and the role of international NGOs in the negotiation. The section also examines the contents 
of the convention. 
 
4.2.1 The Protracted Negotiations 
The Open-Ended Working Group tasked to negotiate the CMW met for the first time on 8 
October 1980 (Battistella 2009: 55). The procedural rule adopted by the UN Working Group 
was that each article would be agreed on by consensus. Therefore, as in many multilateral 
negotiations, the wording of each article was reached through a series of compromises. In 
general, the main debates and negotiations occurred between labour sending countries and 
labour receiving countries. If the former tended to demand greater protection, the latter were 
mindful of the consequences of these demands on the cost and feasibility of compliance (Hune 
and Niessen 1991: 134). 
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The greatest difficulty in the drafting process was how to develop articles that at least 
met minimum standards but, at the same time, would be acceptable to a majority of nations for 
the sake of future ratification. As a result, countries that already had national legislation 
covering migrant labour rights had to exert extra efforts to ensure the CMW draft accorded 
with their existing legislation. Compromises were made. Some of the articles concerning rights 
were set as optional rather than mandatory in order to create flexibility for states to adjust to 
standards above the minimum set by the draft Convention (Hune and Niessen 1991: 134). After 
ten years of negotiation, the UN General Assembly finally adopted the CMW on 18 December 
1990. 
The fact that they took as long as ten years suggests there were uneasy processes during 
the negotiations. In essence, there were two types of negotiated drafts: the first and the second 
draft readings (Battistella 2009: 54-58). The first draft had actually been completed in 1984 
and by this time there were only 19 articles unresolved, indicating that completion should not 
take much longer. Yet it took another six years to complete the second draft. According to 
Lönnroth (1991), there were various factors that caused these lengthy negotiations. These 
included the high turnover of the delegates, the open-endedness of the Working Group, and the 
vested interests of the states. Concerning the vested interest of the states, Battistella (2009: 56) 
pointed out that while the first draft presented a general tone favouring the protection of 
migrants, the second draft was more “an expression of the interests of governments”. It was 
the interests of governments that prolonged the negotiations. 
Grange and D’Auchamp (2009: 71-74) have argued that the involvement of NGOs 
during the drafting process was minimal. The primary reason of this was the political context 
and the evolution of the human rights movement at that time. During the 1970s when the CMW 
was negotiated, existing international human rights NGOs spent most of their efforts on civil 
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and political rights or on combating apartheid. The issue of migrant workers was not considered 
a pressing global priority. 
The number of international human rights NGOs was also a factor leading to minimal 
participation in the CMW negotiations. Grange and D’Auchamp (2009: 72-73) noted that, in 
comparison to the current situation where there are more than 3,000 NGOs holding ECOSOC 
consultative status that enables them to participate in many UN activities, in the 1980s when 
the negotiation of the CMW took place, their number was less than 300. To make matters 
worse, only a few of them engaged directly with the migrant labour issue. NGOs also lacked 
funding which prevented them from mobilising a migrants’ rights movement at the 
international level. 
If international NGOs could not participate much in the CMW negotiations due to 
various reasons as above, the lack of participation by national and regional NGOs should not 
be surpising. According to Grange and D’Auchamp (2009: 73), the reason for this was that 
ECOSOC consultative status for national and regional NGOs was only available from the 
1990s onwards. Another reason was the minimal pressures from national and regional NGOs 
themselves. The main proponent countries for the convention, such as Algeria, Egypt, and 
Mexico, did not have active civil societies. Even the human rights NGOs in the MESCA 
countries at the time were still non-existent, weak, or did not view the protection of migrant 
workers as important. 
 
4.2.2 The Specific Contents of the Convention 
The CMW consists of 9 Parts with an overall 93 Articles. Part I starts with Scope and 
Definitions. The term ‘migrant worker’ is defined as “a migrant worker who retains his or her 
habitual residence in a neighbouring State to which he or she normally returns every day or at 
least once a week” (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
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2014a). In general, this Part consists of a list of concepts and informs a detailed scope such as 
categories of people who are not covered in the Convention (Article 3). Those people are, 
among other things: persons employed by international organisations; persons sent by a state 
who work in development programmes; persons enjoying residential status as investors; 
refugees and stateless persons; students and trainees; and seafarers and migrants who work on 
offshore installations but are not permitted to enjoy residential status. 
Part II emphasises the non-discriminatory nature toward migrant workers who can 
enjoy the rights provided in the convention. This Part, the shortest among the other parts, rules 
that the state parties to the CMW must respect the rights of all migrant workers and members 
of their families “without any distinction of any kind such as to sex, race, colour, language, 
religion or conviction, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, nationality, 
age, economic position, property, marital status, birth or other status” (Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014a). 
Part III details the aspect of human rights that all migrant workers and members of their 
families shall enjoy. It stipulates, inter alia, freedom of movement (Article 8), protection from 
torture, inhuman treatment, and forced labour (Article 9 – 11), freedom of thought, religion 
and expression (Article 12 – 13), protection from violence, physical injury and intimidation 
(Article 16), protection provided by consular or diplomatic authorities (Article 16 and 23), 
equal rights as nationals of the state concerned before the courts and tribunals (Article 18), 
protection from collective expulsion in which each case shall be investigated and decided on 
an individual basis (Article 22), protection of remuneration and other conditions of work and 
other terms of employment (Article 25), treatment of social security similarly enjoyed by 
nationals as long as requirements within applicable legislation are fulfilled (Article 27), 
medical care when urgently required (Article 28), rights of a migrant worker’s child to a name, 
to registration of birth, and to a nationality (Article 29), basic right to education of a migrant 
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worker’s child (Article 30), cultural rights (Article 31), and the right to transfer earnings and 
savings (Article 32). 
Part IV lists the rights of migrant workers and members of their families who are 
specifically documented or in a regular situation. It stipulates, among other things, the right to 
receive all information on conditions in receiving countries (Article 37), temporary absence 
(Article 38), the right to form associations and trade unions (Article 40), the right to take part 
in public affairs, to vote and to be elected at elections of their state of origin (Article 41), 
political rights (Article 41), equality of treatment in certain aspects with the nationals of 
receiving countries (Article 43), protection of the unity of families (Article 44), exemption 
from import and export duties and taxes (Article 46), the right to seek alternative employment 
(Article 51), freedom from expulsion (Article 56). 
Part V deals with the particular categories of migrant workers and members of their 
families. The particular categories specified in this part are, inter alia, frontier workers (Article 
58), seasonal workers (Article 59), itinerant workers (Article 60), project-tied workers (Article 
61), and self-employed workers (Article 63). 
Part VI is concerned with the promotion of sound, equitable, humane and lawful 
conditions in connection with international migration of workers and members of their families. 
It obliges the state parties to, among other things: consult and cooperate with one another with 
regard to the promotion of sound, equitable and humane conditions (Article 64); maintain 
relevant services concerning international migration (Article 65); cooperate in the management 
of the orderly return of migrant workers and members of their families to their states of origin 
(Article 67); collaborate in preventing and eliminating illegal movement and irregular 
employment of migrant workers (Article 68); take measures on the irregular situation of 
migrant workers and ensure the situation is fixed (Article 69); take measures not less than 
enjoyed by nationals to be in line with the standards of fitness, safety, health and principles of 
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human dignity (Article 70); and facilitate the repatriation to the sending country of the bodies 
of deceased migrant workers or members of their families. 
Part VII deals with how the CMW is applied. It informs important measures such as: 
the establishment of a Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, which consists of fourteen experts with integrity, impartiality and 
acknowledged competence in the areas relevant to the Convention (Article 72[1]); the election 
procedure for Committee members and the duration of their work (Article 72[3-5]); the 
facilities, privileges and immunities of the experts (Article 72[9]); submission of a report on 
legislative, judicial, administrative and other measures (Article 73); the examination of a report 
of each state party by the Committee (Article 74); the possible involvement of UN specialised 
agencies and other intergovernmental organisations in the work of the Committee (Article 74); 
the management of the Committee’s rules and procedures, election of officers, meetings 
(Article 75); the rules if a state party claims that another party does not fulfil its obligation as 
stipulated in the Convention (Article 76); and the competence of the Committee to receive and 
consider claims of a state party on the violation of the rights of its citizens (Article 77). 
Part VIII outlines the general provisions of the CMW. It includes, among other things, 
the CMW shall not affect the right of each state party to establish the admission criteria of 
migrant workers and members of their families (Article 79); the encouragement not to renounce 
the rights of migrant workers and members of their families (Article 82); the obligation of each 
state party to have an effective remedy if these rights are violated (Article 83); and the 
obligation of each state party to implement the provisions of the CMW. Finally, Part IX lists 
the final provisions. It contains, inter alia: the procedure for signing and ratification (Article 
85); the period of entry into force (Article 87); the possible denunciation of the Convention by 
any state party (Article 89); possible amendments to the Convention after five years of entry 
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into force (Article 90); and dispute settlement processes between two or more states parties, 
either through negotiation, arbitration or the International Court of Justice. 
 
4.3 Challenges of and Obstacles to Ratification 
As the preceding section demonstrates, the adoption of the CMW in 1990 was not without its 
challenges. The same applies to the situation in the years immediately after its adoption, with 
considerable time passing before it came into force in 2003. Guchteneire and Pecoud (2004: 1) 
observe that it took 13 years for the CMW to enter into force, which was an unusually long 
period of time. It was also acknowledged that many countries were reluctant to sign the CMW, 
let alone ratified it. As an example, up to June 2015 there were still less than 50 ratifications 
(United Nations Treaty Collection 2015). This is in line to what has been argued by Ruhs (2012: 
1281) that the CMW is the least ratified treaty among all major treaties of human rights 
norms.15 
Interestingly, as shown on Table 4.1 below, none of the countries actively involved in 
the negotiation or drafting process, particularly those belong to the MESCA-group, have 
ratified the CMW. Scholars call this situation the ‘lack of success’ of the CMW since “not one 
major migrant receiving state is among the parties to the Convention” (MacDonald and 
Cholewisnki 2007: 9). 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 The major human rights treaties are: the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination; the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
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Table 4.1   Status of the Ratifications toward International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families 
 
 
Entry into force : 1 July 2003, in accordance with article 87(1) 
Registration : 1 July 2003, No. 39481 
Status : Signatories: 38, Parties: 48 
Text : United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2220, p. 3; Doc. A/RES/45/158 
Note : The Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, was adopted by 
Resolution 45/1581 of 18 December 1990 at the forty-fifth session of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Convention is open 
for signature by all States in accordance with its article 86 (1) 
Participant 
Signature, Succession to 
signature(d) 
Ratification, Accession(a), 
Succession(d) 
Albania    5 Jun 2007 a 
Algeria   21 Apr 2005 a 
Argentina 10 Aug 2004  23 Feb 2007  
Armenia 26 Sep 2013    
Azerbaijan   11 Jan 1999 a 
Bangladesh  7 Oct 1998  24 Aug 2011  
Belize   14 Nov 2001 a 
Benin 15 Sep 2005    
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)   16 Oct 2000 a 
Bosnia and Herzegovina   13 Dec 1996 a 
Burkina Faso 16 Nov 2001  26 Nov 2003  
Cabo Verde   16 Sep 1997 a 
Cambodia 27 Sep 2004    
Cameroon 15 Dec 2009    
Chad 26 Sep 2012    
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Chile 24 Sep 1993  21 Mar 2005  
Colombia   24 May 1995 a 
Comoros 22 Sep 2000    
Congo 29 Sep 2008    
Ecuador    5 Feb 2002 a 
Egypt   19 Feb 1993 a 
El Salvador 13 Sep 2002  14 Mar 2003  
Gabon 15 Dec 2004    
Ghana  7 Sep 2000   7 Sep 2000  
Guatemala  7 Sep 2000  14 Mar 2003  
Guinea    7 Sep 2000 a 
Guinea-Bissau 12 Sep 2000    
Guyana 15 Sep 2005   7 Jul 2010  
Haiti  5 Dec 2013    
Honduras    9 Aug 2005 a 
Indonesia 22 Sep 2004  31 May 2012  
Jamaica 25 Sep 2008  25 Sep 2008  
Kyrgyzstan   29 Sep 2003 a 
Lesotho 24 Sep 2004  16 Sep 2005  
Liberia 22 Sep 2004    
Libya   18 Jun 2004 a 
Madagascar 24 Sep 2014 13 May 2015 
Mali    5 Jun 2003 a 
Mauritania   22 Jan 2007 a 
Mexico 22 May 1991   8 Mar 1999  
Montenegro 2  23 Oct 2006 d   
Morocco 15 Aug 1991  21 Jun 1993  
Mozambique 15 Mar 2012  19 Aug 2013  
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Source: United Nations Treaty Collection 2014 
 
The low rate of ratification drove the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to carry out a project in the early 2000s investigating the 
obstacles and challenges faced by countries in ratifying the CMW. Based on regional 
investigations, the organisation tasked scholars to undertake studies in several countries 
Nicaragua   26 Oct 2005 a 
Niger   18 Mar 2009 a 
Nigeria   27 Jul 2009 a 
Palau 20 Sep 2011    
Paraguay 13 Sep 2000  23 Sep 2008  
Peru 22 Sep 2004  14 Sep 2005  
Philippines 15 Nov 1993   5 Jul 1995  
Rwanda   15 Dec 2008 a 
Sao Tome and Principe  6 Sep 2000    
Senegal    9 Jun 1999 a 
Serbia 11 Nov 2004    
Seychelles   15 Dec 1994 a 
Sierra Leone 15 Sep 2000    
Sri Lanka   11 Mar 1996 a 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines   29 Oct 2010 a 
Syrian Arab Republic    2 Jun 2005 a 
Tajikistan  7 Sep 2000   8 Jan 2002  
Timor-Leste   30 Jan 2004 a 
Togo 15 Nov 2001    
Turkey 13 Jan 1999  27 Sep 2004  
Uganda   14 Nov 1995 a 
Uruguay   15 Feb 2001 a 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  4 Oct 2011    
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examining the obstacles to CMW ratification and the social and political impacts if ratification 
took place (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2014). 
These studies found that the main common obstacles were the lack of promotion, 
awareness, and understanding of the CMW in many countries (Ruhs 2012: 1282). For example, 
in the Asia-Pacific, Piper and Iredale (2003: 6) observe that labour-sending countries had not 
investigated article by article the legal implications of becoming parties to the Convention. 
There was also a problem with human resources in government bodies, which were either 
under-staffed or had minimal expertise in the fields of international law and human rights. 
Furthermore, there were strong combined interests of recruitment agencies, employers, and 
government officials who were against the granting of rights to migrant workers. As for the 
receiving countries such as New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, and Korea, problems 
mostly related to immigration policies, political systems and perceptions of human rights (Piper 
and Iredale 2003: 7). 
In Africa, Adekokun (2003: 25) argued that the problems of migrant workers are mostly 
related to the rights of undocumented workers. Undocumented migrant workers were not fully 
protected due to their illegal status. As for documented migrant workers, even though there 
were ECOWAS Protocols that applied basic instrumental rights, workers might not be fully 
protected from abuse and exploitation especially when working in the private sector. 
The pertinent obstacles to the ratification of the CMW were political, legal and 
economic. Politically, ratification might not be seen as a strategic move due to local challenges 
that relate to labour issues. Legally, the implications of ratification would have to be analysed 
to ensure that the CMW will not conflict with existing provisions on the rights of migrant 
workers and their families. Economically, there were huge financial implications particularly 
concerning the training of personnel who control the border, the provision of more entry ports 
and on various other important structures when the CMW is implemented. Due to these factors, 
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it was recommended that more effort should be made in explaining the importance of 
ratification. Adekokun (2003: 5) argued that the strategies for ratification were the creation of 
awareness, sensitisation, and advocacy on the values of ratification. 
In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Patzwaldt (2004: 9-12) observed that there were at 
least three types of obstacles to the ratification of the CMW: knowledge and problem-solving 
deficits within the administration; nation building; and social problems. On knowledge and 
problem-solving deficits, most countries in the region considered migration as a topic of low 
priority in the political and public domain. The most important factors causing this situation 
were the social and economic changes and crises that force governments to focus more on 
macroeconomic reforms and consolidation of political institutions. On the nation building 
obstacle, the region faced a number of challenges since reforms took place. Problems 
embedded in political democratisation emerged, such as the rights of citizenship, ethnicity and 
nationalism. With regard to problems concerning institutions, there were issues such as ethnic 
mobilisation, decentralisation and regional fragmentation of power resources that formed the 
new national framework. On the obstacle of social problems, there were biased perceptions of 
the status of migrant workers. On one hand, the region encouraged its population to migrate to 
other countries for the purpose of easing social tension and reducing domestic unemployment. 
On the other hand, migrant workers were perceived to gain the benefits of better income 
opportunities and therefore did not require or warrant protection. 
MacDonald and Cholewinski (2007) stated that there were generally three categories 
of obstacles behind the non-ratification in the European Economic Community (EEC, which 
consists of 27 member states of the European Union and Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway). 
The first category was legal obstacles. In this category, the core problem was the 
‘misconception’ about the ratification of the CMW. In this regard, there had been common 
claims that the CMW would limit the sovereign rights of states in border control. Furthermore, 
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there was also the fear that the CMW would provide the right of family reunion to all migrant 
workers, which obliges the countries to meet the right in each territory of a state. The second 
category was financial or administrative obstacles. In general, this category was not considered 
as highly significant, even though some countries such as Poland or Norway did not have much 
experience with immigration. The exception was France, which considered the financial 
provisions of the CMW a major obstacle, such as the Article 47 that required appropriate 
measures to facilitate the remittances transferred by migrants to their home countries. The third 
category was political obstacles. This category was considered the real obstacle toward the 
ratification of the CMW. Hence, these obstacles were not merely related to the core problem 
of ‘misconception’. There is a need for in-depth analysis to ensure further acceptance. 
Based on these three categories of obstacles, MacDonald and Cholewinski (2007: 16-
17) recommended that the EEC should, among other things, focus on efforts to ensure the 
CMW is a significant factor in developing legislation on migration; pay urgent attention to the 
ongoing drafting process of the EU General Framework Directive on the rights of regular 
migrants; focus on promoting ratification of the CMW in major labour receiving countries such 
as the UK and France with an expectation that they will show leadership in the region; 
encourage further participation and collaboration of major migrant and human rights NGOs 
calling for ratification; carry out or commission further studies or comparative analysis to 
create awareness not only of the content of the CMW but also the implications of its ratification; 
and develop a synthesis and synopsis of the CMW on a single page and make it available in all 
official languages of the EEC. 
In short, based on the commissioned reports, Guchteneire and Pecoud (2004: 1-2) 
argued that the major source of difficulty in the ratification of the CMW derives from social 
changes – the factors of economic, politics, and security – in the world between the 1970s 
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(when the CMW started to be developed) and the 1990s (when the UN General Assembly 
adopted the Convention).  
 
4.4 The Role of International NGOs in Promoting the CMW 
This section examines the roles of human rights and migrant worker NGOs in promoting the 
ratification of the CMW. It is argued that NGOs, both at international and regional levels, 
played key roles in this endeavour. 
International civil society groups, most particularly NGOs, were certainly influential 
with regard to campaigns for CMW ratification. Scholars (Guchteneire and Pecoud 2009, 
Grange and D’Auchamp 2009) have argued that NGOs played key roles, especially after the 
adoption of the CMW in 1990 through campaigns calling for states to ratify it. Grange and 
D’Auchamp (2009: 70) observed: 
[…] there was civil society involvement directly after the adoption of the Convention 
[…] Since the early to mid 1990s, a small-scale but steadily growing group of NGOs has 
mobilised awareness-raising initiatives and a global ratification campaign. There have 
been calls for ratification in all regions, and sustained NGO advocacy for the human 
rights of migrants and towards ratification exist in some thirty countries in Asia, Europe, 
Latin America, the Middle East and North America, and to a lesser extent in Africa. 
This is in line with the observation of Plaetevoet (2008) in which he acknowledged the 
mobilisation for ratification undertaken by NGOs across the globe. For example, in North 
America, NGOs established a platform that gathered together numerous organisations such as 
the Immigrant Workers’ Centre, PINAY (a migrant workers group from the Philippines), and 
two other group coalitions that support agricultural labour and migrant labour. In the US, 
around 100 organisations belonging to the National Network on Immigrant and Refugee Rights 
released a statement calling for the ratification of the CMW. 
In Southeast Asia, unions, migrant labour associations and migrant rights NGOs jointly 
worked in the Task Force on ASEAN Migrant Workers (TF-AMW), calling upon members of 
ASEAN to ratify the Convention. In its official statement, the Task Force urged the ASEAN 
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member states to “immediately ratify [...] the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families” (Task Force on ASEAN Migrant 
Workers 2009: 53). The ratification by Indonesia had even been hoped for in 2007 when TF-
AMW in its statement on 12 May 2007 demanded the Indonesian government ratify the CMW 
by that year (Task Force on ASEAN Migrant Workers 2009: 54). 
The Task Force on ASEAN Migrant Workers consisted of trade unions, NGOs focusing 
on human rights and migrant rights, and association of migrant workers in Southeast Asia (Task 
Force on ASEAN Migrant Workers 2015). In this Task Force, Indonesia was represented by 
the Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) which was a coalition of Indonesian NGOs that 
provided human rights advocacy (Hivos 2014). The TF-AMW, according to Chavez (2015: 
10), was a transnational social movement established to specifically deal with the ASEAN 
Committee on Migrant Workers and the making of an ASEAN instrument for the protection of 
migrant workers. From the official statement of TF-AMW it is clear that the ASEAN 
movement, which consists of national and regional groups in ASEAN countries, made solid 
demands for CMW ratification. It can be argued that this regional movement was influenced 
by national NGOs over the importance of CMW ratification. 
The active participation of international NGOs began in 1994 when they became 
involved in campaigns for the ratification of the CMW. As observed by Grange and 
D’Auchamp (2009: 80), a critical turning point in raising awareness of human rights violations 
of migrant workers was the 1994 submission of the Preliminary Report to the CHR (UN 
Commission on Human Rights) by Radhika Coomaraswamy, the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences. The Report cited a range of human 
rights violations against migrant workers submitted by international NGOs, more particularly 
the Human Rights Watch - Women’s Rights Project and Asia Watch. Later, the Report drove 
the making of the United Nations resolution entitled ‘Violence against women migrant 
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workers’ (C.H.R. res. 1997/13) which was agreed unanimously. The resolution shows how the 
Commission on Human Rights is concerned “by the continuing reports of grave abuses and 
acts of violence committed against the persons of women migrant workers by some employers 
in some host countries” (Human Rights Library 1997a). The Commission, through Article 7 of 
the resolution, therefore encourages “States to consider signing and ratifying or acceding to the 
[CMW]”. 
Resolution 1997/13 of the Commission of Human Rights was echoed by another 
resolution pushing for more substantive work under the Commission. As stated at the C.H.R. 
res. 1997/15 entitled ‘Migrants and human rights’ (Human Rights Library 1997b), the 
Commission established a working group of five intergovernmental experts with a mandate to 
gather all relevant information from governments, NGOs and any other relevant sources on the 
obstacles to the effective and full protection of the human rights of migrants. The NGOs, as 
observed by Grange and D’Auchamp (2009: 80), welcomed the establishment of this working 
group (later known as IGWG – the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on the 
Human Rights of Migrants) and recommended the group make full use of the definitions and 
standards of human rights protection as stipulated in the CMW. As a result, the IGWG came 
up with a recommendation on the need to have a mandate for a Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Migrants, which was finally approved in 1999.16 The NGOs also participated 
actively at the IGWG meetings, including by having meetings with the IGOs, later presenting 
an idea to have a global campaign for CMW ratification. Grange and D’Auchamp (2009: 81) 
observe that it was the informal meetings between NGOs and IGOs on the sidelines of IGWG 
                                                          
16 Some of the main functions embedded within the mandate are: (a) to examine ways and means to overcome the 
obstacles existing to the full and effective protection of the human rights of migrants, recognising the particular 
vulnerability of women, children and those undocumented or in an irregular situation; and (b) to request and 
receive information from all relevant sources, including migrants themselves, on violations of the human rights 
of migrants and their families (OHCHR 2014b); 
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meetings that “paved the way for the creation of the Steering Committee of the Global 
Campaign for Ratification of the Convention.”17 
The creation of a mandate for the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants 
in 1999 drove the NGOs to work more determinedly. Grange and D’Auchamp (2009: 81) 
observe that the NGOs provided the Special Rapporteur with a wealth of information for the 
purpose of assisting the mandate’s monitoring and reporting role. The NGOs worked closely 
with the first mandate holder, Gabriela Rodriguez Pizarro, including during her visits to a 
number of countries. The NGOs also provided the Special Rapporteur with records of human 
rights violations towards migrant workers, as proven in the lengthy annual reports of the 
Rapporteur to the CHR entitled ‘Communications sent to governments and replies received’ 
(United Nations General Assembly 2009). 
Nonetheless, the mandate of the Special Rapporteur since its establishment in 1999 was 
considered to be weak as the CMW had yet to enter into force. This situation forced the NGOs 
to focus more on campaigning for ratification and to continue participating actively at world 
conferences and summits. “NGOs organised seminars, held press briefings and distributed 
material on the CMW at parallel events and actively participated in the drafting of outcome 
documents” (Grange and D’Auchamp 2009: 83). The involvement of NGOs at world 
conferences also opened ways for their work to have greater impact. By attending world 
conferences18, NGOs developed broad regional and international networks and at the same time 
                                                          
17 The Steering Committee of the Global Campaign for Ratification of the Convention on Rights of Migrants 
includes December 18, HRW, the ICMC, the ICFTU, the ILO, the International Movement against All Forms of 
Discrimination and Racism, the IMO, MFA, MRI, the OHCHR, Public Services International (PSI), UNESCO, 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and the World Council of Churches (WCC) (Grange and 
D’Auchamps 2009). 
18 The ‘building block’ of NGOs at world conferences began at the 1994 International Conference on Population 
and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, continued in 1995 at the World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen 
and the 4th World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, and was further continued at the 2001 World 
Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (WCAR) in Durban 
(Graham and D’Auchamp 2009). The very first alliance of NGOs was established in September 1994 at the ICPD. 
The alliance was called the International Migrants Rights Watch Committee, later known as Migrants Rights 
International (MRI) (Gencianos 2004). 
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publicised and monitored the implementation of action-oriented recommendations emerging 
from these conferences. They have also held governments accountable for their public 
declarations and commitments made at world conferences. 
Another important stage of NGO collaborative work happened in 1998 when they, 
together with international governmental organisations (IGOs), established the Steering 
Committee of the Global Campaign for Ratification. Soon after its establishment, the 
Committee published “Achieving Dignity: a Campaigner’s Handbook for the Migrants Rights 
Convention” (Migrants Rights International 1998), a comprehensive publication on how to 
campaign for the CMW’s ratification. Available in English, French, and Spanish, the 
publication was regarded as one of the first popular materials and guiding tools in promoting 
the CMW (Gencianos 2004: 149). Furthermore, the hybridism between NGOs and IGOs that 
formed the Steering Committee also gave the movement a high profile (Grange and 
D’Auchamp 2009: 84). Beside its activities being commended by the UN Secretary General, 
the Steering Committee was considered to have played a role in the increase in ratifications 
between 1998 and the entry into force in 2003. As observed by Grange and D’Auchamp (2009: 
84), “Only nine states had ratified the CMW in the eight years since its adoption by the General 
Assembly in 1990. Over the five years following the creation of the Steering Committee in 
1998, eleven states ratified”. 
The Steering Committee of the Global Campaign for Ratification had indeed done 
much to achieve its goals. Gencianos (2004: 148) describes that members of the Committee 
met regularly every month to exchange updates of the work of individual organisations against 
the CMW, to identify strategies for campaigning, such as organising events, letter-writing 
campaigns, and supporting each other’s initiatives. The Steering Committee also maintained a 
website (www.migrantsrights.org) where it provided useful and relevant information and 
updates on global campaign activities. 
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Nonetheless, despite the hard work in creating awareness and promoting the importance 
of ratifying the CMW, there have been challenges that the NGOs have had to face. With their 
limited resources, they faced challenges from recruitment agencies, employers, and 
government officials who were against granting rights to foreign workers. Piper (2004: 84) 
suggested, “Combined interests which go against granting rights to foreign workers constitute 
a huge force that are not easily counteracted by NGOs”. After the CMW came into force in 
2003, NGOs have been exposed to the challenges presented by many governments unwilling 
to ratify the Convention. Governments often argued that the fact it took ten years to draft the 
CMW shows how divisive was the issue (Grange and D’Auchamp 2009: 75). Some of the 
arguments put forward by governments since the adoption of the CMW have been, first, that 
the convention was impractical and unrealisable as an international standard because it is over 
ambitious and too detailed; second, the CMW was irrelevant because no host states have shown 
their willingness to adopt it; and third, the convention was essentially ‘dead’ given the slow 
progress of ratification (Taran 2001). 
Despite all the challenges faced in creating awareness and promoting the importance of 
ratifying the CMW, the NGOs contribution in persuading states to ratify has been seen as an 
important element in the policy process. Grange and D’Auchamp (2009: 89) argued that the 
ratification decision was generally a result of multiple factors among which the continuous 
interventions by NGOs were important elements. Both scholars indeed acknowledge that 
documenting the impact of campaigning activities was difficult, yet it was important to mention 
that the growing number of campaigns for ratification ran in parallel with an increase in 
ratification, particularly since the Convention entered into force in 2003. It took 13 years for 
the CMW to have its first twenty ratifications, yet the number has doubled only six year after 
the entry into force. This development indicates the important role the NGOs have played in 
actively campaigning for ratification. Their commitment post 2003 can be considered as a new 
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phase in their advocacy and monitoring activities, which eventually led to the convention being 
finally listed in official UN documents and ratification at the UNGA and more particularly 
becoming one of the core international human rights treaties (Grande and D’Auchamp 2009: 
89). 
 
4.5 Indonesia’s Ratification of the CMW 
This section will briefly introduce the role of Indonesian NGOs and their members – labelled 
as policy entrepreneurs – in the signing and more particularly the ratification by Indonesia of 
the Convention. One can question whether these policy entrepreneurs played a key role or not 
in the ratification. In that regard, the statement of Marty Natalegawa the then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs on the date of ratification (12 April 2012) before the DPR (Indonesian House 
of Representatives) should prove the case. On that occasion, Natalegawa (2013) stated (in an 
unofficial English translation): 
Our highest appreciation also goes to the societal organisations and the national human 
rights institutions to have worked hard concertedly together with the Government in 
pushing for the ratification of the convention. 
The role of the policy entrepreneurs in the ratification by Indonesia of the 1990 CMW 
is indeed notable. As discussed in Chapter 2, in 1997, prior to Indonesia signing the CMW in 
2004, around 100 NGOs established an alliance called Konsorsium Pembela Buruh Migran 
(Kopbumi – the Consortium for the Defence of Migrant Labour) with a view to responding to 
the draft Manpower Law No. 25 of 1997. At this time, Kopbumi considered the draft to have 
excluded the issue of migrant labour (Ford 2004: 109, Yazid 2008: 10). Thus, members of 
Kopbumi undertook their work individually at grassroots levels but authorised the consortium 
office to conduct an advocacy campaign on their behalf (Ford 2005: 20). Kopbumi also 
conducted campaigns on the importance of Indonesia’s ratification of the CMW. Further, the 
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group drafted a national bill modelled after the CMW and used the Philippines’ 1995 Migrant 
Workers Act as a benchmark. As documented by Yazid (2013: 107-8): 
Kopbumi conducted activities such as advocating policy, giving legal assistance, 
conducting training, gathering data, and campaigning for a national law on the 
protection of migrant workers and the ratification of the 1990 International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. 
The demands of Kopbumi and other NGOs on the government to adopt the CMW bore 
fruit when Indonesia finally signed in 2004. As discussed in Chapter 2, Kopbumi and other 
NGOs filed a citizen lawsuit against the government in September 2002. Moreover, another 
primary purpose of Kopbumi was the demand for a national law protecting the rights of 
Indonesian migrant labour. This demand was also met when the Megawati administration 
enacted Law No. 39 of 2004 on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Labour. 
Since its birth in 1997, Kopbumi has been highly regarded and yet its prominence 
declined after the enactment of Law No. 39 of 2004. Scholars (Yazid 2013: 108, Ford 2005: 
20) observe that there were various reasons for Kopbumi’s decline: some of the prominent 
activists left; it began to work like a standard NGO, such as seeking funding and expanding its 
activities beyond its mandate which was to focus on the campaign for migrant labour law; it 
considered itself to have achieved the main mandate, the passing of the Law, though at a later 
stage the group criticised it19; and the group was seen to no longer have its mandate as a network 
of NGOs campaigning for the national law. 
Nonetheless, after Indonesia signed the CMW in 2004, a number of civil society 
organisations continued to play active roles in campaigning for Indonesia’s ratification. One of 
these organisations was the Komisi Nasional Perempuan (Komnas Perempuan – National 
Commission on Women). On 24 July 2006 Komnas Perempuan organised an event entitled 
                                                          
19 Some of the criticisms of Kopbumi are, among others, the Law No. 39 of 2004 favours mostly economic or 
business dimension and tends to treat humans as commodities; the Law pays less attention to the protection 
dimension; the Law discriminates against undocumented migrant workers; the Law undervalues migrant workers 
with low education levels; and the Law does not accord with national and international norms of human rights 
and migrant rights (Seknas Kopbumi 2005: 45-47). 
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“National Consultation of Indonesian NGOs and Komnas Perempuan with the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants”. Komnas Perempuan, in collaboration 
with the Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) and the Gerakan Perempuan untuk 
Perlindungan Buruh Migran (GPPBM – Women’s Movement for the Protection of Migrant 
Workers), organised this nationwide meeting for the purpose of “sharing information between 
Indonesian NGOs and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants” (Komnas 
Perempuan 2006: 72). 
At that event, Komnas Perempuan and other relevant Indonesian NGOs presented their 
research and findings on the current state of Indonesian migrant workers to the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Prof. Jorge A. Bustamante. More specifically, 
Komnas Perempuan presented its findings on the vulnerability of Indonesian women migrant 
workers, particularly domestic workers. In concluding the National Consultation, Bustamante 
stated that there was always high demand for migrant workers and therefore suggested “an 
increase in activities by pro-migrant worker countries to expose the susceptibility of migrant 
workers at the national level as well as in the countries where migrant workers work” (Komnas 
Perempuan 2006: 14). 
Pressures from Indonesian civil society, and more particularly the NGOs, on the 
government and the DPR on the urgency of ratification reached its height in the early 2010s 
when the NGOs formed an alliance. Ali Akbar Tanjung of HRWG reveals that around two 
years prior to the ratification by Indonesia, the concerned NGOs established a movement or an 
alliance called Aliansi Rakyat untuk Ratifikasi Konvensi 1990 (ARRAK 90 – The Peoples’ 
Alliance for the Ratification of the 1990 Convention) (Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October). 
Co-coordinated by himself and Thaufiek Zulbahary of Solidaritas Perempuan (Solidarity for 
Women) and having a secretariat at the HRWG, Tanjung observes that ARRAK 90 had done 
much to highlight the importance of Indonesia ratifying the CMW. The alliance realised that a 
154 
 
huge stumbling block was how to make the relevant stakeholders aware, and convinced, of the 
importance of ratification. This was because minimal campaigns had been conducted to inform 
stakeholders of the importance of ratifying the CMW and the importance and substance of this 
step. 
Ali Akbar Tanjung further explains that ARRAK 90 formulated a position paper on the 
importance of  ratifying of the CMW and ran ‘road shows’ to relevant stakeholders (2013, 
pers.comm., 11 October). Press releases were used as a broader targeted media strategy to 
inform all stakeholders of the content and implications of ratification. An important targeted 
stakeholder was the Kemenlu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) as it was regarded as the frontline 
government ministry responsible for ratification. Tanjung states that while the implementing 
agency, namely the Kemenakertrans (Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration) was still 
sceptical and even refused the ratification, Kemenlu had raised hopes of eventual success. 
From the author’s interviews with Tanjung of HRWG and Yura of Solidaritas 
Perempuan, there are several civil society groups and their members who were involved 
actively in ARRAK 90. These groups are, among others, Solidaritas Perempuan, Human Rights 
Working Group (HRWG), Peduli Buruh Migran (PBM), Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia 
(SBMI), and Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) Jakarta. The detailed activism, or policy 
entrepreneurship, carried out by these groups and their members will be examined in detail in 
Chapter 5 and 6. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that three crucial phases involved in the adoption of the CMW (the 
pre-negotiation, the negotiation, and the ratification campaigns) in a very long process. In 
analysing these phases, it is important to note that the process has evolved involving several 
parties, particularly the major international, regional, and national NGOs. Further, the activism 
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and concerns of the international NGOs indicate that they must have played a role prior to UN 
member countries negotiating the CMW in 1980. The international NGOs, borrowing from 
Mintrom (1997), have played the role of policy entrepreneurship in terms of, among others, 
identifying policy problems that raise the attention of policy makers.  
It is true that the United Nations and governments mainly in developing countries 
played the key roles, such as by producing the report and preparing the draft convention 
respectively. Hence, the role of international NGOs should be taken into account in bringing 
awareness of the importance of migrant worker issues. The NGOs played important roles 
especially by exposing to an international community the vulnerable situation of female 
migrants.   
Ultimately, the present form of the CMW was agreed after a long protracted process. 
From the initial negotiations to the adoption of the CMW in 1990, it took the UN member states 
at least ten years, longer if the period when the idea first emerged was taken into account. 
Developed countries have indeed contributed to the development of the convention, proven by 
observation by scholars that the CMW text was basically a European text. It is therefore 
interesting that developed countries let the convention be adopted but have not themselves 
ratified it. The initial analysis shows that this is due to the competing interests of labour sending 
countries and labour receiving countries. This analysis may relate to what have happened in 
the stage of the ratification campaigns as there have been opposing views from labour 
migration industries. In the case of Indonesia, the recruiting agents have more interest in the 
commercial side rather than an increased protection of migrant labour. This will be discussed 
later in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Empirically, the historical record indicates that the number of ratifications of the CMW 
has been low particularly in the years immediately following its adoption in 1990. Scholars 
observe that there have been various reasons for this, but generally they are due to political, 
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legal, and economic obstacles or reluctances. Nonetheless, the number of ratifications 
multiplied in the 2000s onwards. In the 1990s only 12 countries ratified the CMW; in the 2000s 
up to the writing time of this thesis (2015), almost 50 countries ratified it. In this context, NGOs 
at international, regional, and national levels have played key roles. 
On the roles played by the NGOs, my analysis is that their activisms of the NGOs have 
been through an incremental process. They began with minimal contribution and, as their 
capacity grew, they conducted more active advocacy roles in any levels or whenever the 
windows of opportunity opened up. The NGOs, for examples, submitted reports on human 
rights violations against migrant workers, participated actively at the Intergovernmental 
Working Group of Experts on the Human Rights of Migrants; mobilised awareness raising and 
global ratification campaigns; and advocated on migrants’ human rights with the aim of CMW 
ratification in different regions of the world. Putting policy entrepreneurship into perspective, 
I claim that all these activisms are in line with one of the characteristics of successful policy 
entrepreneurs as discussed in Chapter 1. 
Another important issue to analyse is the coalition-building of the policy entrepreneurs. 
From this chapter, it transpired that regional and international NGOs established coalitions or 
blocs for the purpose of strengthening their campaigns for CMW ratification both regionally 
and internationally. This indicates that the NGOs realised that they should work in groups in 
order to exert influence and have a more convincing voice. This evidence reflects what has 
been argued by Mintrom et al (2014) that policy entrepreneurs understand the importance of 
working in groups or teams. 
The determination of international NGOs operating on the global stage was also 
remarkable. This can be matched to what has been argued by Kingdon (2003: 181) that 
successful policy entrepreneurs must be persistent, including when they faced challenges such 
as lacked of funding and the combined interests against CMW ratification. Had the NGOs given 
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up their attempts in influencing UN member states, the multiplication of ratification from the 
2000s onwards might not have been achieved. 
As the subject of this chapter is the ratification by Indonesia of the CMW in 2012, one 
may question whether there was any direct linkage between the ratification and the activism of 
international NGOs, particularly if the focus turns to the role of Indonesian NGOs. Bringing in 
the ‘linkage theory’ as discussed in Chapter 1, that there are linkages between domestic and 
international politics, I claim that the answer to such question is affirmative. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, Indonesian human rights and migrant workers NGOs played an important role after 
2002 in demanding the Indonesian government adopt the CMW, which finally forced the 
administration at the time to sign it in 2004.  
For researchers, it is indeed challenging to prove any direct linkage between the activism 
of international NGOs and the signing by Indonesia of the CMW in 2004. Nonetheless, the 
linkages between international NGOs with their Indonesian counterparts were more obvious 
after Indonesia signed the CMW. It is shown particularly through the establishment of a 
movement of NGOs in ASEAN, namely the TF-AMW, which has been demanding the 
Indonesian government ratify the CMW since 2007.  
In the national context I claim that the Indonesian NGOs, particularly those focusing on 
human rights and migrant rights, played important public roles of policy entrepreneurship in 
spurring Indonesia’s ratification of the CMW. As discussed in Chapter 1, policy entrepreneurs 
are the political actors who work for the promotion of policy ideas (Mintrom 1997: 739) or 
advocates for prominence of an idea (Kingdon 2003: 122). The main concern of these 
domestic-based NGOs that Indonesia should ratify the CMW, proves the case. Essentially, their 
primary objective was ratification by Indonesia. 
The policy entrepreneurs came mainly from civil society NGOs, even though one or 
two government officials also played roles in facilitating the formal processes toward 
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ratification. The location of policy entrepreneurs who are not from the government actually 
accords with the definition by Roberts and King (1991), as political actors who, from outside 
formal government positions, introduce and help implement new ideas into public practice. Yet 
the actual location of policy entrepreneurs does not really matter. As argued by Kingdon 
(2003), the placement of policy entrepreneurs is almost irrelevant. Therefore, NGOs and their 
members can also be labelled as policy entrepreneurs as long as they play a role in promoting 
policy ideas or advocating for the prominence of an idea. 
The activism carried out by Indonesian NGOs further proves the case that they have 
demonstrated policy entrepreneurship. As illustrated in this chapter, the NGOs organised 
conferences, submitted reports on the vulnerability of Indonesian migrant workers to the UN 
Special Rapporteur, and established a movement or an alliance called ARRAK 90 that certainly 
contributed to the CMW ratification by Indonesia in 2012. With regard to establishing a 
national movement, this is in fact similar to regional (the TF-AMW) and international ones 
(The Steering Committee of the Global Campaign for Ratification of the Convention). Similar 
to the earlier analysis in this chapter concerning international NGOs, Indonesian NGOs and 
their members are indeed policy entrepreneurs who realised the importance of working in 
teams. The next two chapters will examine in detail the many roles of these policy 
entrepreneurs. 
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Chapter 5 
Assessing the Influence of Policy Entrepreneurs: Identifying the 
Key Actors and Examining Their Views and Proposals 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, there are a number of Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) that have played a key role in the ratification by Indonesia of the 1990 International 
Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW).  The 
role played by these NGOs and their members was to shift Indonesia’s foreign policy on the 
question of ratification. 
In examining the role of key policy entrepreneurs who successfully pushed for this policy 
shift, it is necessary to first and foremost identify who they are and which NGOs they come 
from. Other important things to examine are the policy entrepreneurs’ ideas, proposals, work, 
resources, and so on. All of these aspects will be examined based on the proposition stated in 
Introduction of this thesis: that policy entrepreneurs are successful if: (1) their ideas or policy 
proposals constitute cogent proposals; (2) they base their proposals on normative 
principles/orient to values; and (3) their ideas are promoted with persistence. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section identifies the NGOs and their 
key members. The second section identifies other policy entrepreneurs from the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR – Indonesia’s House of Representatives) as well as the government. 
The third and fourth sections examine the views and proposals of the policy entrepreneurs 
regarding the significance of ratification by Indonesia. Examining the views and proposals is 
an important initial step as they can reveal the main ideas of those who played the role of policy 
entrepreneur. 
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5.1 Policy Entrepreneurs from NGOs 
As briefly examined in Chapter 4, several NGOs and their members played a key role in 
Indonesia’s ratification of the CMW, particularly those actively involved in an alliance called 
ARRAK 90. The NGOs are Solidaritas Perempuan, Human Rights Working Group (HRWG), 
Peduli Buruh Migran (PBM), Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia (SBMI), Lembaga Bantuan 
Hukum (LBH) Jakarta, and Migrant Care. With the notable exceptions of SP and LBH, all were 
established in the twenty-first century. I used information from the media as well as insights 
from the NGO activists themselves to identify key members. 
 
5.1.1 Solidaritas Perempuan (Solidarity for Women) 
Solidaritas Perempuan (SP) was established on 10 December 1990 and as of February 2012 
had 777 members comprising grass root community members, activists, academics, and 
students (Solidaritas Perempuan 2014a). SP is regarded as the first migrant worker NGO in 
Indonesia (Ford 2005: 19). The main activities of SP are advocating for the rights of women 
who work overseas as domestic workers and building a movement on broader women’s rights 
in Indonesia (Rinaldo 2013: 24). The highest decision-making authority of SP is Kongres 
(Congress) (Solidaritas Perempuan 2014c). Besides Kongres, there are other decision-making 
mechanisms at lower levels, namely: (1) the National Meeting of Community Board, (2) the 
Community Forum, and (3) the Consultative Meeting of Members. All these structural bodies 
have made SP a highly regarded organisation. As argued by Yazid (2013: 113), “As an 
organization, SP is well-established”. The key person with regard to SP’s policy 
entrepreneurship toward CMW ratification is Dinda Nuurannisaa Yura from the SP’s division 
of Trafficking and Migration. 
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5.1.2 Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) 
The official name of the Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) is Indonesia’s NGO 
Coalition for International Human Rights Advocacy (Hivos 2014). HRWG was established on 
23 February 2003 in Jakarta by several human rights organisations. The HRWG’s structure 
comprises the General Assembly of Indonesian Human Rights NGOs and the Working Group 
(SEACA 2007). The General Assembly is the highest decision-making body of human rights 
NGOs from local to national levels. The HRWG has a prominent status within the human rights 
community in Indonesia, including through its appointment by the government to represent 
Indonesia at the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). The first 
representative of HRWG, who at the time of writing served as Indonesia’s commissioner at the 
AICHR, was Rafendi Djamin (World Movement 2011). In relation to HRWG’s policy 
entrepreneurship toward Indonesia’s ratification of the CMW, the key person is Ali Akbar 
Tanjung, who at that time served as the UN Program Manager. 
 
5.1.3 Peduli Buruh Migran (Care for Migrant Workers) 
Peduli Buruh Migran (PBM) was founded on 20 May 2008 by returning female migrant 
workers, driven by the worst health conditions suffered by migrant labour, both physical and 
mental. Unlike the other migrant labour organisations, which are relatively well established, 
PBM has only a simple ‘secretariat’ and a treatment house located in East Jakarta. PBM is 
active in providing training to returning migrant workers, albeit in simple forms. As the author 
observed, training includes cooking, sewing, and other practical skills that can be used by 
former migrant workers for their next job or for entrepreneurial endeavours. The PBM has 
three board members, prominent figures in human rights work who supervise the work of the 
committee (the executive body). The committee is currently led by Ms. Lily Pujiati. The PBM 
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and particularly Pujiati have played an active role in publicising the importance of Indonesia’s 
ratification of the CMW, either through public seminars or media campaigns. 
 
5.1.4 Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia (Indonesian Migrant Labour Union) 
Serikat Buruh Migran Indonesia (SBMI) was established on 25 February 2003 by 12 migrant 
labour organisations in East Java Province and serves as an organisation union for migrant 
workers and their families (SBMI 2014a). Structurally the SBMI has three levels: a national 
committee (DPN - National Executive Board); regional committees (DPW - Regional 
Executive Board); and local committees (DPC - Local Executive Committee) (SBMI 2014b). 
Most of their committee members are activists who used to work as migrant labour in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, and even the United States. Albeit running a relatively simple 
secretariat office in South Jakarta, SBMI is well known due to its wide network throughout 
Indonesia. As observed by Ford (2005: 15), “SBMI is perhaps the most widely-recognized 
network of migrant labour organizations in Indonesia today.” With regard to SBMI’s policy 
entrepreneurship toward Indonesia’s CMW ratification, the key people are Hariyanto and 
Ridwan Wahyudi, who have served at SBMI as Advocacy Coordinator and Program Officer 
respectively. 
 
5.1.5 Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Jakarta (Jakarta Legal Aid Institute) 
Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) Jakarta was established in 1970 with the initial purpose of 
providing legal assistance to the poor in defending their rights, particularly those who are 
marginalised, cut off from work, or the victims of human rights abuses (LBH Jakarta 2014a). 
The idea for establishing LBH Jakarta emerged when the then young lawyer, Adnan Buyung 
Nasution, presented a paper at the 3rd Congress of Peradin (Persatuan Advokat Indonesia – 
Indonesian Advocates Union) in 1969 (Saptono 2012: 1). The paper received a warm welcome 
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by the high profile figures attending the Congress. A year later, on 28 October, the Peradin 
agreed to establish LBH Jakarta, analogous with the historic date of ‘Indonesia’s Youth Vow’ 
(Saleh 2012: xiv). Despite some stumbles during its early establishment, LBH Jakarta 
continues to exist and is currently regarded as an influential legal aid institution in Indonesia. 
Lev (2000: 283) argues that besides existing for many years and having served thousands of 
clients in Indonesia, LBH Jakarta has had “remarkable influence on Indonesian political 
discourse for so small an organization”. In relation to the policy entrepreneurship of LBH 
Jakarta toward Indonesia’s CMW ratification, the key person is Resta Hutabarat, who serves 
as advocate. 
 
5.1.6 Migrant Care 
Migrant Care, or Perhimpunan Indonesia untuk Buruh Migran Berdaulat (Indonesian 
Association for Sovereign Migrant Labour), is widely recognised in Indonesia as one of the 
most active NGOs paying attention to and defending the rights of migrant labour. As argued 
by Silvey (2014: 91), “[Migrant Care is] among the most active NGOs working on long-term 
on behalf of overseas workers”. Migrant Care was established on 22 June 2004. Though a 
relatively young organisation like many of the key NGOs, it has a national and international 
reputation (Yazid 2008: 5). Migrant Care has a board of two people and an executive director 
assisted by a finance manager, a program manager, and administrative staff. In the context of 
the CMW ratification, Wahyu Susilo, the policy analyst as well as the chair of board, reveals 
that he himself had been active in campaigning for the ratification, particularly when he served 
at the Kopbumi.20 Yet as an organisation, Migrant Care is considered by other policy 
entrepreneurs to work mostly by itself and even separated from ARRAK 90.21 
                                                          
20 Susilo 2013, pers.comm., 18 July. 
21 Personal communications with Tanjung 2013, 10 November; Wahyudi 2013, 13 November; Pudjiati 2013, 5 
December. 
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5.2 The Policy Entrepreneurs in the DPR and Government  
Other policy entrepreneurs who deserve acknowledgement in their attempts to push for 
Indonesia’s CMW ratification are a number of prominent members of parliament (DPR) and a 
few key government officials. Based on the author’s media observation as well as suggestions 
made by NGO activists, the policy entrepreneurs from the DPR are Rieke Diah Pitaloka of 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP – Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), 
Nova Riyanti Yusuf of Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party), and a member of Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan (PPP - United Development Party) who did not wish her name to be mentioned. 
One obvious thing is that all of them are members of the Commission IX of DPR, a commission 
that deals with, among other things, the migrant labour issue. 
As for policy entrepreneurs coming from the government, two figures often mentioned 
by NGO activists are Muhammad Anshor and Acep Somantri. At the time of writing, these two 
were mid-career officials at the Kemenlu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) who deal with human 
rights issues. 
 
5.2.1 Nova Riyanti Yusuf (Democrat Party) 
Nova Riyanti Yusuf was elected as an MP in 2009 and served on Commission IX covering 
issues such as health and migrant labour (Yusuf 2014). The posts she held at the DPR were, 
among others, Deputy Chairwoman of Commission IX, and Member of Badan Musyawarah, 
a committee responsible for deliberation before an agenda is scheduled in the parliamentary 
General Assembly. Yusuf is greatly interested in the issue of Indonesian migrant labour 
protection, as evidenced by her active role as the Deputy Chairwoman of the Special 
Committee on the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Labour Bill in the period of October 2012 
to 2014. 
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5.2.2 Rieke Diah Pitaloka (Democratic Party of Struggle)  
Rieke Diah Pitaloka was an Indonesian MP from 2009-2014 through the Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP – Indonesia’s Democratic Party of Struggle). As an MP, she was 
known to be critical of the government, especially on the issue of labour rights. She was 
appointed ILO migrant labour goodwill ambassador on 18 December 2007. On that day, she 
called on the government to ratify the CMW (Antara 2007). As an MP, Pitaloka served at the 
Commission IX. Her statements on labour rights have often been quoted by the media, making 
her a popular DPR politician. The Jakarta Post (2010) wrote, “In her fight for labourers — to 
whom she has chosen to fight for in the House, Rieke, who’s also an activist, admits things 
have never been smooth. Labour issues, she says, are still far from her Commission’s 
attention”. 
 
5.2.3 Acep Somantri (Mid-career official, Kemenlu) 
Acep Somantri is a mid-career official at the Kemenlu and, at the time of interview on 11 
October 2013, served as the Deputy Director for Economic, Socio-Cultural and Development 
Rights, the Directorate of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Somantri is one of two 
government officials mentioned by NGO activists who have contributed much to Indonesia’s 
ratification of the CMW.22 According to Tanjung, Acep Somantri contributed a lot to 
ratification, particularly in raising awareness and convincing other governmental stakeholders 
of the importance of Indonesia ratification of the Convention23. In an interview with the author, 
Somantri confirmed his involvement by stating that he followed up closely any 
intergovernmental processes toward ratification of CMW24.  
                                                          
22 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October; Yura 2013, pers.comm., 19 September. 
23 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
24 Somantri 2013, pers. comm., 28 October. 
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The following table (Table 5.1) was the chronology of processes within the Indonesian 
government in pursuing the ratification of the Convention. The activities began on 15 April 
2011 as it was the date when the inter-ministerial technical meeting took place to follow up the 
ratification process. As explained later, the meeting was carried out after Somantri took a more 
active role particularly after he joined the Directorate Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 
Table 5.1   The Chronology of Intergovernmental Processes in Indonesia toward the 
Ratification of the International Convention of the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 2011 – 2013 
DATE ACTIVITIES NOTE 
15 April 2011 The inter-ministerial technical meeting (IMTM) discussed a 
follow up on the ratification process 
 
26-27 April 
2011 
IMTM discussed and started to prepare the Academic 
Manuscript, the Draft Law, and the Ratification Explanation 
of the Migrant Workers Convention  
 
10 June 2011 Minister of Foreign Affairs requested from the President of 
Indonesia the Initiative Permission (Ijin Prakarsa) for the 
preparation of Draft Law on the Ratification  
 
23 June 2011 IMTM discussed the revision of the Convention’s official 
translation 
 
15-16 July 
2011 
IMTM discussed the Academic Manuscript, the Draft Law, 
and the Ratification Explanation  
 
25 July 2011 The President of Indonesia granted the Initiative Permission 
for the Drafting of Law on the Ratification 
 
4 August 2011 Minister of Foreign Affairs sent requests to relevant 
ministers/heads of state institutions concerning the 
establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) for 
the Drafting of Law on Ratification 
 
14 September 
2011 
Minister of Foreign Affairs endorsed the establishment of 
IMC 
A Decree of Minister of 
Foreign Affairs No. 
09/B/KP/IX/ 2011/01  
29-30 
September 
2011 
IMTM discussed the revision of the Academic Manuscript, 
the Draft Law, and the Ratification Explanation 
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18 October 
2011 
The Meeting of IMC discussed the Academic Manuscript, 
the Draft Law on the Ratification 
 
November 
2011 
IMC conducted consultation and coordination for the 
revision of the final draft of the Academic Manuscript and 
the Draft Law on the Ratification and confirmed that the 
ratification would be carried out without reservation. 
 
22 November 
2011 
Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to Minister of Law 
and Human Rights regarding the requests for harmonisation, 
finalisation, and solidifying (pemantapan) the concepts of 
Draft Law on the Ratification of Migrant Workers 
Convention 
 
13 December 
2011 
The meeting on harmonisation, finalisation, and solidifying 
the concepts of the Draft Law 
 
22 December 
2011 
Minister of Law and Human Rights sent a letter to Minister 
of Foreign Affairs on the result of the Harmonisation, 
Finalisation, and Solidifying on the Concepts of the Draft 
Law  
 
23 December 
2011 
Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a request to the President of 
Indonesia to grant a Presidential Decree (Amanat) for further 
discussing the ratification at the DPR 
 
11 January 
2012 
Minister of State Secretary sent a letter to Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, of Law and Human Rights, and of 
Manpower and Transmigration concerning the request to 
give signature of endorsement on the Draft Law 
 
7 February 
2012 
President of Indonesia sent a letter to the Chairman of the 
DPR regarding the Draft Law to be discussed at the meeting 
of the House for endorsement/adoption purpose  
 
7 February 
2012 
Minister of State Secretary sent a letter to the relevant 
Ministers on the appointment of Ministers who would 
represent the President at the DPR to discuss the Draft Law 
 
3 April 2012 The DPR sent a letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 
invitation to attend the Working Meeting of Commission IX 
regarding the First Level Discussion on the Draft Law 
 
9 April 2012 The Working Meeting of the Commission IX with the 
relevant Ministers took place. The Meeting endorsed the 
Draft Law to be further discussed at the Second Level 
Discussion of the Plenary Meeting (Rapat Paripurna) of the 
DPR 
 
10 April 2012 The DPR sent a letter to the relevant Ministers to attend the 
Plenary Meeting regarding the Discussion of Second Level 
(Decision-Making stage) on the Draft Law 
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 Source: Kementerian Luar Negeri 2013 
Based on the table above, it is clear that significant intergovernmental processes toward 
Indonesia’s ratification of the CMW in 2012 occurred in the last twelve months. Initiated at the 
technical meeting on 15 April 2011 concerning the follow up of CMW ratification, the 
intergovernmental meetings proceeded further, from preparing the academic manuscript, the 
draft law, and the ratification explanation to the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial 
Committee for the Drafting of Law on the Ratification. This momentum culminated when Irgan 
12 April 2012 The Plenary Meeting of the DPR, attended by 324 members 
of the House, decided to endorse the Draft Law to be the 
Law. 
 
17 April 2012 Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a report to the President 
regarding the endorsement of the DPR on the Draft Law 
 
20 April 2012 The Chairman of the DPR sent a letter to the President 
regarding the endorsement of the DPR 
Letter No. 
LG.02.04/04117/DPR 
RI/IV/2012 
24 April 2012 Based on the instruction of the President of Indonesia, the 
State Secretary sent a request to the relevant Ministers to 
give their signature endorsing the Law  
 
28 April 2012 The relevant Ministers signed the Law  
2 May 2012 The Law on the Ratification of Migrant Workers Convention 
was endorsed by the President of Indonesia and was enacted 
by Minister of Law and Human Rights through Law No. 6 
Year 2012 on the Ratification of Migrant Workers 
Convention (Lembaran Negara RI Tahun 2012 Nomor 115) 
 
22 May 2012 Minister of Foreign Affairs signed the Instrument of 
Ratification of the Migrant Workers Convention to be 
deposited at the UN Secretary General through the 
Indonesian Permanent Mission in New York. 
 
31 May 2012 The Indonesian Permanent Mission in New York deposited 
with the UN Secretary General the Instrument of Ratification 
 
8 June 2012 The UN Secretary General sent a letter of receipt and 
declared that the Migrant Workers Convention will be 
effective in Indonesia starting from 1 September 2012 
Letter No. 
LA41TR/2012/IV-
13/Indonesia/1 
4-6 September 
2013 
The Indonesian Ministry of Law and Human Rights held a 
coordination meeting on the implementation of the Migrant 
Workers Convention 
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C. Mahfiz, speaking on behalf of the Chairman of Commission IX of the DPR, gave a final 
statement at the Second Level deliberation on 12 April 2012. Mahfiz (2013) stated in the 
House: 
As one of the largest sending countries of migrant workers, Indonesia needs a better 
protection system for its migrant workers.  
 
The agreement of the General Assembly of DPR today is proof that Indonesia 
acknowledges and respects human rights. 
 
Besides, through the ratification of the Migrant Workers Convention by Indonesia, it is 
hoped to strengthen the legal foundation of national policies in improving the system of 
protection, respect, and compliance to the rights of workers, particularly the rights of all 
migrant workers and members of their families that meet the norms of human rights. 
 
All the policy entrepreneurs identified in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 are the experts or 
authoritative persons from the relevant organisations. Or, borrowing from Kingdon (2003: 
180), they are the persons who have some claim to a ‘hearing’. Members of DPR such as 
Pitaloka and Yusuf are indeed the authoritative decision-makers as they sit on the body dealing 
with migrant worker issues. An official such as Somantri should have an ability to speak for 
others as he coordinated the intergovernmental meetings with other stakeholders. The role of a 
government officials like Somantri is also important as he or she can become a key ally of 
policy entrepreneurs from outside the government. As argued by Roberts and King (1991: 162), 
“Strategically placed insiders within the bureaucracy would be important allies.” 
It does not matter much whether policy entrepreneurs are in the government or outside 
government. As argued by Kingdon (2003: 180), “The placement of entrepreneurs is nearly 
irrelevant, anyway, to understanding their activities or their successes.” Yet, although the 
placement of policy entrepreneurs is irrelevant, those who are labelled as policy entrepreneurs 
in this case study are certainly from relevant activist organisations. Organisations such as 
HRWG and Solidaritas Perempuan have the capacity and relevant expertise in the area of 
human rights and migrant workers’ rights. Organisations such as LBH Jakarta and SBMI are 
known to have wide networks with other NGOs in terms of defending human rights and migrant 
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workers’ rights. The members of DPR who pay high attention to this issue belong to 
Commission IX, a body at the DPR that deals with, among other things, migrant worker issues. 
There might be questions why I did not use Paul A. Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition 
Network in identifying and explaining the actors who had been instrumental in bringing a 
change of Indonesia’s foreign policy, namely the ratification of CMW. Advocacy Coalition 
Network (ACN) is a theoretical framework introduced by Sabatier (1988), arguing that a policy 
change is best analysed through this framework, particularly if the change occurred in a long 
time span.  
Sabatier (1988) argues that a policy change is often determined by a number of actors 
within the “political subsystem” that create a kind of coalitions addressing particular subject 
matters. This political subsystem is defined as an “interaction of actors from different 
institutions interested in a policy area” (Sabatier 1988: 131). Sabatier (1988: 141) further 
argues that, occasionally, within the dynamics of the political system, there exist “policy 
brokers” those who mediate conflicting parties. These brokers can be elected officials, 
researchers, and journalists.  
There are indeed merits in the ACN if it is applied for the purpose of analysing the change 
of Indonesia’s foreign policy toward CMW, from the non-ratification to the ratification. More 
particularly, the policy change occurred for a long time period: from adoption at the UN in 
1990, the signing of Indonesia in 1994, and the ratification in 2012. Yet the ACN does not 
consider individuals as instrumental. Whereas from the initial identification as described in this 
section, the individuals – the policy entrepreneurs – believed that there were their own peers 
who collaborated with one another pursuing their shared goals. Put differently, borrowing from 
Mintrom and Norman (2009: 657), “Policy entrepreneurship is not treated explicitly within the 
[ACN] framework.” 
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To sum up, while the CAN has a merit, I argue that it is not suitable to be applied in 
analysing the subject matter of this thesis, which is the role of policy entrepreneurs in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy from the non-ratification to the ratification of CWM. 
 
5.3 The Views of the Policy Entrepreneurs 
Prior to examining the activism of policy entrepreneurs, it is important to examine their ideas 
or views they prosecuted in the policy process. As discussed in Chapter 1, the main thing that 
policy entrepreneurs promote or advocate for are policy ideas or the prominence of an idea 
(Mintrom 1997: 739, Kingdon 2003: 122). 
The views of policy entrepreneurs on the necessity for Indonesia to ratify the CMW vary. 
In general, such views can be divided into three main arguments. First, as a major labour-
sending country, Indonesia must ratify the CMW as this international legal instrument will 
provide greater protection for Indonesians working overseas. Second, the ratification of the 
CMW is an international obligation for Indonesia. Third, the CMW can fill gaps in the national 
laws. 
 
5.3.1 CMW will provide greater protection 
The view that the CMW would provide greater protection for Indonesian migrant workers was 
voiced by, among others, Dinda Nuurannisaa Yura of Solidaritas Perempuan (SP). She argued 
that Indonesia was a country with a huge number of migrant workers.25 Thus, when labour 
migration was to be discussed, it would involve many countries and an international standard 
was consequently needed. In the words of Yura: 
Indonesia is a country with a huge number of migrant workers. When we talk about 
migration, it involves many countries. Thus, there was a need of an international 
                                                          
25 Yura 2013, pers. comm., 19 September. 
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standard. At that time [in Indonesia] there were no such comprehensive policy protecting 
migrant workers.26 
Yura’s views are similar to the views of Hariyanto, the Advocacy Coordinator of Serikat 
Buruh Migran Indonesia (SBMI – the Federation of Indonesian Migrant Workers). The latter 
argued that the CMW stipulated the rights of migrant workers and their families27. He further 
argued that this view emerged not only due to his observation or analysis as an activist, but 
because of a personal experience as a former migrant worker. According to Hariyanto: 
The CMW deals with the rights of migrant workers and their families. We experienced 
it. There were only few rights we could enjoy as migrant workers. Based on this, we were 
determined to push for Indonesia’s ratification [of the CMW].28 
The lack of protection of Indonesian migrant workers was often caused by their weak 
position. Ridwan Wahyudi, the Program Officer of the SBMI, revealed that the information he 
received prior to his departure as a migrant worker was not clear29. All documents were 
prepared by the sponsoring companies. In his case, he worked in South Korea, firstly in a car-
battery company. After three months, he was fired or out of contract without any clear reasons 
and ended up as a farmer. Wahyudi tried to fight for his rights but did not succeed. He decided 
that he wanted to go back to Indonesia and asked the Indonesian Embassy to assist him. He 
also asked the sponsoring company to pay his wages, yet they never paid him. 
Policy entrepreneurs, particularly those who used to work as migrant workers, believe 
the lack of protection was caused by, among other things, the absence of the right to 
information. Wahyudi argues that Indonesian migrant workers do not enjoy this right.30 
                                                          
26 “Indonesia merupakan negara dengan buruh migran sangat besar. Ketika berbicara migrasi, melibatkan 
banyak negara. Jadi diperlukan standar internasional. Saat itu, belum ada kebijakan komprehensif yang 
melindungi buruh migran“ (Yura 2013, pers.comm., 19 September). 
27 Hariyanto, 2013, pers. comm., 13 November. 
28 “Karena di situ [Konvensi Buruh Migran] menyangkut tentang hak-hak buruh migran dan keluarganya. Kami 
merasakan sendiri, hanya secuil hak-hak buruh migran yang kita dapatkan. Atas dorongan itulah kita bertekad 
untuk ratifikasi” (Hariyanto 2013, pers. comm., 13 November). 
29 Wahyudi 2013, pers. comm., 13 November. 
30 Wahyudi 2013, pers. comm., 13 November. 
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Information such as placement costs, the work, and the contract are not easy to understand. In 
the words of Wahyudi: 
The information we received from the sponsoring companies was not clear. All 
documents were made by them. 
 
I worked in a factory of car batteries. However, three months later I was out of contract 
and eventually worked as a farmer. I was then fired without any clear reason. 
 
I wanted to go home and asked the Indonesian Embassy in Seoul to return me home. I 
asked for my salaries but they were never given to me. I then asked the money from the 
sponsoring company. It was at that time I began to know the activist friends of SBMI. 
 
This is the kind of information rights that migrant workers cannot access. The 
information on the cost of placement, the work, the contract was very difficult to 
understand.31 
 
The problems revealed by the policy entrepreneurs, such as the lack of protection, 
information and the rights migrant workers deserve, are all addressed in the CMW (OHCHR 
2014). This informed the views held by the policy entrepreneurs on why Indonesia should ratify 
the CMW. The Convention would provide a much better and more comprehensive legal 
framework for the protection of these rights. These views are logical due to an absence of a 
comprehensive policy on migrant labour protection in Indonesia. As examined in Chapters 2 
and 3, prior to the ratification in 2012 such a policy did not exist in Indonesia. 
 
5.3.2 CMW ratification as an international obligation 
Another argument for the necessity for Indonesia to ratify the CWM is that it is part of the 
country's international obligations. Wahyu Susilo of Migrant Care argued that as one of the 
                                                          
31 “Informasi yang selama ini kita peroleh dari sponsor kurang begitu jelas. Dokumen-dokumen dibuat oleh 
sponsor.  
Saya bekerja di pabrik aki [baterai mobil]. Namun tiga bulan kemudian menjadi petani, out of contract. Saya 
kemudian diberhentikan kerja sepihak tanpa alasan. 
Saya ingin pulang, meminta bantuan KBRI untuk dipulangkan. Saya meminta uang gaji tetapi tidak pernah 
diberikan. Saya kemudian menuntut uang kepada sponsor. Saat itulah kemudian saya mengenal kawan-kawan 
SBMI. 
Hak-hak informasi seperti inilah yang tertutup bagi buruh migran. Info tentang biaya penempatan, pekerjaan, 
kontrak sangat tidak mudah dipahami” (Wahyudi 2013, pers. comm., 13 November). 
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major labour-sending countries, Indonesia must have such an international legal instrument.32 
He also believes that if Indonesia ratified and implemented the CMW, this would certainly 
equip and boost the performance of the country’s diplomacy. 
This view is in line with that held by at least two members of the DPR. Nova Riyanti 
Yusuf of the DPR argued that by ratifying the CMW, Indonesia would have the backing of 
international law.33 Another member who does not want her name to be revealed also argued 
that through ratification Indonesia’s bargaining power would be improved.34 She believed that 
the receiving countries would see Indonesia’s goodwill in protecting migrant workers. In 
return, she hoped that they also provide protection to Indonesian migrant workers. 
Interestingly, this view was also held by the Kementerian Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi 
(Kemenakertrans - Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration of Indonesia), even though the 
Ministry was known to have shown little interest or previously had even rejected the proposed 
policy of ratification. An official of the Kemenakertrans, who wished to remain nameless, 
revealed: 
The CMW ratification increases Indonesia’s bargaining power. From the viewpoint of 
Indonesia's foreign policy, ratification is needed because by having acceded to the CMW 
the bargaining power of Indonesia will become stronger.35 
It has become empirically apparent that the policy entrepreneurs share the view that 
ratifying the CMW is a crucial part of Indonesia’s international obligation. The pertinent 
reasons for this views include that ratification will boost Indonesia’s international credibility 
and will also strengthen her negotiating power when dealing with other countries. Indeed, as 
examined in Chapter 2 and 3, policies affecting Indonesian migrant labour were generally 
                                                          
32 Susilo 2013, pers.comm., 18 July. 
33 Yusuf 2013, pers.comm., 18 September. 
34 Anonymous 2013, pers.comm., 17 October. 
35 “[Ratifikasi CMW menjadikan] bargaining power [Indonesia] di dunia semakin tinggi. Dari sisi politik luar 
negeri, ratifikasi sangat diperlukan karena mempunyai arti bahwa posisi tawar Indonesia menjadi kuat” 
(Anonymous 2013, pers.comm., 23 October). 
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determined by the interests of the receiving states. In the case of Malaysia, for example, the 
bilateral agreements with Indonesia mostly supported its interests rather than Indonesia’s. 
Through the ratification of the CMW, policy entrepreneurs expected Indonesia to have more 
bargaining power when negotiating and concluding agreements with other countries. 
 
5.3.3. Ratification of CMW will fill the gap of national laws 
A further reason held by policy entrepreneurs arguing that Indonesia must ratify the CMW qas 
because the national law cannot reach or protect migrant workers. Resta Hutabarat of the 
Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Jakarta (LBH Jakarta – the Legal Aid Institute, Jakarta Chapter) 
argued that ratification provided a legal framework for migrant worker protection that the Law 
No. 39 of 2004 does not provide, as it was more heavily weighted on the side of commerce.36  
Similarly, Ali Akbar Tanjung of the Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) argued that 
ratification would fill the gap in national laws, as Indonesia has not enacted national law that 
provided comprehensive protection for its migrant workers.37 According to Tanjung: 
There are no Indonesian laws that can reach its citizens overseas or migrant workers 
except the CMW. Thus, the CMW is highly important in providing protection for 
Indonesian workers overseas, even though the receiving countries have not ratified it. 
Malaysia, for example, [even though it has not acceded to the CMW], it still must respect 
the international standards of human rights.38 
The above view is in line with the view of a member of DPR who does not want her name 
to be mentioned. The member claimed that by ratifying the CMW, Indonesia has provided legal 
protection to its migrant workers.39 Nonetheless, this member had a different view from 
Tanjung who argued that the non-ratifying countries would also provide protection as required 
                                                          
36 Hutabarat 2013, pers.comm., 28 November. 
37 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
38 “Tidak ada hukum nasional yang bisa menjangkau WNI/TKI kita di luar negeri kecuali Konvensi 1990. Jadi 
Konvensi ini sangat penting untuk memproteksi buruh migran Indonesia di luar negeri, sekalipun negara tersebut 
belum meratifikasi. Malaysia, misalnya, harus tetap menghormati standar-standar hak asasi manusia 
internasional” (Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October). 
39 Anonymous 2013, pers.comm., 17 October. 
176 
 
by the CMW. By contrast, the DPR member argued that the legal protection would only be 
provided indirectly. 
The view that ratification by Indonesia will not matter if the receiving states do not 
undertake the same policy was held by the official of the Kemenakertrans. The official argued 
that ratification did not provide much protection for Indonesian migrant workers.40 She further 
argued that what matters most was the strengthening of internal affairs, particularly national 
legislation and capacity building. 
The unwillingness of the Kemenakertrans to ratify the CMW was confirmed by the 
official of the Kementerian Luar Negeri (Kemenlu - Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Acep 
Somantri of the Kemenlu stated that from the beginning the Kemenakertrans were resistant to 
the proposed policy of CMW ratification.41 Somantri shared his observation on the said matter: 
I joined the Directorate of Human Rights of Kemenlu in June 2010 and attended a 
meeting at the Kemenkumham in late 2010 to discuss the process of CMW ratification. 
 
From the beginning, the Kemenakertrans had been resistant toward ratification. I was not 
really aware of their reasons. 
 
In the meeting, I challenged its officials to reveal their reasons for rejection. My suspicion 
was that the rejection existed due to the inappropriate translation of the CMW provisions 
into Indonesian language and later it was proven. I then gave a recommendation to my 
Director of Human Rights that Kemenlu should take this process by firstly translating the 
CMW with a correct and proper Indonesian translation.42 
 
                                                          
40 Anonymous 2013, pers.comm., 23 October. 
41 Somantri 2013, pers.comm., 28 October. 
42 “Saya masuk Direktorat Hak Asasi Manusia (HAM) Kemenlu pada bulan Juni 2010 dan diundang rapat di 
Kementerian Hukum dan HAM (Kemenkumham) akhir 2010 membahas proses ratifikasi Konvensi. Dari awal, 
Kemenakertrans resisten terhadap ratifikasi. Saya tidak begitu tahu alasan mereka saat itu. 
Ketika rapat tersebut, saya menantang Kemenakertrans untuk menyebutkan alasan mereka. Kecurigaan kami 
adalah karena tidak tepatnya terjemahan pasal-pasal Konvensi dan hal itu terbukti ketika mereka mempersoalkan 
beberapa pasal. Saya kemudian mengusulkan kepada Direktur HAM agar Kemenlu mengambil proses ini. Kita 
coba dengan terjemahkan terlebih dahulu Konvensi ini dengan Bahasa Indonesia yang baik dan benar” (Somantri 
2013, pers.comm., 28 October). 
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Later in the process toward CMW ratification, Somantri believed that the meetings 
facilitated by the Kemenlu made significant progress.43 The chronology of this progress was 
summarised in the Table 5.1 in this chapter. 
Based on all the views discussed in this section, policy entrepreneurs had solid views on 
the necessity for Indonesia to ratify the CMW. The view that the CMW would provide greater 
protection was indeed logical in the context of Indonesia as a country with a huge number of 
migrant workers. The argument that ratification would fill gaps in national laws had a solid 
grounding as existing laws had not provided comprehensive protection. 
One may argue that the ratification of the CMW was not a totally new policy idea 
emanating from Indonesian policy entrepreneurs. Yet this should not be an issue. The important 
thing for this analysis is whether policy entrepreneurs have exchanged and promoted their idea 
or ideas. As argued by Robert and King (1991: 159), policy entrepreneurs are those who have 
“traded in ideas, whether the invention of wholly new policy ideas or the brokering of others’ 
ideas”. 
Further, all of the views or ideas examined in this section have contributed toward 
Indonesia’s foreign policy in the field of human rights. This is in line with what has been argued 
by Goldstein and Keohane: “ideas are often important determinants of government policy” 
(1993: 3). Nonetheless, mere ideas are certainly not adequate. They must be crafted into 
proposals. This will be examined in the following section. 
 
5.4 The Policy Proposals of the Key Policy Entrepreneurs 
The proposals from key Indonesian policy entrepreneurs calling for CMW ratification emerged 
in a number of forms and situations. Even though their proposals and activism became more 
intensified in the last two years prior to ratification in 2012, their views and proposals can 
                                                          
43 Somantri 2013, pers.comm., 28 October. 
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actually be dated to 2004 when Indonesia enacted Law No. 39 of 2004 on the Placement and 
Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers. Even before that, the call for ratification had 
already emerged. Susilo of Migrant Care, for example, stated that he started to be active on the 
issue of migrant workers in 1995.44 Prior to this, his colleagues from NGOs who worked in 
women’s rights protection had also been active. According to him, at that time NGO activists 
were already pushing for CMW ratification. The first translation of the CMW was not 
undertaken by the government but the Solidaritas Perempuan (SP). 
This section will show that there were two main proposals calling for CMW ratification. 
The first was proposing the CMW as an agenda item at the Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi 
Manusia (RANHAM - National Action Plan for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
in Indonesia) 2004-09 and, second, the establishment ARRAK 90, a short form of Aliansi 
Rakyat untuk Ratifikasi Konvensi 1990 (the People's Alliance for the Ratification of the 1990 
Convention). This section will examine whether the proposals being presented contain 
normative principles or not. 
 
5.4.1 Proposal 1: National Action Plan on Human Rights 
The Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (often referred as RANHAM) is Indonesia’s 
five-year plan to improve human rights standards in the country. The first time Indonesia 
established and implemented RANHAM was in 1998. Herbert (2008: 475) points out that 
RANHAM I was an attempt by the government of the time to raise Indonesia’s human rights 
profile as well as provide a basis for improved coordination among relevant stakeholders. 
With relation to the CMW, the proposal for ratification emerged and was included in 
RANHAM II that ran from 2004-2009. The reason for this inclusion was the perception among 
                                                          
44 Susilo 2013, pers.comm., 18 July. 
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policy entrepreneurs that Law No. 39 of 2004 was unsatisfactory. Hutabarat of LBH Jakarta 
recalled: 
In 2003 the Nunukan tragedy occurred, 12 people died including babies. At those times, 
LBH was more inclined to sue the government. Yet we realised that there was no legal 
instrument available. 
 
It then became a turning point on the necessity to have a legal framework, an act for the 
protection of migrant workers. Thus the Law No. 39 came out, pushed by the civil 
society. 
 
Unfortunately, due to the political processes [in reaching agreement for the law] and the 
interests of private sectors, the Law turned to be minimalist in terms of protection. We 
considered the Law as a failure. 
 
We then carried out reflections and finally agreed to utilise the human rights instruments. 
Finally, we put [the proposal for CMW ratification] into the RANHAM.45 
 
This is similar to the view of Susilo who argued that the milestone for ratification was 
the involvement of civil society organisations (CSOs) in the making of RANHAM in 2004.46 
At that time, the CSOs pushed for ratification of the CMW. The inclusion of CMW ratification 
into RANHAM did not necessarily mean that the process was smooth. It was only in 2010 that 
things moved further ahead. According to Somantri of Kemenlu, the process had actually begun 
in 2004 but was interrupted.47 He, unfortunately, did not elaborate on this. 
 
  
                                                          
45 “Pada tahun 2003 ada tragedy Nunukan, 12 orang meninggal termasuk bayi. Waktu itu LBH ingin menggugat 
Pemerintah dan baru menyadari tidak ada perangkat hukumnya.  
Ini menjadi turning point perlunya legal framework, yaitu UU buruh migran. Munculah UU No. 39 yang didorong 
masyarakat sipil.  
Namun proses politik, termasuk kepentingan swasta, membuat UU tersebut minim perlindungan. [UU tersebut] 
dianggap gagal.  
Kita refleksi, dan akhirnya sepakat untuk gunakan instrument HAM, kemudian masukkan ke dalam RANHAM” 
(Hutabarat 2013, pers.comm., 28 November). 
46 Susilo 2013, pers.comm., 18 July. 
47 Somantri 2013, pers.comm., 28 October. 
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5.4.2 Proposal 2: ARRAK 90 
Around two years prior to the CMW ratification in 2012, there was massive activism from 
policy entrepreneurs who established and worked through an alliance called ARRAK 90. 
Though this activism was in the form of an alliance for a movement, the alliance can be 
regarded as a proposal from policy entrepreneurs who wished to see a fast and tangible result 
of the call for ratification. Yura of SP observed: 
There was a people’s alliance for the ratification of CMW, coordinated by the SP. The 
members were HRWG, LBH Jakarta, Kopbumi, and so forth. 
 
ARRAK 90 had specific goals. It carried out press conferences, demonstrative actions 
before the DPR and the governmental ministries, and even made collaboration with the 
University of New South Wales (UNSW). The UNSW also came out with a study 
[supporting the ratification].48  
 
ARRAK 90 was coordinated by the SP and had a secretariat at the HRWG.49 According 
to Tanjung of HRWG, ARRAK 90 was established in 2010 by himself and other activist 
colleagues and the alliance was coordinated by Mr Taufik Zulbahary, a Head of Division of 
the SP.50 The pertinent challenge faced by ARRAK 90 upon its establishment was how to 
change the policy position of key stakeholders, particularly the Kemenakertrans. Tanjung 
                                                          
48 “Ada juga Aliansi Rakyat untuk Ratifikasi Konvensi Migran 1990 (ARRAK 90) yang dikoordinatori oleh 
Solidaritas Perempuan (SP). Anggotanya: HRWG, LBH Jakarta, Kopbumi, dan lain-lain. 
ARRAK ini sangat spesifik kegiatannya. Cara-caranya: konferensi pers, aksi ke DPR, ke kementerian, kerjasama 
dengan UNSW [University of New South Wales). UNWS juga membuatkan kajiannya” (Yura 2013, pers.comm., 
19 September). 
49 As an alliance of movement, ARRAK 90 did not, however, have a formal organisational style. It worked and 
spread the message to the public through each of its members by using conventional and social media. The 
members of ARRAK 90 were Asosiasi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (ATKI – the Association for Indonesian Workers), 
Ardanary Institute, Gerakan Perempuan untuk Perlindungan Buruh Migran (GPPBM – the Women Movement for 
the Protection of Migrant Workers), Human Rights Working Group (HRWG), Institute for National and 
Democratic Studies (INDIES), IWORK, LBH Apik Jakarta, LBH Jakarta, Komisi Keadilan Perdamaian dan 
Pastoral Migran Perantau-KWI (Church Group), Peduli Buruh Migran (Caring for Migrant Workers), Serikat 
Buruh Migran Indonesia (SBMI – the Federation of Indonesian Migrant Workers), Solidaritas Buruh Migran 
Karawang (SBMK – the Federation of Indonesian Migrant Workers in Karawang), Solidaritas Buruh Migran 
Cianjur (SBMC - the Federation of Indonesian Migrant Workers in Cianjur), Kelompok Perempuan untuk 
Keadilan Buruh (KPKB – the Women Group for Labour Justice), Solidaritas Perempuan (Solidarity for Women), 
Solidaritas Perempuan Komunitas Jabotabek (Solidarity for Women of the Communities in Jakarta, Bogor 
Tangerang, and Bekasi), Perkumpulan Praxis (Praxis Community), FSPSI Reformasi (the Reformed FSPSI), 
Yayasan Genta Surabaya (Genta Foundation of Surabaya), and Trade Union Rights Centres (TURC) (Peduli 
Buruh Migran 2009). 
50 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
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further observed that the biggest challenge was how to convince key stakeholders so that they 
could realise the importance for Indonesia in ratifying the CMW. The rejection by the 
Indonesian government [the Kemenakertrans] was due to the lack of awareness raising over 
the contents and substance of the CMW.51 
In addressing the obstacles to the CMW ratification proposal, ARRAK 90 and 
particularly the HRWG, produced a working paper. According to Tanjung, the HRWG 
produced a working paper on why ratification was important.52 The paper (HRWG 2010: 9) 
was basically intended to respond to the main arguments held by the government 
(Kemenakertans) which argued, among other things: 
First, because none of the migrant-receiving countries such as Malaysia and Saudi Arabia 
have ratified the CMW, the ratification will not change the lives of Indonesian migrant 
workers in those countries; 
 
Second, if Indonesia ratified the CMW, Indonesia should therefore provide equal rights 
to foreign workers in the country, whereas in economic terms the country’s situations 
still cannot meet such demands; and 
 
Third, if Indonesia ratified the CMW, the government is cautious that there will be more 
foreign workers coming to Indonesia to work, because they will have the freedom to form 
a union, insurance, lawyer facilities, and social care. In other words, the ratification will 
not automatically protect the lives of Indonesian migrant workers.53 
 
The response to the above arguments in the HRWG working paper is summarised in 
Table 5.2 below,  
 
                                                          
51 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
52 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
53 “Pertama, karena negara tujuan penempatan pekerja migran tidak ada yang meratifikasi Konvensi, seperti 
Malaysia dan Arab Saudi, sehingga ratifikasi justru tidak akan mempengaruhi nasib para pekerja migran 
Indonesia di negara-negara tersebut. 
Kedua, alasan lain yang juga sering disebutkan oleh Pemerintah adalah ketika Indonesia meratifikasi Konvensi 
Pekerja Migran, maka Indonesia harus memberikan hak setara terhadap pekerja asing yang datang ke Indonesia, 
sementara secara ekonomi kondisi Indonesia saat ini belum mengizinkan. 
Ketiga, ketika Indonesia meratifikasi Konvensi, Pemerintah khawatir hal ini justru akan memperbanyak pekerja 
asing yang masuk ke wilayah Indonesia untuk menjadi pekerja, karena para pekerja akan diberikan kebebasan 
berserikat, asuransi, fasilitas pengacara, dan jaminan sosial. Dengan perkataan lain, dengan meratifikasi 
Konvensi ini, tidak serta-merta akan melindungi nasib pekerja migran Indonesia”. 
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Table 5.2   The Responses of HRWG to the arguments of Kemenakertrans 
 General 
Responses 
International 
Mandate 
National 
Mandate 
ASEAN 
Mandate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R 
E 
S 
P 
O 
N 
S 
E 
S 
Indonesia must be 
proactive in carrying 
out efforts to enhance 
the protection of its 
migrant workers; 
A ‘passive strategy’ 
does not work as 
Indonesia cannot push 
other countries such as 
Malaysia if Indonesia 
has not done so. 
 
The 71st Meeting of the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), 2007, states, 
“The Committee encourages the State 
party to envisage ratifying the 
International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their 
Families.” 
 
Article 27 (2) of the 
1945 Constitution 
(Amended) stipulates, 
“Every citizen shall 
have the right to work 
and to a living 
befitting human 
beings.” 
 
ASEAN 
Declaration on the 
Protection and 
Promotion of the 
Rights of Migrant 
Workers, signed on 
13January 2007 in 
Cebu, the 
Philippines. 
By 2010, 43 countries 
had ratified the CMW, 
and they never have 
issues and are being 
disadvantaged. 
 
The 40th Meeting of the Committee 
Against Torture (CAT) states, “The 
Committee is also concerned at reported 
cases of ill-treatment of migrant 
workers, especially women, reportedly 
abused by Indonesian recruiting 
companies, which often place them in 
situations that impair the enjoyment of 
their human rights while abroad, 
including debt bondage, forced labour 
and other ill-treatment, including sexual 
abuse.” 
 
The CAT also pays attention to the 
Indonesian government to consider 
ratifying one of the major human rights 
agreements, namely the CMW. 
 
Article 28D (2) of the 
1945 Constitution 
(Amended) stipulates, 
“Every person shall 
have the right to live 
and to defend his/her 
life and living.” 
In the last three 
years, the ASEAN 
Committee on 
Migrant Workers 
and Instrument 
Drafting Team 
have conducted a 
series of meetings. 
This process, 
however, faced a 
deadlock due to the 
refusal of Malaysia 
to recognise and 
protect the rights of 
undocumented 
(irregular) migrant 
workers. 
 
Bilateral MoUs with 
receiving countries are 
inadequate since there 
are no standards or 
protection principles in 
national policies. 
 
The Committee of the Convention to 
Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) states, “The 
Committee notes that States’ adherence 
to the seven major international human 
rights instruments enhances the 
enjoyment by women of their human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in all 
aspects of life. Therefore, the 
Committee encourages the Government 
of Indonesia to ratify the treaty to which 
it is not yet a party, namely, the 
Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families.” 
Article 28G (1) of the 
1945 Constitution 
(Amended) stipulates, 
“Every person shall 
have the right to 
protect him/herself, 
his/her family, honor, 
dignity and property 
under his/her control, 
and shall have the 
right to feel secure 
and be protected from 
the threat of fear to 
do, or not to do 
something which 
Indonesia is 
expected to boost 
its diplomacy 
against the refusal 
of Malaysia on the 
issue of 
undocumented 
migrant workers. 
Not only because 
there are many 
Indonesian workers 
there who are 
undocumented, but 
it is also mandated 
in the CMW. 
Therefore, it is 
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 constitutes a human 
right.” 
  
pertinent for 
Indonesia to ratify 
the CMW. 
The right to form a 
union is a universal 
human right, thus it 
should not worry the 
government. Further, it 
should not worry the 
foreign workers either 
since their number in 
Indonesia is relatively 
small. 
 
The United Nations Special Rapporteur 
for the Rights of Migrant Workers, Mr. 
Jorge Bustamante, despite all the 
concerns of the Government of 
Indonesia, has requested the 
Government to ratify the CMW as it 
will improve migrant workers’ 
protection and prevent illegal practices 
and problems of migrant workers 
becoming public. 
  
Article 28G (2) of the 
1945 Constitution 
(Amended) stipulates, 
“Every person shall 
have the right to be 
free from torture or 
treatment degrading 
human dignity and 
shall have the right to 
obtain political 
asylum from another 
country.” 
 
 
 Article 15 of the CMW 
acknowledges the 
rights of foreign 
workers in Indonesia 
to own a property or 
properties. In the 
context of Indonesia, 
this worry can be 
responded by the Act 
No 5 year 1990 
concerning Basic 
Regulations of Land 
Rights, which states 
that foreign nationals 
cannot own a property 
or properties in 
Indonesia. 
  
Prior to competing for membership of 
the Human Rights Council in 2007, the 
Government of Indonesia made a 
voluntary commitment to the United 
Nations that it would continue the 
ratification efforts of the human rights 
international conventions as listed in the 
RANHAM 2004-2009. As the CMW 
has been made a priority in the 
RANHAM, thus the Government is 
responsible to meet its commitment. 
 
Article 29 of the Act 
No 39 of 1999 
stipulates, “Everyone 
has the right to 
protection of the 
individual, his family, 
opinion, honor, 
dignity, and rights.” 
 
  The Presidential 
Decree No 40 of 2004 
on the RANHAM 
2004-2009, which has 
listed the CMW as 
one of the priorities 
for international legal 
instrument 
ratification. 
 
 
Source: HRWG (2010: 9-27)  
The rejection by Kemenakertrans did not only appear as a policy within the government. 
In 2008 the Ministry released a public campaign refusing the ratification. Tanjung observed 
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that the Kemenakertrans produced an advertisement, campaigning that it refused CMW 
ratification.54 The Ministry even hired Professor Juwono Sudarsono, a prominent International 
Relations scholar of the University of Indonesia, to support its campaign. 
The release of the advertisement deeply disappointed the policy entrepreneurs. Hutabarat 
stated that at that time she and other policy entrepreneurs were very disappointed with the 
Minister for Manpower and Transmigration who produced the advertisement.55 They felt that 
the Ministry was uncooperative. Yet, the advertisement also triggered a more active response 
from civil society. Responding to this advertisement, Hutabarat and other NGOs’ colleagues 
then started to cooperate with the Kemenlu. Hutabarat observed that at the beginning, 
cooperation was quite difficult. Yet she further believed that the situation changed in 2010 
when the LBH and ARRAK 90 filed a citizen lawsuit suing the president, the DPR, the 
Kemenakertrans, and the Kemenlu. The lawsuit was eventually rejected by the court. Yet 
Hutabarat believes that it exposed the court, the public, and particularly the defendants, to the 
importance of ratification.56 
 
5.4.3 The normative principles in the proposal 
As presented in the Introduction, this thesis argues that policy entrepreneurs can achieve 
success to the extent that their policy proposal contains normative principles likely to be more 
accepted. The discussion below will demonstrate whether the ideas or proposal of the policy 
entrepreneurs contain normative principles. 
The recognition of the CMW as a major human rights treaty has indeed demonstrated 
that it contains normative principles or values, namely human rights. Battistella (2009: 47) 
                                                          
54 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
55 Hutabarat 2013, pers.comm., 28 November. 
56 Hutabarat 2013, pers.comm., 28 November. 
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pointed out, “the [CMW] is one of the seven human rights instruments of the international 
community”. Therefore, the CMW has been acknowledged an integral part of human rights 
that all individuals, including migrant workers, shall enjoy. Further, as argued by Guchteneire 
and Pecoud (2009: 6), “By definition, human rights protect all individuals, regardless of their 
status. […] In principle, migrants enjoy the protection of international human rights law”. 
In the context of Indonesia, the inclusion of the CMW ratification agenda as one of the 
main priorities of RANHAM II (2004-2009) further emphasises the close linkages between the 
CMW and human rights. 
Furthermore, based on the interviews with policy entrepreneurs, the research finds that 
generally they believe their idea or proposal calling on the government to ratify the CMW had 
normative principles or values. A policy entrepreneur member of the DPR pointed out that, in 
general, the CMW contains the principle of protection.57 
The close proximity between general human rights widely supported across the 
Indonesian community and migrant workers’ protection is also emphasised by another policy 
entrepreneur. According to Yura of SP: 
The normative principles are, among others, we observe that the government treats the 
migrant workers more as commodities and remittances targets. We do not want that 
paradigm. In Southeast Asia, those phenomena are called forced migration. 
 
 [For us] the main principle is protection. We want the country to treat the migrant 
workers as humans, just like any other Indonesian citizens whose rights shall be 
protected.58 
 
Another value contained in the proposal for CMW ratification is the attachment of civil 
society to marginal groups such as migrant workers. Hutabarat argued that the proposal of 
                                                          
57 Anonymous 2013, pers.comm., 17 October. 
58 “Untuk nilai-nilai prinsipil, kita mengamati bahwa Pemerintah lebih melihat buruh migran sebagai komoditas 
dan target remitansi. Kita tidak ingin paradigma tersebut. Di Asia Tenggara, itu lebih kepada forced migration. 
[Bagi kita] prinsip utamanya: perlindungan. Kita ingin negara melihat buruh migran sebagai manusia, sebagai 
warga negara yang memiliki hak-hak yang harus dilindungi” (Yura 2013, pers.comm., 19 September). 
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CMW ratification has a moral value that civil society is strongly supportive and attached to 
marginal groups.59 
Indeed the attachment of civil society to the CMW was empirically strong, not only in 
Indonesia but internationally. As observed by Grange and D’Auchamp (2009: 70), “There was 
civil society involvement directly after the adoption of the Convention [at the UNGA in 1990], 
including that of some international NGOs, among which were faith-based and women’s 
organisations”. 
Based on the above discussion, it is obvious that the call for CMW ratification from 
policy entrepreneurs came out of two types of strong proposal: first, as one of the agendas of 
RANHAM II and, second, through ARRAK 90. The inclusion into RANHAM II can be 
regarded as a strategic achievement as it consequently made CMW ratification an obligation 
of the government and the DPR. The challenge was when ratification would take place. Thus, 
when the ratification proposal was promoted through the alliance ARRAK 90, it created a 
further impetus and a sense of urgency for the government and the DPR. 
The activism of policy entrepreneur members of ARRAK 90 was even more vigorous as 
they sued the DPR and the government in 2010. As described above, one of the driving factors 
of this lawsuit was the opposition campaign carried out by the government (Kemenakertrans) 
at that time that produced an advertisement rejecting the ratification. It suggests therefore that 
policy entrepreneurs were creative in pushing for their proposal, especially when they had to 
move against a powerful authority. As argued by Mintrom et al. (2014: 425), policy 
entrepreneurs “often face powerful forces working against them and they must be creative 
about working within binding constraints”. 
With regard to the content of the proposal, the policy entrepreneurs believe that the call 
for CMW ratification contained normative or moral values, particularly human rights values. 
                                                          
59 Hutabarat 2013, pers.comm., 28 November. 
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The involvement of human rights organisations as well as the inclusion of the CMW as a human 
rights treaty provides strong evidence that the ratification proposal contains normative or moral 
values. Accordingly, they conform the initial propositions of this thesis that, in order to be 
successful, the proposal put forward by policy entrepreneurs should contain normative 
principles or orient to values. 
 
Conclusion 
There are a number of actors who have played a key role in Indonesia’s ratification of the 
CMW. The actors, or policy entrepreneurs, came from both outside and inside government. 
Those from outside government are experts and/or activists in NGOs dealing with human rights 
and migrant workers’ rights. Those inside government are the members of Commission IX of 
DPR and the officials of government (Kemenlu, in particular). 
The research demonstrates that policy entrepreneurs have strong ideas or views on the 
importance of CMW ratification for Indonesia. Their views vary, from the belief that the CMW 
can provide comprehensive protection for migrant workers to the possibility of the Convention 
filling gaps in national laws. 
The proposals from policy entrepreneurs were transmitted through two forms, RANHAM 
II and ARRAK 90. RANHAM is a governmental agenda carried out to raise Indonesia’s human 
rights profile. ARRAK 90 is an alliance of CSOs established to push the government to take 
action faster. Furthermore, as the policy entrepreneurs faced opposing forces from the 
government (Kemenakertrans), they became even more active, shown by their decision to file 
a lawsuit against the government and the DPR. 
Last but not least, one of the success factors of policy entrepreneurs was that their 
proposals contain normative principles or values. In this context, the proposals are strongly 
188 
 
attached to human rights values. Although this factor is not the only or a major success factor, 
it must have contributed to this significant policy shift. 
Chapter 6 will examine other activism of the policy entrepreneurs that has contributed to 
the policy shift. These factors are, among others, the work, resources, motivations, and success 
factors involved in influencing the shift.  
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Chapter 6  
Assessing the Success of Policy Entrepreneurs: Examining the 
Work, Resources, Motivations and Success Factors of the Policy 
Entrepreneurs 
 
This chapter will examine the work, resources, motivations, and success factors of the policy 
entrepreneurs identified in Chapter 5 in promoting the ratification policy. Examining all of 
these is important for the purpose of answering the questions raised in this thesis, especially on 
how and why the policy entrepreneurs succeeded in their endeavours. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first and second sections investigate the 
work done and the resources used by policy entrepreneurs in reaching their goals. The findings 
in these two sections will answer one of the primary questions of this thesis: what attempts 
have policy entrepreneurs made to ensure that their policy proposals are adopted? The third 
section examines the motivations of policy entrepreneurs in carrying out their activism, and the 
fourth section examines the success factors of their policy entrepreneurship. The findings in 
these last two sections will answer one of the main questions of this thesis as stated in the 
Introduction, particularly on why policy entrepreneurs are successful in promoting their ideas. 
 
6.1 The Work of Policy Entrepreneurs 
The work of policy entrepreneurs in urging the government and DPR to ratify the CMW was 
varied. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, policy entrepreneurs had worked since the 2002 
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Nunukan humanitarian crisis, which eventually forced the Megawati government to enact Law 
No. 39 as well as sign the CMW, both in 2004. Nonetheless, policy entrepreneurs were not 
satisfied with Law No. 39 of 2004 as they considered it weak in terms of actual protection. 
Thus, they urged the government and the DPR to ratify the CMW. The early work, however, 
was carried out individually by each policy entrepreneur or civil society group. It was only 
from 2009 that they worked together through an alliance called ARRAK 90 that eventually 
gave more of a push to the call for CMW ratification. Based on this, in essence the work of the 
policy entrepreneurs can be divided into two categories: that done pre-ARRAK 90 and the 
work of ARRAK 90. 
 
6.1.1 Pre-ARRAK 90 – Policy Entrepreneurs Worked as a Loose Coalition 
The work of policy entrepreneurs before the establishment of ARRAK 90 consisted of their 
activism between 2003 and 2009. The work itself, if compared to the work after the 
establishment of ARRAK 90, was basically similar. The main difference was that if after the 
establishment of ARRAK 90 the work were better organised, the work done prior to that was 
unorganised. According to Tanjung of HRWG (Human Rights Working Group): 
The work before ARRAK 90 was in actual fact quite similar [to the alliance], they were 
merely rather unorganised. There were actually many organisations (civil society 
organisations – CSOs) with a similar goal [of ratification] but they did not have the same 
‘rhythms’. In general their activities were similar.60 
 
One example of the work of policy entrepreneurs prior to ARRAK 90 was the translation 
of the CMW from English into the Indonesian language. According to Yura, Solidaritas 
Perempuan was the first NGO to translate the CMW.61 Yet, the decision to produce an official 
translation emerged only in late 2010 when the Kementerian Luar Negeri (Kemenlu – Ministry 
                                                          
60 “Yang dilakukan sebelum ARRAK sebetulnya sama saja, hanya tidak terorganised dengan rapih. Hal ini 
dikarenakan banyak lembaga yang punya tujuan yang sama tapi ‘langgam’-nya tidak seirama. Aktivitasnya 
secara umum sama” (Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October) 
61 Yura 2013, pers.comm., 19 September. 
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of Foreign Affairs), after many consultations with the CSOs, took the lead in the ratification 
process.62 Accordingly, the official translation did not come out until after ARRAK 90 was 
established. 
Policy entrepreneurs prior to ARRAK 90 had indeed carried a good deal of preparatory 
lobbying work. Besides translating the text of the CMW, they produced legal drafts, academic 
papers, and other support material. Yet CMW ratification was not achieved prior to the 
establishment of ARRAK 90 in 2009.  
There could be various reasons for the failure of policy entrepreneurs prior to ARRAK 
90. One could be the political environment at the time in comparison with the early 2010s. As 
stated by Susilo: 
As a matter of fact, at that time the migrant labour activists had already produced and 
conveyed legal drafting, academic materials and so forth. Yet at that time the legislative 
process (in the DPR) was not as transparent as it is now.63 
  
It can be argued, on the one hand, that the failure to achieve ratification was due to 
external causes. On the other hand, there could be internal factors that also caused the failure. 
One reason could be that the preference of each policy entrepreneur or civil society 
organisation was to work individually rather than in an alliance. According to Yura: 
From the perspective of policy entrepreneurs, sometimes there were inter-institutional 
competitiveness, they wanted to exist, and so forth. It was also because of donor funding 
et cetera. The voice of policy entrepreneurs could only be unified when ARRAK 
emerged.64 
Other reasons for the failure of policy entrepreneurs pre-ARRAK 90 were the lack of 
focus and inadequate contacts with members of DPR. Yura states, “A number of civil society 
                                                          
62 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
63 “Sebenarnya para aktivis buruh sudah memberikan legal drafting, naskah akademik, dan lain-lain. Namun 
pada saat itu proses legislasi belum sebenderang sekarang” (Susilo 2013, pers.comm., 18 July). 
64 “Kalau dari sisi policy entrepreneurs, kadang-kadang ada ego antar institusi, ingin eksis, dan lain-lain, 
menyangkut donor dan seterusnya. Suara para policy entrepreneurs baru menyatu ketika ada ARRAK” (Yura 
2013, pers.comm., 19 September). 
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organisations lacked the focus [in campaigning for CMW ratification]”.65 Another factor was 
the inadequate contact [between the policy entrepreneurs] with the members of DPR. 
With regard to external factors, to some extent, government officials contributed to the 
failure of policy entrepreneurs. As an example, the change of relevant officials at the Kemenlu 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was believed to have contributed to the shift in foreign policy. In 
the words of Tanjung: 
At the Kemenlu, prior to when Mr. Anshor [the then Director of Human Rights] took up 
his directorial position, the position of Kemenlu was still similar to the position of 
Kemenakertrans. The official at the Sub-Directorate of Economy [of the Directorate of 
Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs] at that time refused the ratification. Thus, 
the structural changes in governmental ministries also influenced the ratification policy.66 
Somantri of Kemenlu confirmed this statement. He revealed that an important official at 
the Kemenlu, the then Director of Protection of Indonesian Citizens and Legal Institutions 
Overseas, rejected the ratification policy.67 According to Somantri: 
Sometimes there were views that Indonesia did not need ratification because even the 
migrant-receiving countries had not ratified. This view even came out from the then 
Director of Protection of Indonesian Citizens and Legal Institutions Overseas. Yet we 
explained to those who rejected the proposal that ratification would be Indonesia’s 
bargaining chip in demanding other countries to follow suit.68 
A policy entrepreneur from an NGO also confirmed the above statement that the shifting 
of views in the government played a crucial role in the ratification policy. In that regard, she 
believed that one of the failure factors in the pre-ARRAK 90 period was the government’s 
                                                          
65 “Sejumlah organisasi kurang fokus. Kekurangan lainnya adalah minimnya komunikasi dengan pihak DPR” 
(Yura 2013, pers.comm., 19 September). 
66 “Di Kementerian Luar Negeri, sebelum Pak Anshor, posisi mereka sama dengan Kementerian Tenaga Kerja 
dan Transmigrasi. Pejabat di Sub-Direktorat Ekonomi Direktorat HAM saat itu menolak ratifikasi. Jadi, 
perubahan struktur di kementerian juga memengaruhi [kebijakan ratifikasi]” (Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 
October) 
67 Somantri 2013, pers.comm., 28 October. 
68 “Kadang juga ada pandangan bahwa tidak perlu ratifikasi karena toh negara-negara penerima tidak 
meratifikasi. Pandangan ini salah satunya berasal dari Direktur Perlindungan Warga Negara Indonesia dan 
Badan Hukum Indonesia. Namun kemudian dijelaskan bahwa ratifikasi ini adalah ‘bargaining chip’ RI untuk 
mendorong negara lain meratifikasi” (Somantri 2013, pers.comm., 28 October). 
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tough stance. Hutabarat states, “The main problem that caused Indonesia to not ratify at that 
time was because of the government. The bureaucratic process was incredibly complex”.69 
 
6.1.2 The Work of ARRAK 90 – Towards a More Coordinated Coalition 
The work of policy entrepreneurs from NGOs became more organised and better coordinated 
after the establishment of ARRAK 90 in 2009. Despite its informality as a movement, the 
alliance introduced a division of labour. As observed by Tanjung, soon after the establishment 
of ARRAK 90, the alliance developed a strategic plan, action plans, a policy of quick response, 
and a distribution of lobbying tasks.70 
The policy entrepreneurship work of ARRAK 90 can generally be divided into three 
types of activities: substantive advocacy, demonstrative campaigns, and lobbying. On 
substantive advocacy work, some of the policy entrepreneurs or civil society organisations 
(CSOs) that were part of ARRAK 90 produced position papers, which chiefly argued the 
importance of CMW ratification. For example, according to Tanjung, his organisation, HRWG, 
produced a working paper on the necessity for Indonesia to ratify the CMW titled Ratifikasi! 
Konvensi Perlindungan Hak Semua Buruh Migran dan Anggota Keluarga: Belajar dari 
Meksiko (Ratify! The Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families: Learning from Mexico).71 Tanjung further stated that the paper 
was then brought to several institutions, particularly to the relevant government stakeholders 
and news media. 
The paper itself was comprehensive. It covered, among other things, the problems faced 
by Indonesian migrant workers, the urgency for CMW ratification, and laid out the arguments 
                                                          
69 “Masalah utama [mengapa Indonesia ratifikasi belum meratifikasi] ada di pemerintah. Proses di dalam 
birokrasi yang sangat alot” (Hutabarat 2013, pers.comm., 24 November). 
70 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
71 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
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on the necessity for Indonesia to ratify the CMW. The paper also provided a case study for the 
purpose of providing stronger arguments. Using Mexico as a role-model example of both a 
receiving and sending country that ratified the CMW in 1999, the paper argued that Mexico 
not only considered migrant workers important in terms of economic benefit, but the country 
also provided more protection for its own migrant workers (HRWG 2010: 34). 
Other substantive activities of ARRAK 90 included holding press conferences and 
sending press statements to news media.72 When organising press conferences or releasing 
press statements, ARRAK 90 usually chose significant moments, for example, the release of a 
press statement in conjunction with International Migrant Day, 18 December, in 2010. On that 
day, ARRAK 90 issued a press release entitled Indonesia Masuk dalam Sistem Perbudakan 
Global (Indonesia Enters the Global Slavery System). In that article, ARRAK 90 urged and 
demanded the government and DPR to take concrete measures to eliminate the slavery of 
migrant workers by ratifying the CMW (BatamToday 2010). 
Some of the policy entrepreneur members of ARRAK 90 also produced popular writings 
to influence public opinion. Pudjiati of Peduli Buruh Migran (PBM – Caring for Migrant 
Workers), for example, wrote an article titled ‘Bersama Kita Desak Ratifikasi Konvensi Migran 
Tahun 1990’ (Together We Urge for the Ratification of the 1990 Migrant Convention) arguing 
that the government was being inconsistent (Pudjiati 2010). Pudjiati wrote: 
The Government of Indonesia has signed the 1990 Convention on the Protection of 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families in 2004, yet until now there has been 
no follow up. In fact, the government, with various illogical excuses, gives the impression 
that it is not serious about immediately ratifying the Convention.73 
 
                                                          
72 Yura 2013, pers.comm., 19 September. 
73 “Pemerintah Indonesia telah menandatangani Konvensi Migran tahun 1990 tentang Perlindungan Hak-Hak 
Buruh Migran dan Keluarganya pada tahun 2004, namun hingga kini tidak ada tindak lanjutnya bahkan terkesan 
tidak serius untuk segera meratifikasi dengan berbagai alasan yang tidak masuk akal” (Pudjiati 2010). 
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Pudjiati argued that ARRAK 90 always made efforts to persuade the government and the 
DPR to ratify the CMW in a peaceful and professional manner.74 She further argued that 
ARRAK 90 believed campaigning through debate was better than popular protest or civil 
disobedience. In that regard, according to Pudjiati, ARRAK 90 was always known for its non-
violent actions.75 
ARRAK 90 also collaborated with a foreign institution namely the Diplomacy Training 
Program, an institution affiliated with the University of New South Wales (UNSW) in 
Australia, as stated by Yura.76 This is confirmed by a 2014 report of a program affiliated with 
the UNSW. Through the Diplomacy Training Program (DTP), organised by the Faculty of Law 
of the UNSW and a regional NGO called Migrant Forum Asia, ARRAK 90 is one of the alumni 
alliance groups that received support such as capacity building training and the relevant training 
materials (Diplomacy Training Program 2014: 29). The DTP, however, did not claim it was its 
program that brought Indonesia to ratify the CMW. It argued only that its alumni contributed 
to the ratification. As written in the report, “Two countries in the region, Indonesia and 
Bangladesh (locations of DTP courses), have ratified the 1990 Convention and DTP alumni 
were involved in leading the ratification campaigns in both countries” (Diplomacy Training 
Program 2014: 6). 
With regard to demonstrative campaigns, ARRAK 90 carried out a number of campaigns 
through demonstrations. Yura observes that ARRAK 90 held demonstrations on the premises 
of DPR and other relevant ministries.77 The demonstrations by ARRAK 90 were not, however, 
carried out without careful planning as most were organised in conjunction with particular dates 
                                                          
74 Pudjiati 2013, pers.comm., 5 December. 
75 Pudjiati 2013, pers.comm., 5 December. 
76 Yura 2013, pers.comm., 19 September. 
77 Yura 2013, pers.comm., 19 September.  
196 
 
celebrated in Indonesia or internationally. According to Tanjung, ARRAK 90 organised 
demonstrations in conjunction with public events.78 
One example of demonstrative action by ARRAK 90 was organised in conjunction with 
the celebration of ‘Hari Kartini’ (Kartini Day) that falls every 21 April, which celebrates the 
date of birth of Raden Ajeng Kartini, an early women’s rights activist in Indonesia and whose 
name, as argued by Cote (2008: 1), has “travelled beyond Indonesia and holds a celebrated 
place in the history of international feminism”. With a report titled Hari Kartini, Demonstran 
Geruduk Bundaran HI (The Day of Kartini, Demonstrators Attacked the Hotel Indonesia 
Square), Okezone reported:     
Dozens of demonstrators from the Alliance to Ratify the Convention on Migrant Workers 
(ARRAK 90) held a demonstration at the Hotel Indonesia Square to commemorate 
Kartini Day. 
 
 “From all Indonesian migrant workers, 76 percent of them are women who experience 
abuse and exploitation,” said the coordinator, Lily Pudjiati, in her oration. 
 
 “We also demand public accesses in getting information concerning migrant workers. 
Besides that, the government should also involve civil society and migrant workers in 
public policy review processes on migrant workers.” 
 
The demonstrators from ARRAK 90 also displayed a huge banner stating ‘Protect 
Indonesian migrant workers with the Migrant Convention’. A number of police officers 
were on hand during this peaceful action.79 
 
Another type of demonstration frequently carried out by ARRAK 90 was in conjunction 
with International Migrant Day, which falls every 18 December. For example, on 18 December 
2010, ARRAK 90 organised another demonstration in front of the State Palace. Together with 
                                                          
78 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
79 “Puluhan demonstran dari LSM Aliansi Rakyat untuk Ratifikasi Konvensi Migran (ARRAK 90) menggelar unjuk 
rasa di Bundaran Hotel Indonesia untuk memperingati Hari Kartini. 
‘Dari seluruh buruh migran, terdapat 76 persen perempuan yang mengalami penindasan dan eksploitasi,’ ujar 
Koordinator LSM ARRAK 90 Lily Pudjianti, dalam orasinya, Rabu (21/4/2010). 
‘Kami juga meminta ada akses bagi masyarakat dalam memperoleh informasi dalam hal buruh migran. Selain 
itu, pemerintah juga harus melibatkan masyarakat sipil dan buruh migran dalam proses pengkajian kebijakan 
terkait buruh migrant,’ tukasnya. 
Massa ARRAK 90 juga membentangkan spanduk bertuliskan ‘Lindungi TKI dengan Konvensi Migran’. Sejumlah 
aparat nampak bersiaga mengawal aksi tertib ini” (Okezone 2010). 
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other alliances such as Front Perjuangan Rakyat (FPR - People’s Struggle Front) and Komite 
Aksi PRT (the Action Committee for Domestic Workers), ARRAK 90 held a demonstration 
and a long march from Hotel Indonesia Square to the State Palace. In that demonstration, media 
reported that Tanjung, on behalf of ARRAK 90, gave a speech arguing that as one of the major 
labour-sending countries Indonesia still did not have a legal policy protecting the human rights 
of workers (Media Indonesia 2010). 
Besides making speeches, ARRAK 90 also often made theatrical gestures during 
demonstrations. At the demonstration on 18 December 2010, for example, a photo published 
by the Media Indonesia daily (2010) shows several activists from Serikat Buruh Migran (the 
Federation of Migrant Workers, one of the civil society organisations member of ARRAK 90) 
locked in chains and carrying a heavy model of the Earth. Below the photo, Media Indonesia 
wrote: 
Eliminate Slavery: Activists from Serikat Buruh Migran carried out theatrical actions 
when commemorating International Migrant Day 2010 in Jakarta yesterday. They 
demanded the government and DPR take concrete action in eliminating the slavery of 
domestic workers.80 
Concerning theatrical actions81, members of ARRAK 90 confirmed that this was an 
important element in their campaign strategies. Some of the policy entrepreneurs even believed 
that these theatrical actions contributed to Indonesia’s decision to ratify the CMW. Hutabarat, 
for example, argued that one of the interesting things about the CMW ratification campaign 
was the informal political process, such as theatrical dramas produced by ARRAK 90 in the 
court.82 She stated that it was true that the legal complaints were rejected, but she believed that 
                                                          
80 “Hapuskan Perbudakan: Aktivis yang tergabung dalam Serikat Buruh Migran melakukan aksi teatrikal saat 
memperingati Hati Buruh Migran International 2010 di Jakarta, kemarin. Mereka menuntut pemerintah dan DPR 
segera mengambil langkah nyata menghapuskan perbudakan pembantu rumah tangga” (Media Indonesia 2010). 
81 On the role of theatrical actions or performance in Indonesian politics, see Heryanto (2010). Writing in the 
context of how entertainment influences elections in Indonesia, Heryanto argues, “Recent studies on elections and 
popular culture in Indonesia have highlighted the role of performers in party politics and the growing interest of 
professional politicians in singing or dancing in public” (2010: 191). 
82 Hutabarat 2013, pers.comm., 28 November. 
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ARRAK 90 made the courts, the public, and particularly the defendants far more aware on the 
issues. She even believed that informal political process such as the theatrical dramas 
contributed to the ratification. As she claimed, “It is proven, after those activities [theatrical 
actions], the CMW was finally ratified”.83 
Besides the substantive advocacy and demonstrative aspects of their work, ARRAK 90 
was also involved in lobbying. Most of the policy entrepreneurs from the alliance who were 
interviewed confirm that the alliance actively lobbied the government and the DPR.84 
ARRAK 90 prioritised lobbying the government ahead of the DPR. The reason was 
because it was the government, more particularly the Kemenakertrans, who opposed the CMW 
ratification proposal. Tanjung stated that ARRAK 90 first brought its position paper to the 
Kemenakertrans, Kemenlu and Wantimpres [Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden – Advisory 
Council for the President].85 He further stated that in the beginning the proposal was not 
warmly welcomed. Yet, because the ‘front institution’ [ujung tombak] was Kemenlu, ARRAK 
90 actively held meetings with members of its staff, particularly its Director of Human Rights. 
The Kemenlu later produced an official translation of the CMW and this translation was 
disseminated to other ministries.86 In the words of Somantri of Kemenlu: 
We tried by translating the CMW texts into formal Indonesian. At a meeting on 15 
April 2011, we invited language experts from the Centre of Language so that the 
Kemenakertrans would not feel they were being lectured at. One example was on an 
article concerning ‘property’. In the translation by Kemenakertrans, it reads as allowing 
foreign workers in Indonesia to have property such as a house and land. Whereas when 
it was translated correctly, it should read as we [the destination country] are not allowed 
to be arbitrary in taking the property rights of others.87 
                                                          
83 “Terbukti, setelah berbagai kegiatan tersebut [drama teatrikal], akhirnya Konvensi diratifikasi” (Hutabarat 
2013, pers.comm., 28 November). 
84 Personal communications with Yura 2013, 19 September; Tanjung 2013, 11 October; Hadi 2013, 13 November; 
Hutabarat 2013, 28 November; and Pudjiati 2013, 5 December. 
85 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
86 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
87 “Kita coba dengan terjemahkan dulu Konvensi ini dengan Bahasa Indonesia yang baik dan benar. Pada Rapat 
pertama, 15 April 2011, kita undang ahli bahasa dari Pusat Bahasa, tujuannya agar Kemenakertrans tidak 
merasa digurui. Sebagai contoh, pasal mengenai properti. Dalam terjemahan Kemenakertrans, mereka boleh 
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The role of the Kemenlu officials and their work in supporting ARRAK 90 was indeed 
significant. Yura also held similar views that officials of the Kemenlu provided a lot of 
assistance.88 
Nonetheless, even though the collaboration between ARRAK 90 and the Kemenlu was 
quite intensive, it did not imply the alliance did not need to actively lobby the Kemenakertrans. 
The Ministry was also being lobbied intensively by members of ARRAK 90, particularly when 
opportunities for influence were opened. Pudjiati revealed:  
I often went to the Kemenakertrans [for various migrant worker issues]. [When I met the 
Minister], I conveyed the message to him on the necessity for Indonesia to ratify the 
CMW. We [ARRAK 90] often carried out personal lobbying as well as personal visits.89 
  
Tanjung stated that after ARRAK 90 received the green light from the government, they 
then lobbied the DPR.90 They also organised a number of public discussions on DPR premises. 
The lobbying of the DPR itself was intensive. Yura observed that ARRAK 90 lobbied the DPR 
many times, both by paying visits or carrying out campaigns.91 They organised public 
discussions, inviting migrant workers, NGOs, the Kemenlu, members of the DPR, and the 
National Commission for Human Rights, though the primary target was DPR members. The 
DPR members targeted were, in general, those who belonged to Commission IX, a sub-
structure at the DPR overseeing issues such as migrant labour. They were, inter alia, Rieke 
Dyah Pitaloka, Nova Riyanti Yusuf, and Okky Asokwati. 
                                                          
memiliki properti. Yang mereka maksudkan: rumah, tanah. Padahal setelah diterjemahkan dengan benar, artinya 
adalah kita tidak boleh sewenang-wenang mengambil hak miliknya” (Somantri 2013, pers.comm., 28 October). 
88 Yura 2013, pers.comm., 19 September. 
89 “Kalau saya sering ke Kemenakertrans. [Jika saya bertemu Menakertrans], saya memberikan pesan kepada 
Pak Menteri untuk segera meratifikasi. Kami sering melakukan lobi pribadi, juga audiensi pribadi” (Pudjiati 
2013, pers.comm., 5 December). 
90 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
91 Yura 2013, pers.comm., 19 September. 
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Besides lobbying the government and the DPR, ARRAK 90 also lobbied the news 
media.92 The alliance regarded this as one of its obligations in disseminating the call for CMW 
ratification. In the words of Pudjiati: 
We also visited the media such as Kompas, Metro TV, and Tempo. There was a kind of 
obligation for the members of ARRAK 90 that wherever we had chances to talk, we 
should insert the message on the importance of CMW ratification.93 
 
In summary, the work of the policy entrepreneurs can be seen to fall into two distinct 
periods: pre-ARRAK 90 (2003-2009) and ARRAK 90 (2009-2012). In essence the forms of 
campaigns were similar but became much more intensified after the policy entrepreneurs 
established the alliance. 
The work carried out pre-ARRAK 90 was deemed to be relatively unsuccessful due to 
both external and internal factors. Of the external factors, there was the political environment 
at that time and resistance from the bureaucracy. Of the internal factors, the policy 
entrepreneurs from NGOs unanimously believe that it was their method of working 
individually rather than in alliance that led to their lack of success. 
Indeed, the work of policy entrepreneurs transformed significantly when ARRAK 90 was 
established in 2009. Through this alliance, they carried out at least three types of activities: 
substantive advocacy, demonstrative campaigns, and lobbying. On the substantive activities, 
they produced position papers, generated publications, and sold their ideas through the media. 
This is in line with the arguments of scholars that policy entrepreneurs stress the importance of 
creating a body of evidence to present a compelling case for policy change and subsequently 
employ a range of dissemination mechanisms (see, for instance, Mintrom et al. 2014: 430, 
Roberts and King 1991: 160). These campaigns had certainly given further influence toward 
                                                          
92 Pudjiati 2013, pers.comm., 5 December. 
93 “Kami juga datang ke media-media seperti Kompas, Metro TV, Tempo, radio. Ada semacam kewajiban bagi 
anggota ARRAK bahwa dimanapun mereka bicara, mereka harus menyisipkan pesan mengenai pentingnya 
ratifikasi” (Pudjiati 2013, pers.comm., 5 December). 
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the relevant decision makers. At the very least, through a compelling body of evidence, the 
campaigns gave the decision makers more awareness on the importance of ratification. 
Concerning demonstrative activities, ARRAK 90 carried out a series of campaigns. The 
campaigns were carefully planned as many, if not all, of them were organised in conjunction 
with public events, such as Kartini Day and International Migrant Day. These kinds of 
demonstrative activity were certainly organised for the purpose of getting the attention of the 
general public and government and keeping the momentum of those events. This is in line with 
what has been argued by Roberts and King (1991: 161), “A growing list of activities and an 
increasing number of supporters and interested parties made it imperative to keep the attention 
focussed and keep the momentum going.” 
ARRAK 90 lobbied all the relevant institutions, such as the government, the DPR, and 
even the advisory body to Indonesian president, Wantimpres (Advisory Council to the 
President). One may question whether the latter institution was worth lobbying as it could not 
make any binding decisions only offer recommendations. It can be argued, however, that the 
body had the power to influence the president as well as the relevant ministers on the 
importance of ratification. Furthermore, the decision of ARRAK 90 to lobby Wantimpres can 
also be seen as part of the alliance’s strategy to achieve greater diversity among supporters. As 
argued by Mintrom et al (2014: 435), in order to win a policy change, policy entrepreneurs 
“must create strong coalitions of diverse supporters”. The lobbying activities of the policy 
entrepreneurs also used the moments, borrowing a term coined by Kingdon (2003: 166), when 
the ‘policy windows’ were open. For example, one policy entrepreneur sometimes used 
opportunities to discuss the CMW ratification proposal with the Minister for Manpower and 
Transmigration, one of the most authoritative persons in making decisions on this matter, 
whenever she met the minister. 
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6.2 The Resources 
Scholars (see, for instance, Roberts and King 1991; Kingdon 2003, Mintrom et al. 2014) have 
generally argued that policy entrepreneurs have to spend resources in order to achieve their 
goals. In the context of Indonesia’s foreign policy to ratify the CMW, most of the policy 
entrepreneurs interviewed in this research confirm that they spent or made full use of their 
resources in promoting their call for CMW ratification.94 From these interviews, the resources 
spent can be divided into two categories: financial as well as ideas and skills. 
 
6.2.1 Financial Resources 
Financial resources, or simply money, are the most tangible resources spent by the policy 
entrepreneurs in supporting their activities, such as conducting research, organising seminars, 
and lobbying. Yusuf of DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat - House of Representative) stated that 
the main resource commitment she made was money.95 Yusuf, however, did not elaborate on 
how she spent money for the purposes of CMW ratification. 
Other policy entrepreneurs also confirmed that there were financial resources spent that 
were channelled through their organisations. Yura of Solidaritas Perempuan (SP), for example, 
stated that her organisation spent a lot.96 She further stated that the reason for this spending 
was because SP focused on ratification. 
Policy entrepreneurs did everything they could to generate resources including financial 
ones. According to Pudjiati: 
We certainly did anything we could. We also collected money, allocated time and other 
activities so that the Convention could be ratified. Our movement is pure, from our hearts. 
                                                          
94 Personal communications with Yusuf 2013, 18 September; Yura 2013, 19 September; Tanjung 2013, 11 
October; Anonymous 2013, 17 October; Hadi 2013, 13 November; Hutabarat 2013, 28 November; and Pudjiati 
2013, 5 December. 
95 Yusuf 2013, pers.comm., 18 September. 
96 Yura 2013, pers.comm., 19 September. 
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Almost all members were willing to struggle to make it happen. We fought like this for 
years on end.97 
 
NGOs and the policy entrepreneurs used their financial resources in support of campaign 
actions and other relevant needs. According to Tanjung of HRWG (Human Rights Working 
Group), his organisation and others in ARRAK 90 collected and used money for demonstrative 
actions and other activities.98 Interestingly, they never asked for financial support from any 
third party institutions. In the words of Tanjung, “One uniqueness of ARRAK 90, we never 
sent any funding proposal to sponsors”.99 They were keen to uphold their own integrity and not 
be beholden to anyone. 
 
6.2.2 Ideas and Skills 
Ideas are the non-tangible resources most frequently expended by policy entrepreneurs writing 
or speaking on the issues concerned. Yusuf stated that she wrote popular articles, such as 
through her weekly columns in Koran Sindo.100 Similarly, another DPR member stated that 
whenever she was interviewed, she always tried to make comments critical of the government, 
including on the necessity to ratify the Convention.101 She believed that the more DPR 
members who spoke through the media, the more they would bring about a policy change. She 
argued that the parliament should always push the government. Furthermore, she also 
sometimes spoke in front of prospective Indonesian migrant workers when asked by 
Kemenakertrans (Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration). 
                                                          
97 ”Kita memang mengupayakan segala cara. Kita juga mengumpulkan uang, menyisihkan waktu dan lain-lain 
agar Konvensi tersebut dapat gol [diratifikasi]. Gerakan kita semuanya bersifat murni, dari hati nurani. Hampir 
semua anggota mau berjuang supaya itu [terwujud]. Dan hal ini diperjuangkan bertahun-tahun” (Pudjiati 2013, 
pers.comm., 5 December). 
98 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11/10/2013. 
99 “Uniknya untuk ARRAK, tidak ada proposal kepada sponsor” (Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11/10/2013). 
100 Yusuf 2013, pers.comm., 18 September. 
101 Anonymous 2013, pers.comm., 17 October. 
204 
 
Using their ideas, policy entrepreneurs conveyed their views to the public, particularly 
through the mass media. Whenever they had chances to talk before the media, they used these 
opportunities to bring up their preferred policy. A DPR member, for example, used such an 
opportunity when she attended a regional event.102 Thus, her message was not only intended 
for the government of Indonesia but also of the governments of the Southeast Asian region 
more generally. According to this DPR member:  
When we attended a conference in Brunei Darussalam (AIPA – ASEAN 
InterParliamentary Assembly, in early 2010s), I was interviewed by a local newspaper 
The Brunei Times. I then stated to the media that it was necessary for labour-destination 
countries to ratify the CMW. The reason is, if the ASEAN Economic Community would 
be implemented in 2015, it would be strange if those countries had not done so.103  
 
Another form of resource spent by the policy entrepreneurs was their skills, such as 
producing campaigns through social media. Some of the policy entrepreneurs even broadcast 
the demonstrative actions through live streaming and, later, the events were uploaded to the 
popular You Tube channel. Hadi stated they made full use of their intellectual resources.104 
Among other things, they created social media and organised live streaming broadcasts of 
various events that would later be uploaded to You Tube. They believed that campaigning 
through social media can reach both the decision makers and the migrant workers themselves. 
Hadi claimed the broadcast and the recorded videos had been watched by thousands of 
Indonesian migrant workers. 
In summary, in order to achieve their goals, policy entrepreneurs expended a diverse 
range of resources, partly financial as well as their ideas and skills. On financial resources, or 
simply money, the policy entrepreneurs drew either from their own or their organisations’ 
                                                          
102 Anonymous 2013, pers.comm., 17 October. 
103 “Ketika kami lakukan konferensi di Brunei (AIPA: ASEAN InterParliamentary Assembly), saya diwawancarai 
oleh koran The Brunei Times. Saya katakan negara-negara penerima pekerja migran perlu meratifikasi 
Konvensi. Karena ketika ASEAN Community diberlakukan pada tahun 2015, sangat aneh jika Konvensi tersebut 
belum diratifikasi oleh Komunitas ASEAN” (Anonymous 2013, pers.comm., 17 October). 
104 Hadi 2013, pers.comm., 13 November. 
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budgets. Interestingly, in the case of ARRAK 90, most of its activities did not depend on 
outside sponsorship. 
The policy entrepreneurs made full use of ideas and skills in whatever opportunities they 
had. They used their ideas to write and speak to the media, including foreign media. They also 
used their skills to produce multimedia content that promoted their campaign activities. Of this 
kind of resources, one may relate to what Mintrom et al (2014: 436) argue that policy 
entrepreneurs apply their skills as communicators to great effect. 
Additionally, the resources spent by the policy entrepreneurs as discussed above are in 
line to what has been defined by Kingdon. He argues, “[Policy entrepreneurs] are advocates 
who are willing to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a 
position for anticipated future gain” (Kingdon 2003: 179). This anticipated future gain, and the 
motivations of policy entrepreneurs, will be discussed in the following section. 
 
6.3 The Motivational Success 
This section examines the motivations and persistence that drove the policy entrepreneurs in 
pursuing their goals. Based on interviews, the motivations that brought policy entrepreneurs to 
call for CMW ratification were, among others, their concerns about the problems faced by 
women and marginal groups. These motivations emerged due to personal concerns or particular 
events such as Indonesian women migrant workers facing death penalties. In the words of Yura:  
At first I was interested with the women issue and later studied about the women 
trafficking. From there I learned about the CMW. I used to work as a journalist, then I 
learned about the CMW, through SP. At that time I wrote a lot about migrant workers 
issue. Then I realised just writing was not enough. I finally joined an NGO.  
 
My purpose at that time was more for migrant workers. At Solidaritas Perempuan (SP), 
I felt useful, and realised that it had been focusing on the ratification. At SP, I often 
meet migrant workers. I have become more exposed to the cases of women migrant 
workers, including the death penalty of Rosita, an Indonesian woman migrant worker 
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in the United Arab Emirates. That case was my departure moment to be totally focussed 
on the issue of migrant workers.105  
  
A DPR member revealed that because her main concern was migrant women, she paid 
attention fully to the issue of women’s empowerment, as most overseas Indonesian migrant 
workers were women.106 One policy entrepreneur argued that it was due to idealism that people 
were on the side of marginal groups. According to Hutabarat, “It is the idealism. There should 
be people who take sides with the poor. There should be empowerment so that the women 
migrant workers can be self-sufficient”.107 
Another motivation for policy entrepreneurs in fighting for their cause was their own 
unfortunate experience as migrant workers themselves. Pudjiati revealed her motivation was 
her personal experience subjected to inhumane treatment in the placement country and that she 
had not received any protection from her own country.108 Such bad experiences caused her to 
work to her utmost ability (mati-matian) in ARRAK 90. Pudjiati shared her sad story: 
In 2000 I went to Taiwan. Prior to my departure, we were accommodated in a PPKTIS 
(Pelaksana Penempatan TKI Swasta – a Private Company for the Placement of 
Indonesian Migrant Workers) for six months. I was once asked to be naked so that they 
could check whether I was handicapped or not. Later, our health was checked. In the 
accommodation, we were not allowed to communicate with others outside. 
 
At the times, we did not know how to be migrant workers safely. I was brought by a 
middleman. All documents had been prepared. My name and address were fraudulent. I 
was flown to Taiwan. 
 
                                                          
105 “Saya awalnya tertarik dengan isu perempuan. Namun ada saran agar saya juga mempelajari isu trafficking. 
Dari situ saya mulai tertarik. Dulu saya juga wartawan, kemudian saya belajar mengenai Konvensi 90, lewat SP. 
Saat itu saya banyak membuat tulisan tentang isu ini. Sampai titik tertentu, saya cuma hanya bisa menulis. 
Akhirnya saya kemudian putuskan pindah ke NGO.  
Tujuan saya waktu itu lebih untuk kerja kepada buruh migran. Ke SP, match, dan tahu kalau mereka sedang fokus 
dengan ratifikasi. Kemudian, di SP, saya sering bertemu dengan buruh migran. Jadi semakin banyak tahu kasus-
kasus mereka. Kasus Teh Rosita yang diancam hukuman mati di UEA. Itu menjadi titik tolak untuk saya total di 
isu buruh migran” (Yura 2013, pers.comm., 19 September). 
106 Anonymous 2013, pers.comm., 17 October 2013. 
107 “Idealisme. Harus ada orang-orang yang berpihak kepada masyarakat miskin. Penting adanya empowering 
agar mereka bisa mandiri” (Hutabarat 2013, pers.comm., 28 November). 
108 Pudjiati 2013, pers.comm., 5 December. 
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In Taiwan, I found out that my agent was illegal, they did not have a licence. The 
agreement was that I would work in a hospital, but I was asked to work in a plantation. I 
refused. My agent then asked me to pay the debt, so I had to work at that plantation 
 
Later, the agent sold me to a café to do a cleaning job. There I was tricked again, ended 
up to accompany customers. I refused, which brought me to a more inhumane work, 
which was to clean up floors wearing only underwear. I had to sleep near trash bins and 
eat the left-over food.  
 
Few days later, I fought. This led to me being sold to another agency. I had to work a 
massage therapist. I fought back, which caused me to receive a lot of physical beatings. 
The agency then sent me back to the previous agency. My debt grew. 
 
My passport was held by the supervisor. One day we broke the passport holding cube, 
ran away and reported to police. But at the police office I was charged with a crime. I 
had to spend 10 months in jail.  
 
From the jail, I contacted Indonesia’s Trade Representative in Taiwan. But I only 
received harsh words, that this was my own mistake by going to Taiwan. I was even 
insulted, labelled as the ‘waste of society’. 
 
In jail we received better treatment. We could work. The officers also taught us how to 
go on hunger strike. I was finally deported home. But the money from my work was 
taken by the agency. 
 
The worse experience was when we arrived in Indonesia. At the Terminal 3 [of 
Indonesia’s Soekarno-Hatta International Airport], we were gathered like terrorists, 
approached by agents in Indonesia. My friends were even asked to pay IDR 6 million.109 
                                                          
109 “Saya berangkat tahun 2000 ke Taiwan. Sebelumnya ditampung di PPKTIS 6 bulan. Kita pernah disuruh 
telanjang, dilihat punya cacat atau tidak. Kemudian ada cek kesehatan. Di penampungan kita tidak boleh 
berkomunikasi. 
Dulu daya tidak tahu cara bermigrasi yang aman. Saya dibawa calo. Semua dokumen saya sudah dibuatkan. 
Nama dan alamat palsu. Kemudian saya diterbangkan ke Taiwan. 
Di Taiwan, ternyata agen saya gelap (ilegal), tidak ada ijin dari Pemerintah Taiwan. Perjanjiannya, saya bekerja 
di rumah sakit. Saya ternyata diminta bekerja di perkebunan. Saya tidak mau. Agen saya bilang saya harus bayar 
hutang. Jadi dipaksa bekerja di kebun. 
Oleh agensi saya dijual ke salah satu kafe untuk bersih-bersih meja. Di sanapun saya dibohongi, diminta 
menemani tamu. Saya tolak, dan akhirnya dipekerjakan secara tidak manusiawi. Saya harus membersihkan lantai 
pakai pakaian dalam. Tidur juga harus dekat tong sampah. Makan pun yang sisa-sisa.  
Itu bertahan beberapa hari. Saya berontak. Akhirnya saya dijual ke agensi lain. Saya dipaksa bekerja di panti 
pijat. Saya pun melawan, sehingga sering dipukul.  
Saya kemudian dikembalikan ke agensi awal. Hutang saya menumpuk. Di sana buka berankas dan ambil paspor, 
lari dan lapor polisi. Di sana saya justru dituduh kriminal mencuri paspor. Kemudian dikenakan hukuman 10 
bulan penjara. 
Dari penjara, saya menghubungi Kantor Dagang Indonesia (KDI), justru dimaki-maki, salah sendiri kenapa ke 
Taiwan. Saya justru dihina, dibilang sampah masyarakat.  
Saya dipenjara 10 bulan. Namun justru di penjara kita dihargai. Dan di sana kita bekerja. Sama sipir diajarkan 
untuk mogok makan. Akhirnya dideportasi. Tapi uang hasil kerja diambil oleh agensi. 
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Stories like this demonstrate that the policy entrepreneurs who struggled for CMW 
ratification had strong personal motivations, not because of financial or any other rewards but 
mostly due to their strong emotional response to the issue. This motivation underscored their 
persistence. Their actions were taken because of personal bitter experiences as migrant workers 
themselves. 
It may be challenging to prove that there is a cause-effect relationship between the 
motivations of policy entrepreneurs as intending change agents and their success in making a 
policy change. Yet scholars have already indicated that policy entrepreneurs with grounded 
idealism and strong motivations will likely do much to make change happen. This underlines 
the reason why policy entrepreneurs need to have a normative basis for their idealism for 
change, especially in areas including human rights. As argued by Mintrom and Norman (2009: 
649), “Highly motivated individuals or small teams can do much to draw attention to policy 
problems, present innovative policy solutions, build coalitions of supporters, and secure 
legislative action”. 
One may question whether the motivation of policy entrepreneurs are always idealistic, 
such as the above examples, or if there are other motives, such as financial gain or even political 
power. While this question is pertinent, in essence, policy entrepreneurs aim for the interest of 
a larger group, at least in terms of how they frame their motivations (Verduijn (2014: 189). 
 
 
6.4 The Success Factors 
This section examines the primary factors governing the success of policy entrepreneurs in 
pushing the government and the DPR to ratify the CMW. This examination is based on the 
                                                          
Lebih buruk lagi ketika tiba di Indonesia. Di terminal 3 kita digiring seperti teroris, didatangi agen-agen 
Indonesia. Teman-teman ditagih 6 juta” (Pudjiati 2013, pers.comm., 5 December). 
209 
 
policy entrepreneurs’ self-assessments or assessments of their actions through the alliance 
(ARRAK 90). In that context, success factors varied. Based on the interviews with policy 
entrepreneurs, there were at least two factors identified: coalition and persistence. 
 
6.4.1 The Importance of Coalition-Building 
Most of the policy entrepreneurs interviewed for this research agreed that one of the crucial 
factors that helped them achieve success was coalition-building. Collaboration, either through 
ARRAK 90 or with other policy entrepreneurs in the government and the DPR, has proven to 
be effective in achieving their goals. Yusuf argued that whatever their initiatives in the DPR, 
if they could not convince and collaborate with others, they would not achieve their 
outcomes.110 She believed that while individuals were important it would be personal arrogance 
to think that they alone created the conditions for policy change. She argued that individuals 
did not have the ability to do everything on their own. 
Yusuf also emphasised that working as a group, or in this context through a coalition, 
was actually a crucial part of Indonesian culture called ‘gotong royong’ (working together). 
She argued:  
Whatever our initiative is, if we cannot convince others, work with others, our initiative 
will not go through. Personal arrogance should not take place. Bullshit. It is because we 
do not have all expertise in all areas. 
 
It is important to make the conveyance of personal initiative a tradition. In the United 
States, it is already a culture. In Indonesia, there is such a rule [in the DPR], yet the 
tradition has not grown. Hopefully from 2014 [when the DPR members of the 2014-2019 
period assume their duties] there will be more of such initiatives. 
 
An idea cannot be fought alone. Indonesia is still deeply embedded with the ‘gotong-
royong’ (helping each other out) culture.111 
                                                          
110 Yusuf 2013, pers.comm., 18 September. 
111 “Apapun itu inisiatif kita, jika kita tidak bisa meyakinkan pihak lain, bekerjasama dengan pihak lain, maka hal 
ini tidak bisa jalan. Arogansi pribadi tidak boleh. Bullshit. Karena kita tidak punya kemampuan dalam semua 
hal. 
Penting dibudayakan penyampaian inisiatif pribadi. Di Amerika Serikat, ini sudah budaya. Di Indonesia, sudah 
ada di tatibnya [tata tertib DPR], tapi belum menjamur. Mudah-mudahan mulai 2014 semakin banyak. 
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The commitment of the groups or individuals participating in the coalition was also an 
important factor. Tanjung observed that at ARRAK 90 there were several civil society 
organisations committed to staying in the alliance.112 This argument was similar to the view of 
Somantri) who observed that the organisations were solid and their support was very important, 
particularly when the process was brought to the DPR.113 This observation is also similar to the 
view held by a policy entrepreneur member of the DPR. According to her, “We members of 
the DPR would not be as influential on the government if we were not supported by the extra-
parliamentary powers such as NGOs”.114 
On the importance of the work of a coalition or team, one policy entrepreneur made a 
metaphor of the work of farmers, stating that success with CMW ratification was not the result 
of her work alone but the work of many. According to Hutabarat: 
This is not merely my personal success. We were just like farmers: some cultivated the 
land, some others sowed the seeds and applied the fertilisers, and we just reaped the 
harvest. This is the achievement of civil society who consistently demanded the 
government. 
 
Civil society has social intelligence, thus their innovation emerges. In general, they have 
social intelligence with rich experiences in working within organisation. It is due to their 
young ages, not more than 35 years old, bravery, and not having sub-organisation 
relations.115 
 
To conclude this sub-section, the Indonesian policy entrepreneurs understand and highly 
value the importance of coalition. Not only do they underline that working in coalition opens 
                                                          
Ide tidak bisa diperjuangkan sendiri. Indonesia masih kental budaya gotong royong” (Yusuf 2013, pers.comm., 
18 September). 
112 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
113 Somantri 2013, pers.comm., 28 October. 
114 “Anggota DPR tidak akan kuat desakannya kepada pemerintah jika tidak dibantu kekuatan-kekuatan extra-
parliament seperti LSM” (Anonymous 2013, pers.comm., 17 October). 
115 “Ini bukan semata keberhasilan saya. Ini seperti petani, ada yang menggarap tanah, ada yang memberi pupuk, 
dan kita tinggal menuai. Ini keberhasilan masyarakat sipil yang konsisten menuntut pemerintah. 
[Masyarakat sipil memiliki] kecerdasan sosial, sehingga inovasinya muncul. Secara umum mereka punya 
kecerdasan tersebut dengan intelektual dan pengalaman berorganisasi. Karena usia mereka relatif muda, tidak 
lebih dari 35 tahun, berani, tidak ada hubungan sub-organisasi” (Hutabarat 2013, pers.comm., 28 November). 
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more possibilities for them to achieve their goals, they also stress that it was the coalition that 
succeeded and not the achievement of individuals. 
 
6.4.2 Persistence 
Another factor that brought the policy entrepreneurs to finally witness the CMW ratification 
was their persistence. Persistence in carrying out their work or activism was achieved through 
ARRAK 90, collaborating with others, or sometimes working individually. 
In the context of ARRAK 90, the persistence of its members played a key role in their 
success. According to Tanjung, “In ARRAK 90, several organisations were steadfastly 
determined for the ratification”.116 Other policy entrepreneurs even stated that the final result 
of CMW ratification was due to the emergence of a ‘fighting spirit’ (semangat juang), a phrase 
similar in meaning to persistence or determination. Hariyanto, Wahyudi, and Hadi of SBMI 
unanimously agreed that: 
It was because of fighting spirit. Our motto was ‘fight or be abused’. Because based on 
our social analysis, many our migrant workers friends have been abused.117 
 
Success in the application of the persistence factor can be attributed to consistency in 
pursuing the primary goal. Hutabarat argued that CMW ratification was the achievement of 
civil society that was consistent in demanding the government and the DPR shift their stance 
in favour of ratification.118 Tanjung similarly argued that ARRAK 90 could not turn back from 
the ratification goal as the alliance believed that through ratification Indonesia would have a 
stronger legal standing internationally.119 Another aspect of persistence was stamina. As argued 
                                                          
116 “Di ARRAK, beberapa lembaga tetap committed/determined untuk ratifikasi” (Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 
October). 
117 “Kami memiliki semangat juang atau perlawanan yang kuat. Moto SBMI adalah ‘lawan atau tertindas’. Kita 
buat analisa sosial, teman-teman memang banyak yang tertindas” (personal communications with Hariyanto 
2013, 13 November; Wahyudi 2013, 13 November; and Hadi 2013, 13 November). 
118 Hutabarat 2013, pers.comm., 28 November. 
119 Tanjung 2013, pers.comm., 11 October. 
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by Hutabarat, “Masyarakat sipil punya stamina yang sangat panjang” (Civil society had 
enduring stamina).120  
On the examples of the persistence of ARRAK 90, one may observe the continuous work 
carried out by the policy entrepreneurs within the alliance. As argued by Pudjiati, ARRAK 90 
continuously pushed their demand through writing, conducting studies, and so forth, which 
later made the government listen.121 The alliance also paid visits to the government and the 
DPR. Last but not least, ARRAK 90 also organised a number of events. 
This section demonstrates that the coalition factor played a crucial role in the policy 
entrepreneurs’ success. This is in line with an argument put forward by scholars that policy 
entrepreneurs are usually more effective if they are team players (Mintrom et al. 2014) and 
their real strength “comes through their ability to work effectively with others” (Mintrom and 
Norman 2009: 653). As discussed above, the call for ratification emerged in 2003. But it was 
only within the last two or three years prior to the ratification in 2012 that the activism of policy 
entrepreneurs reached its height. This was indeed triggered by the formation and work of the 
coalition ARRAK 90. 
 Persistence played perhaps the most significant role in the success of policy 
entrepreneurs. One may wonder how persistence is defined and whether the activism of policy 
entrepreneurs in the context of Indonesia’s CWM ratification could be regarded principally as 
persistence. In that regard, it is worth underlining what Kingdon (2003: 181) explained about 
the meaning of persistence,  
Successful entrepreneurs are persistent […] Most of these people spend a great deal of 
time giving talks, writing position papers, sending letters to important people, drafting 
bills, testifying before congressional committees and executive branch commissions, and 
having lunch, all with the aim of pushing their ideas in whatever way and forum might 
further the cause. 
 
                                                          
120 Hutabarat 2013, pers.comm., 28 November. 
121 Pudjiati 2013, pers.comm., 5 December. 
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If we closely examine the work of policy entrepreneurs for Indonesia’s ratification to the 
CMW, it becomes obvious that what they did and how they did it fully meet the criteria of 
persistence as argued by Kingdon. To cite relevant examples, they gave talks regularly 
whenever they had the chance, they constantly produced position papers, they wrote 
extensively to influence public opinion, they actively organised public campaigns to attract 
attention in their cause, and they lobbied key people and organisations. All of this was done 
repeatedly and continuously over a dedicated period of time. 
The willingness of policy entrepreneurs to carry out the above activism over many years 
can also be regarded as a demonstration of their persistence. As discussed previously, though 
the policy entrepreneurs intensified their work in the last two to three years prior to ratification 
in 2012, in reality they commenced their struggle in earnest in 2003. Hypothetically, had the 
policy entrepreneurs not been persistent, CMW ratification might not have been achieved up 
to the present date. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined foreign policy entrepreneurship in Indonesia in the context of the 
country’s ratification to the CMW, particularly in terms of work, resources, motivations, and 
success factors. This examination is important as it can illuminate how and why the policy 
entrepreneurs achieve success in making a policy change. 
There were two periods of work: pre-ARRAK 90 (2003-2009) and ARRAK 90 (2009-
2012). The difference between these two is that pre-ARRAK 90 the work was mostly carried 
out individually; after the formation of the coalition work was much more organised and co-
ordinated. The findings in this chapter are that it was the work under ARRAK 90 that changed 
Indonesia’s foreign policy from non-ratification to ratification. 
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There were two types of resources spent and used by policy entrepreneurs: financial as 
well as ideas and skills. Financial resources were spent either individually or through 
organisations policy entrepreneurs belonged to. Full use was made of ideas and skills for the 
purpose of promoting CMW ratification. 
Concerning the motivations of policy entrepreneurs, the findings are that they were often 
bitter personal experiences either when dealing with migrant worker issues or being migrant 
workers themselves. Being migrant workers who were abused was a strong motivation, proven 
by the narrative from a policy entrepreneur who had a terrible experience while working in 
Taiwan. 
Last but not least, policy entrepreneurs generally believe that there were two factors 
determining their success: coalition and persistence. On coalition, the emergence of ARRAK 
90 in 2009 significantly transformed the work of policy entrepreneurs. Through the coalition, 
they carried out continuous activities in terms of substantive work, demonstrations, and 
lobbying. On persistence, what the policy entrepreneurs did and how they did it demonstrate 
how persistent they were. In this context, policy entrepreneurs produced working papers, gave 
talks, wrote extensively to influence public opinion, and even conducted various 
demonstrations for the purpose of getting public and the government attention. All of this 
entrepreneurship was carried out tirelessly. Had the policy entrepreneurs not been persistent in 
their policy entrepreneurship, Indonesia might still be a non-ratifying country to the CMW at 
the present time. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion – the Growing Significance of Policy Entrepreneurs in 
Policy Change 
 
This thesis addresses primarily the questions of how and why key policy entrepreneurs became 
successful in promoting their ideas and changing policy. In examining this, the thesis uses the 
case of Indonesia’s policy on the protection of migrant workers, particularly on its ratification 
of the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families (CMW). There are three questions that this thesis examines: 
(1) To what extent were policy entrepreneurs important in shaping or playing roles in 
Indonesia’s policy on the protection of its migrant workers and who were the main actors? (2) 
How did these policy entrepreneurs attempt to ensure that their policy proposals were adopted 
or their ideas heard? and (3) Why were policy entrepreneurs successful in promoting their 
ideas? 
As discussed in the Introduction, the protection of migrant workers became a pressing 
issue in the context of Indonesia’s foreign policy and regional relations. This can be seen from 
the decision of Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemenlu) in 2002 to establish a special 
directorate to address the issue, namely the Directorate for the Protection of Indonesian 
Citizens and Legal Agencies. Nonetheless, since the establishment of this directorate, the initial 
protection policy was still viewed domestically as poor since there were many numerous high-
profile cases involving Indonesian migrant workers suffering from numerous forms of 
mistreatment and even capital punishment. Recent policy developments, however, have been 
viewed more positively as improvements. This is demonstrated by Indonesia’s decision to 
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ratify the CMW in 2012. With regard to this decision, the initial findings showed that there 
were at least two categories of policy entrepreneurs: civil society organizations or NGOs who 
worked under the umbrella movement Aliansi Rakyat untuk Ratifikasi Konvensi 1990 
(ARRAK 90 - People’s Alliance for the Ratification of 1990 Convention) and several members 
of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR – Indonesia’s House of Representatives). 
The thesis has attempted to test the propositions that policy entrepreneurs are typically 
successful if they advocate cogent policy proposals that are based on convincing normative 
principles and are vigorously promoted with persistence. In testing these propositions through 
examining the central questions of the thesis, I have applied a qualitative methodology 
combined with the case study method. 
In conclusion, the discussion now needs to turn to the broader theoretical issue of what 
explains policy change in the Indonesian case of the increasing recognition and international 
protection of migrant workers. Policy change did not come about by itself as though some 
inevitable mechanism march of history. Policy change came about through a protracted 
institutional process spurred by coalition and activism to influence policy outcomes. It came 
about because of a rich combination of factors that enabled key actors to prosecute ideas for 
change in a receptive context. These factors included the growing salience of the issue 
concerning the protection of Indonesia’s migrant workers working in risky or dangerous 
circumstances in overseas labour market often with poor condition and little protection. 
The issue of migrant worker protection affected the Indonesian community greatly and 
heightened concerns among civil society groups for better protection for the migrant labour 
overseas (and to comfort the state of mind of affected families). Migrant labour protection was 
closely linked to the growing interest in human rights. Factors also included the important 
contextual link between domestic community concerns (and domestic political/altitudinal 
dynamics) and the formal stances on foreign policy taken by the Indonesian government. 
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As Indonesia gradually democratised and liberalized its political system in the post-
Independence period, the importance of public pressure on government (and presidential) 
decision-making to respond to community concerns grew gradually. Democratisation was an 
important precondition that enabled local ‘champions’ to frame issues, advocate cogent ideas 
for change to improve protection, and pressure the ‘system’ to act when it otherwise might 
have been avoided the issue or continued to regard it as too complex to solve. Other factors 
included the exponential growth in NGOs and community activist groups who were prepared 
to champion the issues related to protection. These bodies provided the crucibles for policy 
entrepreneurs to emerge and gain notoriety for themselves and their campaigns. 
 
7.1 Policy Entrepreneurs, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, and the Iterative Linkage 
between Domestic and Foreign Policies 
In Chapter 1, I examined the literature of policy entrepreneurship and Indonesia’s foreign 
policy as well as the linkage between domestic and foreign policies. I begin with an argument 
that policy entrepreneurs have become an important dimension in foreign policy. The concept 
of policy entrepreneurship itself has been developed by scholars in the broad theoretical 
framework of domestic public policy. In short, policy entrepreneurs are political actors who 
promote policy ideas and in order to be successful in promoting the ideas, they must work in 
coalition and carry out their advocacy for change with persistence. 
In regard to changes in foreign policy or policies, I have regarded these as discrete 
purposeful decisions or actions authorized by or at the political level but influenced by 
individuals or group of individuals, inside or outside the state. This definition suggests that the 
actors of foreign policy-making do not necessarily come from a state/government or any formal 
institution; they can also come from civil society organizations. Further, I also use an analytical 
tool namely foreign policy analysis (FPA) theory, a tool that is actor-specific rather than state-
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specific. The thesis demonstrates that this theory is useful in explaining foreign policy making 
processes, particularly the role and behaviour of human decision makers whether they act as 
individuals or in groups. 
The literature on Indonesia’s foreign policy that I examine in this thesis shows that there 
have been important direct linkages between domestic and foreign policies, be they on the 
periodization of governmental regimes or the thematic issues of Indonesia’s foreign policy on 
which scholars have focused. What has not been much appreciated or explained are the roles 
of non-state actors (NSAs) and more particularly the NGOs that play important roles in policy 
changes. Those actors, I argue, are the real policy entrepreneurs. 
 
7.2 The Forces of Democratisation that Opened Up Windows for Civil Society in 
Policy Change 
In the thesis I have argued that labour migration in post-colonial Indonesia differs from that in 
the pre-colonial and colonial eras particularly in regard to the factors that have determined the 
migration. In post-colonial Indonesia, the democratisation that effectively began only in late 
1990s can be regarded as a special era stimulating particularly with the rise of a vibrant civil 
society.  
From 1945-1959, under Sukarno government, Indonesian labour migration was limited 
as the country still faced revolutionary upheavals after the independence declaration. Some 
Indonesian labour, however, still moved to Malaysia due to the policy of the Malaysian 
government that encouraged Indonesian labour migration, aiming to maintain population 
dominance against the Chinese and Indians. The pattern of migration in this period was more 
externally-driven responding to overseas demand. 
Indonesian labour migration policies shifted significantly with the regime change from 
Sukarno to Suharto in 1967. Under the Suharto administration, the government created an 
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economic policy based on cheap labour for the purpose of attracting foreign investment and 
sending more labour overseas to earn income for Indonesia. Later in 1969, the government 
implemented Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Repelita) Pertama (The First Five Year 
Plan), 1969-1974, and proceeded further in later years. Another significant development was 
what occurred in Malaysia after the 13 May 1969 riot. As this riot drove the Malaysian 
government to implement the New Economic Policy, more Indonesian labour moved to 
Malaysia – a phenomenon that continued into the 1970s. The pattern of migration in this period 
was that it was driven both by internal and external factors. Further, it emphasised the notion 
on the linkage between domestic and foreign policies. 
In the 1970s, Indonesia experienced a significant increase in overseas labour migration, 
once more particularly to Malaysia. But now the pattern of labour migration was driven by a 
balance of both internal and external factors. These were principally: the facilitative 
governmental policies of foreign nations, where migration was encouraged by policies 
implemented by Malaysian authorities; and national domestic policies of the Indonesian 
governments, where these governments undertook active interventions on labour migration 
through, among others, the government-to-government programs on the sending of Indonesian 
labour overseas. These continued in the 1980s and it was in this period that Indonesia for the 
first time dispatched labour to Saudi Arabia. 
To explain the pattern of overseas labour migration in the 1970s and 1980s it should be 
recognized that the policies made by the government of Indonesia were heavily influenced by 
the policies of other host countries. As described in Chapter 2, Indonesia adjusted its policies 
in sending its labour overseas based on the policies implemented by host foreign nations, 
particularly Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. Domestically the government considered migrant 
labour principally as crucial sources of external revenues (remittance incomes); and indeed 
Indonesia’s economic dependence on foreign countries was becoming most obvious and 
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pressing. The government of Indonesia adjusted its policies based on the dynamics of demand 
in foreign nations to ensure the outflow of labour migration would not be interrupted. Any such 
interruption would in turn create another series of problems domestically adding to the surplus 
of labour that were without jobs in the local economy.   
The degree to which Indonesia tried to influence the subsequent policies of foreign 
governments is evidenced in the 1990s. By then Indonesian labour was greatly affected by 
Malaysia’s regularization policy. Because of this policy, many Indonesian workers were 
repatriated. Indonesia was also embracing the era of democratisation from 1998 after being hit 
by a crisis that brought the fall of authoritarian regime Suharto. From this point of time, more 
particularly from 1999 when the former human rights activist Abdurrahman Wahid became 
President, Indonesia experienced an open political system where there emerged influential civil 
society actors and groups that could legally advocate for preferred outcomes and demonstrate 
their criticisms without fear or reprisal. The liberalization that came with democratisation, 
combined with the sympathetic Wahid presidency, were hugely important factors that created 
the pre-conditions for the emergence of policy entrepreneurs seeking policy change in 
Indonesia’s responsibilities to its overseas workers. 
Hence, from 1998-99 the crucial change that reoriented the policy domain was the rise 
of influential NGOs based in the civil society who campaigned for better conditions for migrant 
workers.  Nonetheless, this embryonic activism on its own by NGOs was necessary but not 
sufficient to effect further substantial changes. The salience of the issue of migrant worker 
protection had to be underscored through external tragedies and specific crises. This was 
evidenced when we turn to explain the policy changes in the period of the 2000s especially 
under the Megawati government.      
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7.3 Protection Policy was More Symbolism than the Actual Protection  
The pattern of labour migration policies shifted slightly in the 2000s particularly after 
Megawati became president in 2001. Unlike Wahid who had a keen interest in human rights 
issues, Megawati seemed noticeably less interested in these matters. Special attention was 
directed in this thesis to the Nunukan humanitarian crisis as more than 70 Indonesian migrant 
workers died. This Nunukan crisis resulted in the deportation of almost 400,000 Indonesian 
workers from Malaysia. This crisis then drove Indonesian NGOs to push the Megawati 
government to act more urgently in enhancing the protection of Indonesian migrant labour, a 
push that resulted in the enactment of Law No. 39 of 2004 on the protection of labour as well 
as the signing of the CMW in 2004. 
 Both the enactment of the Law No. 39 as well as the signing of CMW did not 
necessarily demonstrate that Megawati cared personally about migrant labour but was mostly 
due to the influential roles played by the NGOs, who can be regarded as the policy 
entrepreneurs in their early initiatives. The enactment of the law, for example, was viewed by 
scholars and activists as falling short of providing protection for Indonesian migrant labour. 
The main reason for this was that out of the 109 clauses stipulated in the law, only 9 deal with 
protection. 
With hindsight Megawati actions could be regarded more as symbolic acts than a 
substantive or comprehensive policy for migrant labour protection. What may explain to this 
assessment may relate to her personality and personal style.  As mentioned earlier, Megawati 
was less interested in human rights issues, let alone in the protection of Indonesian migrant 
labour. Even though she often claimed herself to be representing ‘wong cilik’ (literally means 
‘little person’ or low class people in Indonesian society), in reality it was difficult to establish 
prove that she was actually close to such people, including migrant workers. When Megawati 
and her administration enacted the Law No. 39 as well as signed the CMW in 2004, these acts 
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were merely attempts to show the public that they cared. In short, it was more symbolism rather 
than the actual protection itself. Megawati’s stance also indicates that particular foreign policy 
positions were often determined by key individuals in the decision-making process. This 
affirms the argument put forward in Chapter 1 particularly in regard to the Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA) theory, a theory that emphasizes on the role of individuals in foreign policy 
decision-making.  
 
7.4 When the Policy Entrepreneurs Fully Seized the Policy Initiative  
President SBY replaced Megawati in 2004. The SBY government made numerous notable 
foreign policy decisions. The first policy was the Presidential Instruction No. 6 of 2006 on 
Reforming the System of Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers. This 
instruction put in place a number of important measures to protect Indonesians working 
overseas as well as mandating the establishment of BNP2TKI.  
Another policy was made in 2006, which was a MoU with Malaysia concerning the 
recruitment and placement of Indonesian domestic labour. This MoU was, however, still 
regarded as providing only limited labour protection and therefore received wide criticism, 
particularly from NGOs. In 2009 the administration announced further policy change by 
unilaterally imposing a moratorium on the sending of domestic labour to Malaysia due to many 
well-publicised cases of abuse. The moratorium forced Indonesia and Malaysia to revise the 
2006 MoU and the two countries finally agreed a Protocol in 2011 amending the MoU. Another 
policy made was a moratorium on sending workers to Saudi Arabia after the beheading of 
Ruyati binti Satubi. 
President SBY, who was reported to have paid serious attention to the issue of migrant 
labour protection, opened up more windows for policy entrepreneurs to play advocacy roles 
actively. It is one of the reasons that, under the SBY government, the policy entrepreneurs on 
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labour migration grew more solid. Encouraged by the emerging democratization of society, the 
policy entrepreneurs now had more scope and capacity to carry out their advocacy which 
culminated in the rising momentum generated to push Indonesia to ratify the CMW in 2012. 
Indonesia’s ratification of the CMW in 2012 was a substantial policy change that, 
theoretically, would force the country to implement more rights protection of migrant labour. 
One obvious fact arising from the CMW ratification was that Indonesian policy entrepreneurs 
had contributed much to the processes, a central theme that this thesis examined. 
Under the SBY government, the policy entrepreneurs seized the initiatives that resulted 
in several notable agreements and more particularly the ratification of Indonesia to the CMW. 
There are at least two factors that explain why the policy entrepreneurs in this period seized 
the initiative: an accommodative president and a conducive socio-political environment. 
Borrowing Kingdon (2003), these two factors were the ‘open windows’ that enabled the policy 
entrepreneurs to seize the opportunities.  
As explored in Chapter 3, President SBY as an accommodative president had a keen 
interest in the issue of migrant labour. He paid significant personal attention to a number of 
high-profile cases affecting migrant labour and which later led to policy responses directly 
affected by such cases. These circumstances brought more room for the policy entrepreneurs 
to effect policy change, particularly by influencing the government on what they should do 
toward the issue of migrant labour protection. 
On the factor of conducive socio-political environment, the SBY government 
encouraged the growing liberalization and democratization of civil society as Indonesia 
embraced a reform era from the year 1998 onwards. Starting with the Wahid government, the 
democratisation further flourished in the era of SBY government. This came as a bigger 
opportunity for the policy entrepreneurs as they could play more roles through their activism 
and later influence the policy-making process.  
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These two factors existed for a relatively long period as SBY presided Indonesia for ten 
years. These made the policy advocacy rooms for the policy entrepreneurs were wide open. 
These also made possible for the policy entrepreneurs seize the initiatives for policy changes. 
 
7.5 Increased Collaboration to Intensify the Pressure for Change 
Chapter 5 examines the CMW by addressing several questions: What factors drove the 
emergence of the convention? What international events contributed to its making? Why did it 
take as long as ten years to negotiate? Why was there no ratification in the early years after 
adoption? These questions will help explain the patterns of decision taken, particularly on how 
the policy entrepreneurs at the international, regional, and national levels, increase their 
collaboration for the purpose of intensifying the pressure for change. 
Concerning the question why there was no initial ratification in the early years after its 
adoption, studies show that there was a lack of promotion, awareness, and understanding of the 
CMW in many UN member countries. There was also a lack of human resources in 
governmental bodies, and combined interests of recruitment agencies, employers, and 
government officials who were not in favour of the granting of migrant worker rights. These 
problems were made more difficult due to immigration policies, political systems and 
perceptions of human rights in migrant receiving countries. 
The above situation brought impetus to international and regional civil society actors, 
mainly NGOs, to carry out more active campaigns. Thus, from the early to mid-1990s, NGOs 
mobilized awareness training programs and a campaign for global ratification. They also called 
on other regional NGOs to join their activism. The international and regional NGOs continued 
their campaigns and continue to be active at world conferences and summits. Despite all 
challenges they faced, their contributions were considered an important element in the 
ratification of the CMW. The campaigns bore fruit when there was a significant increase in 
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ratifications, from only 12 in the 1990s to almost 50 by 2015. Indonesia’s ratification of the 
CMW was indeed the result of NGOs’ activism. In brief the policy entrepreneurs had played a 
crucial role in shifting Indonesia’s foreign policy, from non-ratification to ratification. 
The above narrative helps explain the processes through which important decisions 
concerning the CMW were taken. There was an incremental process which increased the 
awareness of the main NGOs about the need to increase collaboration to intensify pressure for 
change. They realized concerted effort was required to affect policy changes. What may explain 
the sometimes long duration needed to make policy changes in many countries can be traced 
back to the challenges faced by several actors, particularly the NGOs and the governments. For 
the governments, the obvious reason for a reluctance to act was mainly the lack of awareness 
on the importance of the CMW. As for the NGOs, the main challenges they faced were the 
resources and persistence in doing their activism particularly at international level. The strategy 
of NGOs, be they at international, regional and national level to increase collaboration and later 
intensify pressure eventually brought a relative success, particularly in increasing the number 
of ratifying countries to the CMW. 
 
7.6 Future Challenge: the Need to Move from Awareness-Making and Symbolic 
Policy Pronouncements to Effective Implementation and Enforcement 
In general, the thesis has demonstrated that Indonesian policy entrepreneurs achieved their 
goals in improving policy protection for migrant workers. The thesis, for example, has shown 
that the policy entrepreneurs had strong ideas or views on the importance of ratification for 
Indonesia. The work of the policy entrepreneurs – the substantive advocacy, demonstrative 
campaigns, and lobbying – were carried out through a coalition called ARRAK 90 that brought 
to a success in Indonesia’s ratification to the CMW. 
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The policy entrepreneurs believe that there were two factors that provided important 
bases for them to succeed:  coalition and persistence. I demonstrated this belief in Chapter 6. 
The policy entrepreneurs believe that the emergence of ARRAK 90 in 2009 significantly 
transformed their work. Through this flourishing coalition, all policy entrepreneurs undertook 
continuous activities in terms of substantive advocacy, demonstrative campaigns, and 
lobbying. The policy entrepreneurs also believe that what they did and how they did it 
demonstrates persistence. All these factors, particularly coalition building and persistence, 
answer the primary question of this thesis: how and why policy entrepreneurs were successful 
in promoting their policy proposals. The thesis has demonstrated that the analysis of foreign 
policy can benefit from utilizing the concept of policy entrepreneurs. 
Nonetheless, one may wonder on what and how would be the future policy trajectories 
in the coming years or decades after Indonesia’s ratification to the CMW? Has not the Jokowi 
government treated the ratification as important as the SBY government did? Does it show that 
the policy entrepreneurs still need to do more entrepreneurship particularly in terms of 
implementation and enforcement of the already ratified CMW? 
What may explain to this situation is that the policy entrepreneurs in general were still 
focused on policy formulation, addressing mainly the lack of awareness. Yet it is 
understandable with the following reasons: first, Indonesia’s democratisation is still relatively 
young; second, the policies of Indonesia’s governments still depend heavily on who leads the 
country. In other words, the civil society still needs to empower themselves so that they can 
play more significant roles in many aspects of the country; third, challenges in the form of 
combined interests of industries and other government officials may remain the same.   
Therefore, the future challenges of the policy entrepreneurs will be on how to make the 
CMW and other relevant policies to be more effective in their implementation. What the policy 
entrepreneurs need to do next is reorienting their activism, from awareness-making to 
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enforcement. It would be interesting how Indonesia will implement and enforce the CMW and 
other related laws in the next five to ten years after from the 2016 onwards. This can be other 
topics for future research. 
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Appendix 
List of Interview Questions 
 
 
1. Why do you think this case is important for Indonesia? 
2. What were the policy proposals which you were making in regard to the ratification of 
CMW? Did they include alternatives to the existing policy frameworks? Did they consist 
of normative principles or orient to values and was sufficient explanatory information 
included? 
3. What specific work had you undertaken in promoting your policy proposals? 
4. Did you make full use of your resources – time, energy, reputation, money – in promoting 
the ideas/proposals? 
5. Did you lobby your political connections/the legislature/key governmental decision makers 
in order to secure adoption of/hearing for your policy proposals? 
6. Why do you think you have been successful in promoting this policy? Can you identify 
other policy entrepreneurs who have helped to secure adoption of the policy proposals? 
7. What were your motivations in promoting such policy proposals? 
8. Is there any further information that you think is relevant to this study? 
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